

- (2) That notwithstanding the open preaching of Republicanism and secret recruiting to the I.R.B., the vast majority of the Irish people became and remained, in 1914 and later, denationalised to an alarming extent.
- (3) That such "open appeals made to the masses" in favour of absolute independence were either greeted with derision or fell on deaf ears.
- (4) That the mass of the people had lost its aspirations for *national independence*. Talk of "a rising wave of revolt" prior to Easter 1916 is so much extravagant nonsense.
- (5) That the "physical force" (I.R.B.) ideal of '67 had become submerged to such an extent (1900-1916) through the policy and teaching of the Parliamentary Party and through the influence of the Church—as well as by the failure of previous revolutionary endeavours—that efforts to locate a possible recruit for the I.R.B. were like "looking for a needle in a haystack";
- (6) That, as a result, the membership of the I.R.B. in Ireland did not exceed 2,000 in 1916;
- (7) That talk about an "*Open Appeal*" to prepare for a "*Rising*" under such circumstances was arrant nonsense;
- (8) That the British Government, if face to face with such an appeal for a Rising, would not need, nor would it await, the revelation of any "military plans" for such proposed Rising. True to its immemorial policy, the British Government would have pounced on any organisation identified with such an appeal, if such organisation were deemed capable of carrying its plans into operation. Had the Irish Volunteers *openly* advocated a Rising in 1914, 1913 or 1916, there cannot be the least possible doubt of the result. There would have been no "Easter Week."
- (9) That neither the Irish Volunteers (as such), nor the Irish Citizen Army (from a *national* standpoint) could be said to be a revolutionary body in 1914.

The fact that the I.R.B. had a secret revolutionary concept for the Volunteers, or that Connolly had a similar concept at the end of 1914 for the I.C.A., does not disprove the foregoing assertion. The I.R.B. leaders were not so blind to hard facts and the lesson of experience as to expose its purpose to the British Government. An open appeal to the people at large to participate in a Rising (before such Rising got started) would be barren

of results so far as the people were concerned, and to have given such information to the enemy would have proved disastrous. Furthermore, it would have (as is apparent from the events of Holy Week 1916) created a split in the Irish Volunteer organisation.

- (10) History proves that "secret conspiratorial talk" of the "little coterie"—the I.R.B. Supreme Council or the Military Council—was not futile. And, finally, when James Connolly's eyes were opened to facts of which he had been oblivious, *he joined this "little coterie" in its "secret conspiratorial talk."* When Connolly reached this stage and learned how far the "conspirators" had advanced their deep and nation-wide plans, I wonder what he must have thought of his own attitude prior thereto, and of how near he had come to destroying the possibility of a worthwhile Rising?

See *Labour and Easter Week* (1949), p. 10. In January 1916 "*Connolly immediately joined the I.R.B. and became a member of the Military Council.*"

P. 88. (Memo) *Parnell Anniversary Commemoration. Oct. 1914.*

"The Citizen Army men were armed with Howth rifles but there was no ammunition."

Comment:

How many rifles?

P. 88. (Memo). I.V. Convention, Oct. 25th, 1914.

Demonstration—Stephen's Green—same day by the Irish Volunteers. The Citizen Army participated.

"It was soon revealed that the Irish Volunteers in shedding the Redmond section had lost the bulk of their members in the country, but had retained those who were most militant.

Their temper was now nearer to that of Connolly and the Citizen Army."

Comment:

Of course, Fox would not admit fact No. 1: that the Irish Volunteers who refused to go over to Redmond (which included the large and very important I.R.B. element) were now more in consonance with the standard which the I.R.B. leaders sought to effect in the Volunteers since the inception of the latter, nor would he admit that the break with Redmond was effected by the I.R.B. Or, is it that he just did not know the facts?

P. 90. *Comment:*

Fox has discovered the existence of a "scout" movement initiated

by Michael Mallin (no date given and no policy mentioned for *these* scouts) but we get the usual type of claim :

- P. 90. "This scout movement *was the forerunner of Fianna Eireann formed by Madame Markievicz a little later.*"

Comment :

The Fianna Eireann established by Madame Markievicz in 1909—with the assistance of Bulmer Hobson and other I.R.B. men—was both a national and militant organisation. I venture to say there was no analogy between it and Mallin's "Scouts." If Madame M's organisation can be said to have a "forerunner" in practice established in 1902¹ in Belfast by Bulmer Hobson, its forerunner was "Fianna Eireann."

Query :

What is known of Mallin's national proclivities back in 1909 and earlier ?

What contacts did he have, if any, with Madame Markievicz between say 1909 and 1913 ? Mallin had been, I believe, a British soldier and mighty few ex-soldiers would touch any kind of *national* movement prior to the establishment of the Irish Volunteers in 1913.

The fact that Mallin and Madame M. were both connected with the I.C.A. 1913 and commanded the I.C.A. contingent at Stephen's Green in the 1916 Rising proves nothing so far as 1909 is concerned.

That Michael Mallin proved himself a splendid *fighting* man and a thorough Republican in 1916, I am proud to assert and acknowledge. The fact that I question his standing in 1909 is forced on me by Fox's tactics.

- P. 94. *Monteith's deportation from Dublin ordered (Nov. 1914) by the British.*

Excerpt :

"Connolly's decision." "If I had the handling of this matter, I would put you in a position in Dublin, turn out every Volunteer in the city and say to the Government : 'Now come and take him.'"

Comment :

Yes, and "the Government" would take him—incidentally smashing the Irish national militant movement.

And to *what purpose* ? Would the inevitable fight be deemed as one for the establishment of AN IRISH REPUBLIC ?

By citing this Monteith incident, Fox evidently convinced himself that he was boosting Connolly's decisiveness and fighting spirit. Instead, he has done Connolly a disservice by taking from his stature as a responsible leader.

Fox also was evidently unaware in 1943 that through the "secret

¹ The *Sunday Press*, 23rd April, 1950.

conspiracy," etc., of Tom Clarke and Diarmuid Lynch (August, 1915) the I.R.B. sent Monteith to Germany to help Casement. Even if he were aware of it, I presume he would not mention it.

- P. 97. "Attack on Dublin Castle." (October 1915).

I have commented on this elsewhere.

- P. 101. "Opposition to Citizen Army association with the Hall and the Union."

- P. 102. This opposition "was always there and was rooted in the feeling that it was not judicious or advisable for the union to be closely identified with a militant, armed and revolutionary body."

Comment :

The Citizen Army had by September 1915 developed into a body as just described. But what of the Union officials ?

Fox mentions another instance of such opposition and states : "This was by no means the end of attempts to separate the Citizen Army and the Union and its headquarters." (See correspondence in the Irish Press, May 1946, between Frank Robbins and R. M. Fox.)

- P. 103. "On 24th July, 1913, under the heading 'Street Fighting,' Connolly gave a résumé of lessons in recent articles . . . He proceeded openly to instruct his readers in general, and Citizen Army men in particular, concerning the technicalities of armed revolt."

Comment :

Here it may be asked : do not these instructions by Connolly, and the fact that the British took no steps to interfere with the Citizen Army, disprove my contention in Comment (8) on page 68 hereof ? It would be of interest to know exactly what Dublin Castle's reasons were. My surmise is :

- (a) The Citizen Army was founded in 1913 as a purely protective force for the strikers ; it had no national revolutionary background ; in 1915-16 it numbered only a couple of hundred men with Headquarters at Liberty Hall.
- (b) To strike at it may arouse the thousands of Irish Volunteers enrolled in the various battalions in Dublin which had their several headquarters, were better armed (July, 1915) than the I.C.A. men ; and, in addition, the other I.V. Battalions in Cork, Kerry, Limerick, Wexford, Tipperary, Galway and throughout the country.
- (c) The war was going badly for the British and they wanted more Irishmen to "join up" and they feared to arouse the latent national spirit of the people.

- (d) They also feared the effect in America at a time when they were exerting every effort to influence the U.S. to side with them against Germany.
- (e) Then, too, they evidently were satisfied that there was no likelihood that the Volunteers would start a "Revolution"; the I.V. declared policy they deemed "safe" and they knew that MacNeill and other men high in the Councils of the Volunteers were not "extremists."
- (f) The British had no idea whatever of the outlook and influence of the secret I.R.B. with respect to the Volunteers.
- (g) They had *not the remotest idea* of the possibility that the Volunteers and the I.C.A. would one day coalesce in starting a *Revolution*.

Had the Volunteers (or their leaders, I.R.B. or non-I.R.B.) talked openly of armed revolt, street fighting, etc., the situation would in all probability have been very different—the British would unquestionably have struck and struck hard. By a sudden swoop, backed by overwhelming military force, they could have arrested all the leading men, not merely of the Volunteers but of the I.C.A. and other nationally-minded organisations. That this could not be effected without casualties is true, but the effect on the people at large (who were supporters of Redmond) might have been very slight *at that pre-Easter stage*. (July 1915.)

Instead of OPEN reference to armed REVOLT by the I.R.B. they planned SECRETLY to make REVOLT a practical undertaking. References to the ultimate purpose planned for the Volunteers were necessarily *cloaked in guarded language*. Listen to Pearse in New York, 2nd March, 1914: "To-day Ireland is once more learning the noble trade of arms. There is again in Ireland the murmur of a marching, and talk of *guns and tactics*." The Clan-na-Gael in America knew what the "guns and tactics" were for, viz., armed REVOLT, and to *this end the Clan* subscribed tens of thousands of pounds.

Other remarks by Pearse, similarly cloaked, could be cited.¹ He and the I.R.B. leaders of the Insurrectionary Movement aimed at the goal of an independent Irish Republic and laid extensive plans for the Rising to achieve it; they in their wisdom left Britain in the dark regarding the use to which the "guns and tactics" were to be put.

- P. 120. Dealing with Connolly's "disappearance" on 19th January, 1916, and the interview or interviews which members of the Military Council

¹ See Appendix II for Diarmuid Lynch's comments on Pearse's remarks on 6th February, 1916—Editor.

had with him while detained (MacDonagh is mentioned by Fox as one of three who conducted the interviews but he was not then a member of the M.C.), Mr. Fox states:

"They were in a position to inform him that Easter Sunday had been fixed provisionally as the date for action."

Comment:

I had earlier—in January, 1916—personal knowledge which bears out my contention (set forth elsewhere) that the Military Council by the end of 1915 had already decided *definitely* that the Insurrection would commence at Easter time, 1916. Good Friday seems to have been the original date. (See my remarks on extract from page 235 of *Green Banners*.)

He (Fox) admits that:

- P. 120. "What actually happened during these discussions is not known, as neither Connolly nor the others ever divulged the details."

Comment:

William O'Brien (Connolly's colleague) gave me confirmation in Richmond Barracks, 1916—after the surrender—on this point regarding Connolly's attitude after release, viz., that he refused to discuss any aspect of his "disappearance."

- P. 121. "It had been agreed earlier that if Connolly were taken, the Citizen Army would fight at once. . . Mallin also appeared before the Military Council of the Volunteers (*sic.*) to demand Connolly's release."

Comment:

In the Irish Volunteer organisation there was no body named the Military Council.

"The Military Council" was an I.R.B. institution founded by the Executive of the Supreme Council.

At the date of Connolly's detention neither he nor Mallin knew of its existence. But I presume Mallin did interview Pearse or MacDiarmada whose connection with the Volunteers was publicly known.

- P. 123. "The Citizen Army mustered (at the Rossa funeral) (1st August, 1915) to the number of 400 to 500. *Every Citizen Army man carried a Gun.*"

Comment:

Here I am satisfied we have an exaggeration. Else how came it that only 200 fought in the Rising, notwithstanding all the boasting about the intense Republican spirit which Connolly is said to have instilled into the I.C.A.?

- P. 124. "The hoisting of the *Green Flag* under Citizen Army auspices at Liberty Hall on Sunday, 16th April."

Comment :

This incident is also detailed in *Green Banners*. It is difficult to understand why so much has been made of it, and why the hoisting of this *Green Flag* involved such "grave and earnest deliberation" by the Council of the Citizen Army. It is also hard to understand why the majority of the Executive of the Transport Union formally opposed the hoisting of the *Green Flag*. Had their objection been against the hoisting of the *Republican Tricolour* their attitude would be easily understood, but all the fuss about hoisting the *Green Flag* is incomprehensible.

P.S. O'Casey, p. 56 of *The Story of the Irish Citizen Army*, states that the flag hoisted on this occasion was "the Irish Tricolour of Orange, Green and White"—which was *not* the fact.

Shortly after the foregoing paragraph was written, letters appeared in the *Irish Press* relative to orders issued by Pearse to the Irish Volunteers directing them to display in their parades the old *Green Flag* (with harp) as "the National Flag."

I shall show elsewhere (in a statement to the Bureau of Military History) that such use of the old *Green Flag* as the *National Flag* was camouflage—to divert attention from the I.R.B. determination that the Irish Volunteers should participate in the proposed Insurrection through which it was hoped to achieve the permanent establishment of the Irish Republic.

(Query: Was Connolly cognisant of the idea underlying Pearse's flag orders to the Irish Volunteers, and was it for similar camouflage with respect to the I.C.A. that Connolly hoisted the old *Green Flag* on Liberty Hall, Palm Sunday, 1916?)

The opposition to the hoisting of the *Green Flag* on Liberty Hall gave rise to a very extraordinary incident. According to Mr. Fox, Connolly threatened to resign his position and issue a statement cancelling the ceremony. . . . The majority of the Committee (i.e. the T.U. Executive) was still opposed, so he *asked permission to speak to John Farrell, one of his strongest opponents, in private.* They went into an adjoining room and here Connolly took Farrell into his confidence explaining that an insurrection was to take place.

The date on which this alleged interview took place was Thursday, 13th April—ten days before the date set for the Rising—a date which was the secret of the Military Council. Pearse did not expose this secret to Eamon de Valera, Commandant of one of the Dublin Battalions, I.V., until Wednesday, 19th April. Also, it was only on this latter date that Sean MacDiarmada officially informed me that the Rising was to start on Easter Sunday. Thus did the I.R.B. members of the Military Council guard zealously their important secret. In contrast, we find



V. The interior of the G.P.O., 1916.
Reproduced from an imaginative painting by Walter Paget.
Courtesy, The National Museum.

In order to prevent the further slaughter of Dublin citizens, and in the hope of saving the lives of our followers now surrounded and hopelessly outnumbered, the members of the Provisional Government present at Headquarters have agreed to an unconditional surrender, and the Commandants of the various districts in the City and Country will order their commands to lay down arms.

B. H. Keane

29th April 1916
3.45 p.m.


I agree to these conditions for the men only under my own command in the Moore Street District and for the men in the Stephen's Green Command.

James Connolly
April 29/16


In consultation with Commandant Keane and other officers have decided to accede to unconditional surrender.

James Keane

VI. The Surrender Order.
Courtesy. The National Museum.



VII. President de Valera receiving one of the Rolls of Honour from Diarmuid Lynch, 21st April, 1935.
Courtesy. Irish Press and National Museum.



VIII. (Standing, left to right) Harry Boland, Liam Mellows, Eamon de Valera, Dr. Patrick McCartan, Diarmuid Lynch
(Seated) John Devoy.

"MEN ON THE LEFT OF THE OLD WALTON HOTEL, N.Y. JUNE 1919 ON THE OCCASION OF A RECEPTION FOR DEVALERA BY STAN. M. NEWMAN. MELLONS IS THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT'S SLOW MARCH LETTER, MAY 10, 1938, NIS 31405 (1) NATIONAL LIBRARY OF IRELAND."

James Connolly (according to R. M. Fox) confiding it ten days in advance of Easter Sunday to a man who opposed the hoisting of even the Green Flag on Liberty Hall.

From the few contacts I had with James Connolly prior to the start of the Rising, I had formed the opinion that he was as discreet, and as capable of keeping secret things that should be kept secret, as Clarke, MacDiarmada, Pearse, etc. I have argued thus over the years on his behalf. My personal regard for him was so high that I would not accept as true assertions that he had confided to "this one, that one and the other one" weeks prior to Easter Sunday, the secret that this date had actually been set up for a RISING. What am I to think now—in face of this alleged Farrell incident :

Postscript January 1948.

On another phase of this important matter—the approximate date on which *Commandants* of the Irish Volunteer Battalions in the provinces were informed that the Rising was planned for Easter time, 1916, may be cited.

It was, of course, essential that *such Commandants* should receive advance information that a Rising was contemplated in the immediate future—to enable them to perfect *their* respective plans.

Apropos of this, I read in the *Enniscorthy Echo* of 23rd April, 1930, that in the "Athenaeum," Enniscorthy, in March, 1916,

"Pearse informed the *responsible officers* on this occasion that the date of the Rising was only 'a matter of weeks,' and a code was arranged for the transmission of the order."

"On *Holy Thursday* the order arrived."

In *Kerry's Fighting Story*, A. Cotton makes what is, in my opinion, a very serious error, viz., that Austin Stack and himself visited Pearse in the Fall of 1915 and that Pearse informed them that "a Rising had been planned for Easter, 1916."

There is no evidence that I know of that the Military Council had prior to *Christmas*, 1915, selected Easter time, 1916, as the date of the Rising, or had issued any instructions respecting the positions to be occupied by the Kerry, Cork and Limerick Battalions at the time set for the Easter "Manoeuvres."

Had Pearse given these last mentioned instructions to Austin Stack, the Commandant of the Kerry Battalion, prior to January 1916, he would not have included the Kerry Commandant among those to whom I was to convey such instructions in January.

Furthermore, Cotton's reference to other important matters which, definitely, were not decided on until the early months of 1916 prove

conclusively that Pearse could not "in the Fall of 1915" have given such information.

Finally, there is abundant evidence to show that Pearse was extremely careful not to expose the Easter Sunday date to anyone unnecessarily far in advance.

Chapter entitled *Final Plans*.

Chapter entitled *The Fight Begins*.

These chapters contain a series of inaccuracies and exaggerations. I have annotated the pages and will now confine myself to noting a few and commenting on a few others :

- P. 138. "Early on Sunday morning Connolly got word that something was wrong (MacNeill's final cancellation of mobilization orders for Easter Sunday. D.L.) . . . at once he sent . . . messengers to the other members of the Military Council with the request that they come immediately to Liberty Hall. . . Now he exerted himself to *save the Rising*."

Comment :

That Connolly took this step to get such a meeting is a fact. This is confirmed by his message to Ceannt, published in Le Roux's *Life of Tom Clarke* (p. 206), which Le Roux states was received by Ceannt between 6 and 7 a.m.

"MacDonagh and I agree that we have a conference immediately."

But MacDonagh's visit to Connolly very early, Sunday morning, was in accordance with the decision reached Saturday night (between midnight and 2 a.m.) (subsequent to receipt of information that MacNeill, earlier that night, had despatched couriers to the country Commandants with orders cancelling all "parades" on Easter Sunday) at the Conference held at 27 Hardwicke Street between MacDiarmada, Pearse, MacDonagh, Plunkett and myself, viz., that all seven members of the Military Council should meet at Liberty Hall next morning (Sunday) to consider the new situation and "save the Rising."

While that meeting of the Military Council (Sunday, 9 a.m. to 1 p.m.) was in session, Liberty Hall could truly be said to be "the heart of the revolt" (p. 138). The application of this term to Liberty Hall as on any previous date would be an exaggeration.

- P. 138. "The decision of the Council (the main and final decision, D.L.) was that . . . the Rising should be postponed until Easter Monday at noon."

Comment :

When the meeting of the Military Council adjourned at 1 p.m.

Easter Sunday, an all important element in the situation was that "Dublin Castle" should remain in blissful ignorance of the arrangement for Monday and remain convinced that MacNeill's cancellation of the Sunday "parades" (published in the *Sunday Independent*) had removed all chances of immediate trouble. Otherwise, the plan of the Military Council to occupy the G.P.O., Four Courts, Jacob's Factory, South Dublin Union, Boland's Mills, etc., might have been made difficult, if not impossible. It was important that MacNeill should remain under a similar impression. I have dealt with this elsewhere.

- P. 139. Yet, Mr. Fox tells us that :

"At about 4 p.m. (Sunday) the Citizen Army set out . . . each man was fully equipped for the fight. They marched . . . to Dublin Castle—all through the centre of the city. . .

"If there had been any interference by police or soldiers, *they were ready to attack the Castle and start the Fight.*"

Comment :

It seems scarcely credible that the I.C.A. and its leaders would have acted in such an irresponsible manner.

- P. 141. "When the fate of the arms ship was known, it was quite evident that the rebels would have to rely on their own resources. *Connolly had always believed that they should do this.*"

Comment :

Connolly had known nothing about the arms coming from Germany until he was co-opted a member of the Military Council on or about 21st January, 1916. When he got this information, *did he still believe (prior to Easter Saturday) that the rebels should rely on their own resources or await an extra 20,000 rifles and a million rounds of ammunition?* Obviously not !

All all events, it is an historical fact that the Irish Volunteers from the date of their inception (with the secret assistance of the I.R.B.) never missed any opportunity to arm themselves (irrespective of the shipload from Germany) and their activities in this respect antedated the efforts of the I.C.A. to procure arms.

- P. 149. "There was never any question of taking the Castle. The forces available were too small for the Castle to have been taken and held."

Comment :

It is evident to me that Commandant Connolly (on Easter Monday at any rate) did not intend that Sean Connolly should attempt to take and hold the Castle. Otherwise, he would surely have allotted him more men (which could have been spared) than the 25 I.C.A. men Sean

Connolly had. But the fact that Sean Connolly did attack the guard at the Upper Castle Yard entrance and did "take" the guard room, complicates the matter. And, against the latter, is the fact that as he advanced along Dame Street, he placed men in occupation of the "Henry and James" shop building—evidently for the purpose of preventing the British from coming out through the Lower Castle Yard gate; further, that he did not attack the guard at *this* entrance from Dame Street to the Castle.

As mentioned in my comment on this Dublin Castle phase (*Green Banners*, p. 249), it is obvious that Commandant Connolly was not aware of the fact that the total military guard in Dublin Castle consisted of only *six men*.

With respect to the foregoing, I place very little reliance in Connolly's alleged "last words" (p. 147) to the Dublin Castle contingent:

"*The Citizen Army will have the post of honour. Your detachment will attack.*" "*The others will be taking up defensive positions.*"

"*Open fire at the strike of the Angelus bell.*"

Comment:

Connolly, in my opinion, would have simply said, "*Open fire at 12 o'clock (noon).*"

But, if Thomas Kane did not just dream these alleged remarks of Connolly (to heighten the I.C.A. picture); if Connolly did issue instructions:

"*Your detachment will attack,*"

the question is, against what and whom was the attack to be made:

P. 172. *Comment:*

I have set out elsewhere how I was deputed by Sean MacDiarmada, early in April, to secure from Andy Fitzpatrick, Sean Byrne and Dick Mulcahy—and later from John Twamley and two King brothers—all details about those manholes (Telephone and Telegraph) throughout the city. "Keys" and sets of demolition tools were provided by these men under my instructions; they were distributed to the several Battalions on Good Friday. (The Details and Sketches had been handed in the first instance to Sean MacDiarmada on Monday of Holy Week). (Compare this with Fox's version on p. 172).

This whole idea about the demolition of the telephone and telegraph wires emanated from the Military Council—several weeks before the Rising.

P. 174. "*Without Connolly and the Citizen Army the Rising might never have taken place.*"

Comment:

This is a fitting finale to the extracts from R. M. Fox's book—except

in one particular. If Mr. Fox had proved all the claims he has made for Connolly and the I.C.A. one would expect to find the words "would not and could not" instead of the words "might never." The impartial verdict of history must be that, although Connolly's influence on the Rising was significant and important, many of the claims made in this book are not proven.

DIARMUID LYNCH.

The marginal notes on Diarmuid Lynch's copy of *The History of the Irish Citizen Army* are as follows:—

P. 138. "But on Sunday morning MacNeill—after some vacillation—had issued his order cancelling all Volunteer mobilisations arranged for that day."

Comment:

Confirmed or reiterated his order of Saturday night.

P. 138. "Connolly had always been opposed to what he regarded as the excessively conspiratorial note of the I.R.B. and to their plan of a dual leadership."

Comment:

He knew nothing of the I.R.B. "conspiratorial plan" until his detention in January, 1916.

P. 138. "At once he sent out girls as messengers to the other members of the Military Council with the request that they come immediately to Liberty Hall."

Comment:

This Sunday meeting had been decided on Saturday night at Hardwicke Street. The decision had been made at a Conference Saturday midnight between Pearse, MacDiarmada, MacDonagh, Plunkett and Diarmuid Lynch.

P. 138. "It was held under a strong guard of Citizen Army men."

Comment:

A number of Volunteers were there for the same purpose.

P. 139. "They were ready to attack the Castle and start the fight."

Comment:

Notwithstanding Connolly's arrangement as a member of the Military Council!! Seemingly they were so damn foolhardy that on little provocation they would mess up things even on Easter Sunday.

P. 140. Quoting the evidence of Major Price at the Commission of Enquiry, R. M. Fox writes:

"What they meant to do, he added, was to surround the place with about 1,000 soldiers and take all the leaders together."

Comment:

"All the leaders", i.e. the members of the Military Council, never met together in Liberty Hall until Easter Sunday morning.

- P. 141. "Monteith sent word by a Volunteer to MacNeill telling him the position and saying that if the Rising was contingent on German help it should go no further."

Comment:

Monteith himself did not know even on Sunday that the arms ship had been captured.

- P. 142. "She came to them at about 2 a.m. on Monday morning with Connolly's final instructions."

Comment:

Fox would have it that these final instructions were Connolly's though the slips of paper containing these instructions were written and signed by Pearse.

- P. 144. "Connolly told his men on the eve of the Rising that there was now no Citizen Army and no Irish Volunteers but only the Army of the Irish Republic."

Comment:

Did he—"on the eve of the Rising"?

- P. 144. "Under the command of McCormack the first section of Citizen Army men left Liberty Hall about 11.35 a.m. on Easter Monday morning. His instructions were to take possession of Harcourt Street railway station and other points of vantage in that area."

Comment:

Was he not told that hostilities were to begin at noon? Twenty-five minutes to reach Harcourt Street Station?

- P. 144. "Their instructions were to seize some of the buildings commanding the Castle. . ."

Comment:

On what authority is this statement made? If correct, why was attack made on entrance to upper Castle yard?

- P. 146. "Connolly had detailed to each officer his part in the general plan . . ."

Comment:

Perhaps—and perhaps not.

- P. 146. "He says that Connolly wished to use the Bank of Ireland as rebel headquarters instead of the G.P.O."

Comment:

What information had Captain McCormack on this? How could he have got any?

- P. 147. Referring to the orders in regard to Dublin Castle, Diarmuid Lynch comments:

Kane was one of the detachment for the *attack* on the Castle. If the orders were as stated on p. 144 the action of Sean Connolly's men would also fall into the *defensive* category.

- P. 148. "Yet here, within fifty yards of Dublin Castle, the I.C.A. were now busy pulling back hammers and bolts on weapons that were charged with death."

Comment:

As they marched towards the Castle!!

- P. 172. "A Citizen Army member—M. King—who worked in the Telephone Engineering Department, has given details of activities from Good Friday to Easter Monday, when plans for destroying the telephone system were being made."

Comment:

I'm pretty sure King was one of my men. Connolly had detailed information (and sketch) showing the exact position of each manhole in the G.P.O. area and the Castle telephone headquarters area since early in Holy Week—prepared by me from information supplied by Fitzpatrick, Mulcahy, etc. Sets of "Keys" and demolition tools were procured about ten days before the Rising and delivered to respective areas on Good Friday.

Fitzpatrick did not know that I handed over sketches, etc., to Sean MacDiarmada on Monday of Holy Week, nor of their subsequent disposition.

- P. 173. In quoting M. King, R. M. Fox refers to a "necklace of dynamite" to be used in the destruction of cables.

Diarmuid Lynch comments:

These necklaces were made up by Jim O'Neill and myself Easter Monday morning when I learned the number of men available was small, with the idea that gelignite would make a quicker job than saw and files. The manhole near the Castle was the one I had in mind.

CHAPTER VI

“GREEN BANNERS”

BY

R. M. FOX

Quotations from and comments thereon by DIARMUID LYNCH

- P. 10. The Proclamation.
“Promulgated on *Easter Sunday*, 23rd April, 1916, at *Liberty Hall*, Dublin.”
Comment:
How’s that for “History”? Two glaring errors right at the beginning of the book. The promulgation was from the *G.P.O.* on *Easter Monday*.
- P. 12. “When Liberty Hall . . . was shelled and the General Post Office . . . burnt out . . . then *Connolly’s* challenge rang round the world.”
Comment:
Was the challenge only that of Connolly? The challenge was that of the signers of the Proclamation—The Provisional Government of the Irish Republic.
- P. 13. “During the Rising the country had *seemed* apathetic.”
Comment:
The vast majority of the people was not merely apathetic but antagonistic—steeped as they were in Parliamentaryism.
- P. 13. “*Last* of the signatories was Sean MacDiarmada, Manager of the militant weekly, *Irish Freedom*.”
Comment:
While it is true that Sean had been Manager of *Irish Freedom* (1910-1914), it was *Nationality* he was Manager of in 1915-16.
- P. 14. “The Proclamation . . . was read out *on the steps of the G.P.O.* by Padraig Pearse.”
Comment:
There was but *one low* step. Other writers have also used the phrase “the steps of the G.P.O.”—evidently with the idea that the “steps” afforded an elevation from which to speak.

- Personally, I am unable to deny or affirm that Pearse read the Proclamation *at the entrance* (to the G.P.O.). I do know that he read the “Manifesto to the Citizens of Dublin” out in the centre of O’Connell Street.
- P. 39. “Hyde went to America in 1905-6 and lectured on the work of the League. *By this time* branches had been formed in American cities.”
Comment:
Several Irish-Language Societies had been established in New York 30 years before 1905 and at least nine had been in operation in New York State alone several years before Dr. Hyde’s visit.
- P. 55. *Davitt’s Land League Policy*.
“John Devoy, a prominent Irish American, carried his proposals through the Clan-na-Gael in America.”
Comment:
No mention is made by Fox of the meeting of the Supreme Council I.R.B. at Paris in 1878, which Devoy came from America to attend for the special purpose of getting the support of the S.C. for what became known as “The New Departure,” nor of Devoy’s success (on conditions) nor of the fact that the direct result of the agreement reached was that the weight of the *I.R.B.* in Ireland was thrown behind Davitt’s Land League and proved one of the main causes for the success of the League.
(See Devoy’s *Recollections* . . . pp. 314 & 344)
- P. 65. “He (Davitt) brought the small farmers into the national struggle. . . When they once realised that this . . . was that country which figured in the glowing periods of national politicians and the *perorations of the physical force men* then . . .”
Comment:
Here we have Fox’s first sneer (in *this* book) at the “physical force men.” He overlooks the fact, or it may be that he was unaware, that those same small farmers constituted a very large element in the *I.R.B.* of those days—these same “physical force men” who were the backbone of the Land League.
- P. 93. “He (Connolly) sought to build a bridge joining Sinn Fein with Labour. In 1916 *he* did succeed in effecting a junction between Labour and National forces, represented by the Citizen Army and the Irish Volunteers.”
Comment:
In 1916 “Sinn Fein,” as such, was non est. The “junction” between the Citizen Army and the Irish Volunteers was effected by the Military

Council of the I.R.B. through the arrest of Connolly in the first place, and then—based on his agreement to co-operate—by his co-option as a member of the Military Council.

- P. 94. "Finally Connolly insisted on the *leading* role to be played by the *working class* in the fight for national independence, summarising his case as follows :

"First——

"Second . . . only the Irish working class remain as the incorruptible inheritors of the fight for freedom in Ireland."

Comment :

Obviously, this latter assertion is far too sweeping. In the limited sphere to which the term "Irish Working Class" applied in the early years of this century (and before that) it is untenable. And, even since the "working classes"—as represented by Trade Unions—came to embrace practically all wage and salary earners—including school teachers—to claim that these classes alone are "the incorruptible inheritors of the fight for freedom in Ireland" is likewise untenable. And in 1916 it was ridiculous to claim a "leading role" for any particular class in the fight for national independence; the only effective forces available were the men and women then in training in the Volunteers, Citizen Army, Hibernian Rifles and Cumann na mBan.

- P. 96. "Connolly's distinctive contribution to the Irish Labour and National struggles. In Dublin he founded the Irish Socialist Republican Party, noteworthy,—as he proudly claimed in later years—for the fact that *it brought Republicanism out of an atmosphere of secrecy, of something to be whispered about in conspiratorial fashion and made it an issue for public debate and discussion.*"¹

¹ In a comment written in 1945 on Donagh MacDonagh's script of a radio talk on James Connolly, Diarmuid Lynch wrote :

That Connolly's ideas gradually developed beyond the purely socialistic and took on a more national turn (as the term was usually understood) is of course beyond question. I wonder to what extent this change was brought about by the fact that many of his colleagues in the Labour Movement were old members of the I.R.B.,—William O'Brien, P. T. Daly, Cathal O'Shannon, Seumas Hughes, etc. ?

We know that on occasions he was dissatisfied with what he deemed a disinclination to fight on the part of the Irish Volunteers. But surely he must have been aware that the published policy of the Volunteers was not a revolutionary one. And I could never understand why he did not discuss the point with Tom Clarke and Sean MacDiarmada of whose revolutionary aims he could not have been in doubt—even if he knew nothing about the existence of the I.R.B.

On the other hand, it is obvious that as the main purpose of the I.C.A. was an economic one, Clarke and his I.R.B. colleagues were justified in not confiding their insurrectionary plans to the impetuous leader of the I.C.A. prior to 1916.

Comment :

This is one of those exaggerated and foolish comments with respect to the working of the I.R.B. which mar this book. (Further comment on excerpt from p. 10 *History I.C.A.* See p. 58.)

- P. 97. "The Capitalist system, he maintained, was the most foreign thing in Ireland . . . but leaving aside 'might have beens,' this enabled him to mobilise national feeling on his side and to use the force of national tradition against what he thought was an evil thing."

Comment :

This reference is apparently to the years 1900–1902. What evidence exists for the big claim that he had mobilised National feeling on his side or gained any headway *through the force of National tradition* ?

The sole purpose for which the I.R.B. existed was the establishment of Ireland's national independence; its succession from the Fenians of 1867 was unbroken. While its aims were revolutionary its leaders were circumspect; they had learned the lessons of previous insurrectionary efforts.

Connolly was different. He had shown himself to be too impetuous. Take the Monteith incident in 1914. Here was a mere Captain and organiser of the Irish Volunteers who was dismissed from the post he held under the British Government, and served with a deportation order to leave Dublin immediately and not enter a "prohibited area." Connolly's reaction to this was: "If I had the handling of this matter, I'd put you in position in Dublin, turn out every Volunteer in the city and say to the Government, Now come and take him."

Had such a course been pursued—with Monteith in some one building, protected by the Volunteers and the I.C.A., and with an inevitable result—what label would the Irish people at home and abroad have attached to the fight? And under what heading would the British Government trumpet it to the world?

Could this effort to secure the right of one man to reside in Dublin be construed as a fight to achieve national independence? No, and there would have been no "Easter Week"!

Would not a similar result have ensued if his order to the Citizen Army to start an armed revolution by itself in the event that Connolly disappeared for more than a stated number of hours? And, as already mentioned, Connolly could at the end of 1915 have had no doubt about the insurrectionary aims of Clarke, Pearse, MacDiarmada, etc.!

Many writers since 1916 have sought to prove that incidents such as the foregoing prove that only for Connolly there would have been no Rising. They fail to follow up the possibilities and place them in their obvious perspective. They fail also to realise that such incidents when considered in conjunction with the now well-known background of fact, detract from rather than add to Connolly's stature as a national leader.

I admired Jim Connolly; I was proud to fight under his command; I was, I believe, the last of his men to say goodbye to him as he lay on his stretcher in the Upper Castle Yard after the surrender, Saturday, April 29th, 1916. His place in Ireland's Hall of Fame is secure; it will not be made more so by claiming credit for him solely which belongs in part, at the very least, to other men.

That Connolly found himself in comradeship eventually with the I.R.B. leaders, and that mutual confidence existed between them, is something of which all of us can be proud—as we are proud of the great contribution which Connolly made to the Rising and the national awakening of the people which followed.

- P. 131. "Out of the Dublin lock-out was born the Irish Citizen Army—a Labour force which was to co-operate with the Irish Volunteers in the 1916 Easter Rising. The idea may have sprung from Larkin's declaration that if Carson urged arming, they would arm too."

Comment :

That the I.C.A. sprung from the Dublin lock-out is, of course, a fact. But Fox, O'Casey and White give contradictory versions as to who actually initiated it. Its *one purpose was*—rightly and understandingly so—to *defend the strikers*. The numerous efforts of Fox and O'Casey to prove that it was also "National" and "Republican" in its early stages are ridiculous.

- P. 133. "Together with his enthusiasm for the freedom of Labour grew the ardour of Connolly's belief in National Independence."

- P. 133. "... so his mind—especially after the outbreak of war in 1914—turned increasingly towards Insurrection and to the shaping of the Citizen Army as a weapon which could be used to strike a decisive blow."

Comment :

This is correct. It was not until the Autumn of 1914 that Connolly developed towards Republicanism, as the term had always been used by the I.R.B., as applied to the Irish Nation.

- P. 160. "After Redmond had pledged Ireland's support to Britain in August, 1914 :

"Ulster was lost and had it not been for the Irish Volunteers, Ireland would have been lost too."

Comment :

For once, Mr. Fox is magnanimous !

- P. 163. "I believe the first public proposal for Irish Volunteers was made by me at Trinity College Gaelic Society' said Captain White."

Comment :

No date given for that meeting. (I doubt that the assertion will stand under investigation).

- P. 164. "Casement's telegram to Prof. Collingswood at Antient Concert Room meeting, urging formation of Irish Volunteers."
(No date given for meeting).

- P. 165. "White's own recollection in his book 'Misfit' is that his own appeal was first made at Croydon Park . . . 'It was at one of these Sunday meetings I first propounded the proposal of the Citizen Army.'"

- P. 166. "Captain White complained of the leaders (of Labour) taking the men away to Political meetings or cancelling parades without his

knowledge. He had one violent scene with Connolly. . . 'You're nothing but a big overgrown schoolboy,' said Connolly."

Comment :

Had a similar situation cropped up in the Irish Volunteers, Mr. Fox and his friends would doubtless have denounced the I.V. leaders as "afraid of military manoeuvres," etc.

- P. 166. "Larkin . . . drew the direct moral from Carson's successful defiance of the law . . . Connolly, a quieter man . . . would no doubt see the possibilities of a Citizen Army in connection with the Strike situation and the Labour Movement. Later he was to take hold of the Citizen Army and shape it as a National Instrument, an important factor in the Irish Rising."

- P. 170. "The Irish Volunteers, an organisation which was started about a month after the Citizen Army."

Comment :

Emphasis repeatedly laid by Fox, etc., that the I.C.A. antedated the I.V.s.

The I.C.A. at its inception and for long afterwards was a purely sectional body—without arms or ammunition.

The Irish Volunteers (initiated October 1913 and formally established 25th November, 1913) was a National organisation on the broadest lines—and for which the I.R.B. had secretly determined an "extreme" policy—as an instrument to bring about a "Rising."

- P. 171. "The Citizen Army rose directly and naturally out of the needs of the Strike situation. Connolly explained this in an article in the *Worker's Republic* for 29th May, 1915. He wrote : 'Three men had been killed and one young Irish girl murdered by a "scab," and nothing was done to bring the assassins to justice. So since justice did not exist for us . . . it was resolved to create our own Army to secure our own rights, to protect our members and to be a guarantee of our own free progress.'"

Comment :

Here we have a frank and truthful statement from Connolly himself. In it he knocks over the laboriously built up case of Fox, etc., that the I.C.A. had also a National and Republican complexion when founded in 1913 and thenceforward.

- P. 178. "The Constitution of the I.C.A. was ratified at a meeting held in Liberty Hall, 22nd March, 1914."

Comment :

See index p. 184 *Green Banners* (infra.)

Comment :

Sean O'Casey in *The Story of the Irish Citizen Army*¹ (1919) and R. M. Fox in *The History of the Irish Citizen Army* (1943) devote a lot of space to the "hostilities" between the Irish Volunteers and the I.C.A. but as they develop this theme it becomes crystal clear that this hostility was all on one side, viz. on that of the I.C.A. and that it was not alone ill-founded but censurable in the extreme.

- P. 178. "The *Irish Worker* announced in its next issue . . . *Let others who may, prate about 'The Rights and Liberties common to All Irishmen.'* We are out for the right to work, to eat and to live. . ."

Comment :

The Irish Volunteers (from whose declared objects the phrase "the rights and liberties common to all Irishmen" is taken) were the alleged "praters." This is but a mild whiff of the hostility referred to above. It has an O'Caseyesque touch about it. Tom Clarke in a letter to John Devoy dated 14th May, 1914, wrote: "Larkin's people for some time past have been making war on the Irish Volunteers. I think this is largely inspired by a disgruntled fellow named O'Casey." How right Tom Clarke was in this is borne out by O'Casey's *Story of the I.C.A.* Fox in *Green Banners* (1938) avoids stressing the "hostility" mentioned, but in his *History of the I.C.A.* (1943) he caught up with O'Casey on the point. On p. 179 of *Green Banners* Fox does admit that:

"Running through all there can be seen the rivalry with, or hostility to, the Irish Volunteers, which was to be a feature of Citizen Army activities for some time yet."

(Dates indefinite).

- P. 180. "Captain White and Countess Markievicz would have nothing to do with any anti-Irish-Volunteer campaign.

Comment :

I was not acquainted with White, but this broad national outlook was typical of "Madam's" republicanism (I.R.B. brand).

- P. 180. "Captain White offered that organisation two companies of uniformed and equipped men if the Volunteer Executive would allow them to remain an *Independent* though affiliated body."

Comment :

This offer was not alone unofficial, but, in view of the condition laid down, was ridiculous. It was, of course, rejected. See also comment on p. 71 *History of the I.C.A.*

¹ (This book bears the imprint "By P. O. Cathasaic." Fox on p. 164 of *Green Banners* gives the name of the author as "Sean O'Casey").

(The "equipment" of the I.C.A. (apart from uniform) at period referred to included just ONE RIFLE.)

- P. 180. "By June 1914 the Roll Book showed that the Citizen Army in the city and county of Dublin numbered 1,000 men."

Notes :

(Liam O'Briain on margin of his copy (which I had the loan of) notes that after the war started the membership of the I.T.G.W.U. was depleted by thousands of men who were British Reservists).

(Memo :? Strength of I.V.s in Dublin after Split?)

- P. 181. "There should be closer union between the workers and the Republican Movement, based on the recognition by the latter that the workers were the real force to be relied upon in any genuine struggle for a Republic."

Comment :

The term "the workers" is undefined. If "Liberty Hall" is meant, the assertion—if applied to 1913-1914—was laughable to those of us who were closely associated with "the Republican movement" (the I.R.B.)

The vast majority of the I.R.B. in Dublin comprised "workers" who were *not associated with* Liberty Hall: clerks, grocers' assistants, workers in the Post Office and other Government Departments, mechanics, etc., etc.

- P. 181. "THE PLOUGH AND THE STARS."

(Liam O'Briain says (in margin) that he never saw it. Well, it was flown from the Imperial Hotel on Wednesday of Easter Week—where the Tricolour had already been hoisted.)

- P. 184. "Dealing with the *theoretical* basis of the Citizen Army, *The Workers' Republic*, 30th October, 1914, spoke as follows:

'Its constitution pledged and still pledges its members for an *Irish Republic* and for the emancipation of labour . . . However it may be for others, for us of the Citizen Army there is but one ideal—an island ruled and owned by Irish men and women, sovereign and independent from the centre to the sea, and flying its own flag outward over all the oceans . . .

The Citizen Army will only co-operate in a forward movement. The moment that forward movement ceases it reserves to itself the right to step out of the alignment and advance by itself if needs be, in an effort to plant the banner of freedom one reach further towards its goal.'

(See extracts from Fox's *History of the I.C.A.* (pp. 85-86) and my comments on Connolly's aforesaid policy.)

(O'Casey quotes it on p. 14—*The Story of the Irish Citizen Army.*)

Comment :

The Constitution of the I.C.A. (the text of which Fox does not include in *Green Banners*) does *not* pledge its members to work for an *Irish Republic*. The fact that it did not do so probably accounts for the phrase "Theoretical basis" by Fox in his introduction to extract from *The Irish Worker*: just another instance of his finesse in the effort to prove the "Republicanism" of the I.C.A. in October 1914 and prior to that date.

- P. 184. "By urging unity of action, co-operation in a real forward movement, Connolly proved himself a true revolutionary and not merely a sectarian. He understood that the *advance guard* of a movement cannot, without disaster, cut itself away from other forces that will fight with it."

Liam O'Briain comments in margin: "What an assumption here: Without the I.V. and I.R.A. even Connolly would never have 'pulled off' an Easter Week."

This last sentence of L. O'B. is subject to comment by me, but for the moment I'll confine my comment to the above extract from R. M. Fox. The term "advance guard" (applied to the I.C.A., of course) is not merely an "assumption" but a piece of presumption—as offensive as it is ridiculous.

- P. 185. "Thus the whole quay is getting drilled and the Irish Citizen Army has a larger reserve of drilled men than any other force in Dublin. The great danger is that the (Labour) dispute may be over before the men are thoroughly drilled." (*The Workers' Republic*, 6th November, 1915.)

L. O'B. asks: "Where were they?"

If the statement quoted were true in November, 1915, where were they in April 1916? The muster of the I.C.A. Easter Monday had not suffered as the I.V.s had from MacNeill's cancellation of orders. The I.C.A., being an independent body, was not affected by MacNeill's actions.

Certainly the strength and influence of the I.C.A. never suffered for lack of exaggeration.

- P. 185. "The war situation was one which demanded, in his view, that the blow should be struck. To strike the blow required a complete mobilisation of Revolutionary Forces . . . Connolly's course was clear and, like the brave and resolute man that he was, he proceeded to take it. In every revolutionary situation the practical leader endeavours to mobilise all the possible forces of revolt. . . ."

Liam O'Briain comments:

"All this could be inverted. One could argue that the I.R.B. leaders, as far-seeing and practical revolutionaries, also sought to mobilise all possible sources of revolt—including the Workers' Republicanism of Liberty Hall."

D. L. Comment:

It is hard to be patient with this "Tail wagging the Dog" stuff. I do not question the honesty of Connolly's outlook *at the end of 1915*. Even so, his attitude, even on the basis of his not-very-intimate knowledge of Clarke, Pearse and MacDiarmada, by, say, the date of Rossa's funeral, was Quixotic (to use a mild term).

But it is hard to understand how Fox could write as he does, twenty-two years after Easter Week, 1916, when all the important facts relating to the plans for the Rising have become public knowledge. The steps taken by the I.R.B. and the Clan-na-Gael through 1915 and up to January 1916, including the arrangements made with Germany to supply arms and the selection of the place where these arms were to be landed, were unknown to Connolly before 21st January, 1916, when he was co-opted a member of the Military Council. Those who comprised the Military Council prior to Connolly's membership thereof had cognisance of all these plans. While satisfied to leave the I.C.A. fighting spirit develop independently of the I.R.B. and Irish Volunteers, Clarke and his I.R.B. colleagues naturally counted on the full co-operation of the I.C.A. when the Rising started.

- P. 188. "In the union some of the officials were not enthusiastic about linking their organisation with revolt. *Connolly was asked to take the Citizen Army out of Liberty Hall.*"

Comment:

Note the nice phrase: "*not enthusiastic.*" The plain fact (if other statements by Fox are correct) is that the majority of the Leaders of the Union were scared of and *opposed* to the then attitude of the I.C.A., and, I'm satisfied, that if the truth were ascertained, so was the bulk of "Labour" affiliated with Liberty Hall. "Labour," like the vast majority of the people of Ireland in 1915 and in 1916 prior to the executions, was not merely apathetic to the militant movement as a whole, but was definitely antagonistic to it. Those of us who had experience in the organisation of the I.R.B. and the Irish Volunteers had a clear idea of this situation.

- P. 189. "Throughout the whole of the official inquiry (after the Rising, D.L.) the important role of the Citizen Army in preparing the way for the Rising is stressed."

Comment :

I would never minimise the actual "important role" of the Citizen Army, but the Report of the Commission (British) is a poor source to quote from, and, furthermore, the quotation taken from the Report throws very little light on the I.C.A. role. The Commission sat immediately after Easter Week and the police were then almost as ignorant of pre-Easter arrangements as they had been on the date of the Rising.

- P. 191. "Connolly was determined that the Citizen Army would fight, and, if need be, he was ready they should do so alone. All his efforts were devoted to implanting the idea of armed revolt. He distrusted secret societies. When he staged the ceremony of hoisting the *National Flag* at Liberty Hall—the Sunday before Easter—it was with the definite idea of challenging all the ideas and loyalties which clung round the British connection."

Comment :

This refers to mid-April 1916. In the light of the known facts this interpretation minimises rather than increases Connolly's stature. That Connolly when co-opted a member of the Military Council in January 1916 was *sworn to secrecy*, there cannot be the least doubt. Whether he was actually sworn in as a member of the I.R.B. I am not in a position to say. Clarke, MacDiarmada, Pearse, Plunkett and Ceannt, were of course, I.R.B. men. (MacDonagh (I.R.B.) was not a member of the Military Council in *January* 1916.) There is nothing on record to show that they asked Connolly to join the I.R.B.¹ Neither is there any reason to feel that if asked at this juncture Connolly refused. But, as already stated, it is as certain as anything can be that he *was sworn or at least pledged to secrecy as a member of the ultra-secret Military Council*. Thus all Fox's repeated allusions to Connolly's "distrust of secret Societies" dissolve into thin air in the final analysis.

The "National Flag" hoisted on Liberty Hall was the *Green Flag* with the Harp. It is clearly ridiculous to attribute to this hoisting any such highfalutin meaning as that given by Fox. The old Green Flag (with harp) had been carried openly by Volunteer Corps on parade all over the country for 12 months at least previous to Palm Sunday 1916—in accordance with Pearse's order of March 1915. (See my article on "The National Flag".)

But here is the important point: Whatever Connolly's views may have been about the I.C.A. "going out alone" *prior to 21st January, 1916*,

¹ In *Labour and Easter Week* (published 1949) William O'Brien states that in January 1916, when Connolly was co-opted a member of the I.R.B. Military Council, he, (Connolly) "immediately joined the I.R.B."!

Connolly from the latter date was a party to all the secret plans and decisions of the Military Council—including the vital decision which the Council had made before he became a member of it, viz., that the Rising was scheduled to start on Easter Sunday. Any assertion that Connolly as late as Palm Sunday talked of the Citizen Army fighting alone is a reflection at least on his common sense.

And if, as asserted by Connolly's eulogists, he had, even prior to Palm Sunday, exposed to some of the I.C.A.—further than what may have been essential to his Second-in-Command—the secret of the Easter Sunday date, what conclusion are we to reach with respect to Connolly as a member of the ultra-secret Military Council?

- P. 191. "The open agitation for revolt jarred on the leaders of the Irish Republican Brotherhood, who, through the Irish Volunteers, were busy preparing for a Rising in their characteristically secret fashion."

Comment :

Here we have a sneer—a ridiculous sneer in view of the historic achievement. Small wonder that the I.R.B. Military Council (it was *not* the Military Council of the *Volunteers*, as stated by Fox on p. 191 further down) were "jarred" at the attitude of Connolly and the I.C.A. which threatened to bring all their nation-wide plans to naught! Looking back over the pre-Easter period, does any sane man believe that were it not for the known strength of the Irish Volunteers the minions of the British Government in Ireland would have permitted Connolly and his fellow-leaders of the I.C.A. to remain at Liberty Hall from, say, November 1915 to Easter Sunday, 1916? Would they have waited till Holy Week when Liberty Hall became an armed stronghold? I, for one, do not believe it. Furthermore, it is my firm opinion that had James Connolly really believed during, say, November 1915 and January 1916 that in the event of a Rising started by the I.C.A. alone, the I.R.B. and the Irish Volunteers would let him fight it out alone—it is my firm opinion, I repeat, that he would have been more circumspect in his activities and talk.

Again, if the 200 men of the I.C.A. started a fight without an understanding with the Military Council (through say Clarke or Pearse—as he (Connolly) had no actual knowledge prior to 21st January or thereabouts that such a body as the Military Council was in existence), it is logical to suppose that the fight could not have assumed the status it did in Easter Week—not even if the Irish Volunteers joined in haphazardly after the I.C.A. had begun. And, what I deem of much more importance: a Rising under such auspices as those of the I.C.A. would have been heralded to the world as a purely *Labour* undertaking; the

broad National and Republican aspect would have been lost. The Irish Race throughout the world instead of looking at Connolly as a national hero would (on learning of the plans perfected by the I.R.B. Military Council) unquestionably have labelled him as an impetuous Socialist who destroyed the best chance Ireland had in hundreds of years to secure National Independence.

Another important point occurs to me: If Connolly and the I.C.A. were determined to "go it alone" prior to the date of his co-option as a member of the I.R.B. Military Council (January 1916), what was his *plan of action*—for a force of 200 men? If he had a definite plan, I, for one, never heard of it.

- P. 191. "Connolly, on his side, feared that they (the I.R.B.) would whisper in corners and take no action at all."

Comment:

Why did he not discuss his fears with Tom Clarke?—to mention only one man. Was Tom Clarke, whose life and actions were an open book, not deemed by Connolly as a man to whom he could put a straight question, or lay down a definite proposal?

I was the last of the men who fought under Connolly to bid him farewell as he lay on his stretcher on the side walk of the Upper Castle Yard on Saturday, 29th April. I am proud to have known him and to have fought under him. He was a great man and as such I revere his memory. But the over-stressing by mis-eulogists of his part in the preparations and decisions pertaining to the Rising at Easter 1916, and their sneers at the men who comprised the Military Council prior to Connolly's membership thereof, compel me to record these present criticisms.

- P. 191. "Connolly 'Disappeared' on 19th January and remained in his 'unknown destination' till 21st January."

Liam O'B's comment at foot of p. 191 reads:

("His men had orders to revolt the Saturday night following any disappearance, arrest, or kidnapping of Connolly (by police in the first place naturally). Mallin informed I.V. he was going to do so. So they had to release Connolly (Mallin to me in Richmond Barracks)".

D. L. Comment:

The fact, which is obvious from Connolly's subsequent membership of the Military Council, is that Connolly on being informed by representatives of the M.C. of their plans, and the stage to which these plans had advanced, agreed to drop his "go it alone" ideas and co-operate loyally with the Military Council. Had he not acquiesced, does anyone believe they would have released him? And, in the event of

his continued custody, who is so naïve as to believe that Mallin would have been permitted to remain at large to lead the I.C.A. into immediate action? The men who did not hesitate to take Connolly into custody would have found a way to deal with Mallin. But, thank God, the danger of a premature, and sectional, "revolt" was removed by Connolly's agreement to fall into line with the Military Council. (I have commented elsewhere on the assertion that Mallin so informed the *Military Council*) D. L.

- P. 192. "Countess Markievicz and Michael Mallin were seriously perturbed at his (Connolly's) disappearance."

Liam O'B. writes: "Arthur Griffith considered Connolly's arrest and release left him master of the situation from that on. (A.G. to me when? Easter Saturday night or later? I disremember. I don't quite agree with A.G. here)."

D. L. Comment:

I totally disagree with Griffith's remark. After Connolly became a member of the Military Council there was no phase in which he could become "master." He just went along on the plans already laid, but it is only natural that, in the matter of perfecting details, Connolly, as well as each individual member of the M.C., made his contribution and I am satisfied that Connolly's contribution was of great value.

- P. 195. "As in Ireland where the I.R.B. worked through Wolfe Tone Clubs and Dungannon Clubs, so in America there were a variety of organisations through which the Clan-na-Gael carried on its propaganda."

Comment:

Here the author shows his ignorance of the I.R.B. organisation, and of America and the Clan-na-Gael. The latter had no subsidiary propaganda organisations. (The "Irish Volunteers" in New York was a *military* organisation composed of Clan men.) The Clan carried on its own propaganda—there was no other organisation in America to do so.

- P. 197. "On his arrival Clarke was *at once* co-opted on the Supreme Council of the I.R.B."

Comment:

This error is copied (evidently) from Le Roux p. 32. Tom did not become a member of the S.C. until 1909—two years after his return to Ireland. (Letter from P. S. O'H. to D. L. 16/2/45.)

- P. 199. "This paper (Irish Freedom) ran from 1910 to 1914 and was succeeded by the *Irish Volunteer*."

Comment :

Irish Freedom and *Nationality* were official I.R.B. organs. *The Irish Volunteer* from December 1914 onwards was run by the *I. Vol. Executive*. (It was, however, influenced by the I.R.B.)

- P. 202. "The Volunteers . . . more than a third of the members of the original committee were supporters of Mr. Redmond's policy and less than half had been connected with the Sinn Féin movement."

Comment :

I cannot escape the conclusion that Fox's assertions (p. 202) are for the purpose of showing that the Irish Volunteers were controlled at their inception by a non-Republican element—thus laying a semblance of foundation (and justification) for the bitter hostility of the I.C.A. towards the Irish Volunteers.

I give hereunder the names of those who were members of the governing Committee of the Irish Volunteers from November 1913 to October 1914 (exclusive of Redmond's 25 nominees who functioned between mid-June and mid-September 1914).

Not all of the 30 were members of the Committee at the same time. The I.R.B. list is definite (Lonergan went to the United States).

I have not attempted to re-classify the non-I.R.B. men into Redmondites and Sinn Feiners ; the list may include a few of the latter.

I.R.B.

Pearse, Padraig.
MacDonagh, Tomas.
Plunkett, Joseph.
O'Rian, Padraig.
Hobson, Bulmer.
O'Connor, Seamus.
Mackin, Peadar.
MacDiarmada, Sean.
Ceannt, Eamonn.
Colbert, Con.
Beaslai, Piaras.
Martin, Eamon.
Mellows, Liam.
Page, Robert.
O'Loughlin, Colum.
Lonergan.

(16)

Non-I.R.B.

MacNeill, Eoin.
Kettle, Tom.
Kettle, Larry.
Moore, Col.
White, Peter.
Gogan, Liam.
Judge, M. J.
Fitzgibbon, Sean.
Gore, John.
Lenehan, J.
O'Reilly, Peter.
Walsh, Geo. P.
The O'Rahilly.
Sir Roger Casement.

(14)

The above analysis, showing the I.R.B. majority on the Committee, is sufficient comment on the hostility of I.C.A. spokesmen between

November 1913 when the Irish Volunteers were established and the Summer of 1915 when Redmond's nominees were for a few months permitted to act as members of the I.V. governing Committee.

- P. 216. Sean T. O'Ceallaigh in *An Poblacht* 30th April, 1926, quoted.

Comment :

In his comments on *Connolly*, Sean T. wrote : "If it were not for the insistence of *Connolly* the Rising might not have taken place just exactly at that time."

This is merely an assumption on Sean T's part—influenced undoubtedly by the repeated claims of the I.C.A. And now (1938—when *Green Banners* was published) Mr. Fox quoted Sean T. when making all-out claims for *Connolly*. Sandwiched in between quotations from O'Ceallaigh, Fox states : "Connolly was not a member of the I.R.B. or of any secret organisation." This view has already been commented on (pp. 9-10 hereof)—William O'Brien in 1949 asserts that *Connolly* did join the I.R.B. !

- P. 218. "The well-to-do sections in Ireland had supplied men to the Indian Civil Service, to Medical, Diplomatic, and Military services elsewhere. They were inclined to look down upon Ireland as a land fit only for cattle herds to live in. This 'shoneen' spirit could not fail to irritate the intelligent men who struggled in the overcrowded ranks of professional life in Ireland. This was one factor of discontent. The farmers, too, although the war had brought them a measure of prosperity, thought in terms of their own land, they did not care for British rule and British ways of thought with their own. Add to this the labour discontent in the cities and it will be seen that there was a fertile field for Volunteer activities."

Comment :

Apparently the above applies to the period after the 1914 war started—that is after the Volunteer Split.

The fact that only 10,000 out of 150,000 Volunteers remained firm against Redmond, and that comparatively few joined the ranks of the "Irish Volunteers" thereafter, is sufficient comment on the above—except to call attention to the well-known hostility of the vast majority of the people to the Rising and those responsible for it, until the post-Easter executions turned the tide.

As against the 10,000 Volunteers who remained loyal to the original Provisional Committee, there is the fact that several hundred thousand Irishmen joined the British forces (and of the latter it would be of interest to figure the percentage which might be classed as "Labour"). And

the alleged "intelligent" men of the "professional classes" were to be found rushing for officerships in the British Army rather than to the ranks of the Irish Volunteers.

On re-reading the whole excerpt, I wonder if Mr. Fox had any personal knowledge of the Ireland of 1914-1916.

- P. 218. "Connolly was himself the *strongest and most practical* individual force on the rebel side—sharing with Tom Clarke a determination to fight that would brook no delay—was motivated by the national tradition of revolt which, in his mind, included his distinctive labour appeal."

Comment :

Here we have the oft-repeated claim that Connolly was "*the strongest and most practical*" force on the rebel side—with the subsidiary grain of appreciation to Clarke by way of contrast to Clarke's other colleagues. Also, the oft-repeated insinuation that on the side of the I.R.B. and I.V. Clarke was the only *man* determined to fight.

Had Clarke outlived the Rising, Fox and his fellow scribes would not have dared to write thus. Or, had they so dared, how Tom would have flayed them!—he was big enough to give credit where credit was due.

To me, as to other I.R.B. men, who knew Sean MacDiarmada, Pearse, Ceannt, etc., intimately, the treatment meted out to them by R. M. Fox is appalling. To myself, in particular, whose contacts with them in connection with many of the important items of preparation 1915-16 were perhaps closer than that of any other man outside the Military Council, Fox's attitude is irritating and deplorable.

- P. 219. Occasionally, Fox throws a bouquet to the Irish Volunteers. Dealing with 1915-16, he writes :

"Yet the Irish Volunteers who marched and drilled in *these months* were the *living embodiment of that National tradition of revolt* which was to sweep the country soon enough."

- P. 229. *Comment :*

I agree with Liam O'Briain that Fox in the chapter devoted to Sheehy-Skeffington over-estimates his value to Ireland in pre-Easter years.

"Over-estimates" is a mild term. Poor "Skeffy" was the proverbial "fly on the fly-wheel" so far as the *Rising* was concerned.

- P. 231. (Memo) On 16th May, 1915, *Sean MacDiarmada* was arrested.
- P. 233. "The Irish Volunteers received a great fillip. Men were coming in in hundreds. In the last few weeks of the year, 2,000 joined up in the provinces."

To the President and Congress of the United States

Dublin, June 18th 1917

Statement

We, the undersigned, who have been held in English prisons, and have been dragged from dungeons to dungeons in heavy chains, cut off since Easter Week, 1916; from all intercourse with the outside world, have just had an opportunity of seeing the printed text of the message of the United States of America to the Provisional Government of Russia:

We see that the President accepts as the aim of both countries "the carrying of the present struggle for the freedom of all peoples to a successful consummation". We also see that the object of President Wilson's own Government is "the liberation of ^{peoples} everywhere from the aggressions of autocratic force"

"We are fighting" writes the President, to the Government of Russia, "for the liberty self government and undictated development of all peoples, and every feature of the settlement that concludes this war must be conceived and executed for that purpose." Wrongs must first be righted and then adequate safeguards must be created to prevent their being committed again. Remedies must be found as well as statements of principle that will have a pleasing and sonorous sound "No people must be forced under a sovereignty under which it does not wish to live"

We trust that such remedies - in preference to any governmental professions whatsoever; will be held to include the right of each people, not merely to rely on other peoples, to support their claim to national liberty, but what the governments and peoples of other nations will, we trust regard as even more sacred, the right of each people to defend ~~themselves~~ ^{themselves} against external aggression, external interference and external control. It is this particular right that we claim for the Irish people, and not content with statements of principles though these themselves may be made a pretext for our oppression, we are engaged and mean to engage ourselves in the practical means for establishing this right without awaiting the issue of the war or the settlement that may conclude the war ~~war~~ we ask of the governments of the United States of America, and the governments of the free peoples of the world to take immediate measures to inform themselves accurately and on the spot about the extent of liberty or attempted repression which we may encounter.

We the undersigned, are officers (just released from English prisons) of forces formed independently in Ireland to secure the complete liberation of the Irish nation

Eamon de Valera
Coinmacth
Domnall Uallachain
Seamus La Bourdelle
Richard O'Riordan
W. E. & L. L. L. L.
Finian O'Leary
Peadar Kirby
Tommy O'Connell

Sean R. Ulickin
Richard MacDonogh
Sean Mac an tSaoi
Peadar O'Riordan
James Doyle
Peter Galligan
Thomas O'Connell
Diamuid MacDonogh

Riprap O'Connell
Seamus O'Leary
Conchubar O'Connell
Arthur O'Staic
Sean Mac Gadhra
Peadar O'Connell
Peadar O'Connell
Peadar O'Connell

Comment :

This estimate of the number of recruits at that time is, in my opinion, grossly exaggerated.

P. 234. *Comment :*

Fox quoted Le Roux regarding the I.R.B. and MacNeill. Liam O'B. asks "Is this true?"

Comment :

I was absent from Ireland in 1914 until November. I do not believe the statement—which Le Roux quotes from "*unpublished* correspondence." He does not quote the name of the writer, nor of the party to whom the "correspondence" was addressed.

That Clarke and/or MacDiarmada (who were the only men then in a position to do so) should send such an ultimatum to MacNeill, I do not believe.

P. 235. "He (Connolly) distrusted too much whispering in corners. Connolly was never a conspirator *for the love of conspiracy.*"

Comment :

Was it but "*whispering in corners*" and *conspiring "for the love of conspiracy"* that the Clan-na-Gael carried on its negotiations with Germany for arms; that Joe Plunkett went to Germany in April, 1915, for this same purpose; that Pearse (with my humble self as his agent) selected a landing-place for those arms; that I.R.B. Commandants of the Irish Volunteers in the South had received their secret instructions regarding their "mobilisation" areas for Easter Sunday, etc.?

Here I revert to Sean T. O'Ceallaigh's comment (Fox p. 216):

Those secret instructions re mobilisation areas of the Irish Volunteers in Cork, Kerry, etc., over Easter Saturday and Easter Sunday were given orally to me by Pearse *early in January, 1916*, for transmission in person to the I.R.B. Commandants of those Battalions. Some months previously I had reported to Pearse that Fenit was the most suitable landing place for a supply of arms, etc., from Germany. The purpose of the selected positions for the Cork, Kerry and Limerick Battalions was obvious: For instance, "Limerick was to hold the line of the Shannon"!

I have written of this matter elsewhere (it was "set up" but not published) and explained how it came about that the messages were not delivered by *me*.

P. 235. "In the *Irish Worker* (date?) he asked 'are we not waiting too long.' All this was most unorthodox from the I.R.B. standpoint. Reared in an atmosphere of secrecy, the cabal habit had become second nature."

Comment :

Connolly's question in cold print was not merely "unorthodox" from the I.R.B. standpoint, it was sheer madness—expressed, it is true, in complete ignorance of I.R.B. decisions and plans conducted through the Military Council. It cannot be gainsaid that it was chiefly the mercy of Providence that blinded the British Authorities to even an approximate sensing of the situation and kept them (in the first place) from pouncing on Connolly and his I.C.A. of 200 men—who could have been nabbed outside the precincts of Liberty Hall in the early months of 1916.

Had they (the British) attacked the I.C.A., the Irish Volunteers (as already mentioned by me) were bound to become involved in some haphazard fashion.

Incidentally, the leaders of the I.R.B. as well as those of the Irish Volunteers (as such), might have been caught off their guard and arrested by the British.

One shudders to think of the probable result !

- P. 235. "Even when the Supreme Council of the I.R.B. met in January at the Clontarf Town Hall, they merely passed a resolution declaring that the rising should take place 'at the earliest date possible.' From *meaning nods and winks*, members of this Supreme Council gathered that the date had been fixed by a smaller body, the Military Committee."

Comment :

The foregoing has evidently been written on the basis of my statement which appears on P. 180 of Le Roux's *Life of Tom Clarke*.

Fox, of course, was unaware of the fact that prior to that meeting I had received Pearse's secret instructions for the Commandants in Cork, Tralee and Limerick, specifying the positions which they were to occupy Easter Saturday and Easter Sunday ; and that I was cognisant of what those positions meant with relation to Fenit as a landing place for arms ; that I was also aware that Clarke and MacDiarmada, who were the two resident members of the I.R.B. Executive, were also members of the Military Council, and that Pearse was a member of both the Supreme Council and the Military Council.

The other members of the S.C. had complete confidence in these men and Clarke and MacDiarmada comprised a majority of the "Executive"—which body had complete control of the organisation when the S.C. was not in session.

So far as I personally was concerned, I preferred to leave the question of Rising date, etc., indefinite at *that* meeting of 10 or 11 representatives

(I am not certain if all 11 of the S.C. were present)—leaving that all-important item rest solely in the knowledge of the Military Council—who to my knowledge were perfecting the plans.

Remarks about "*meaning nods and winks*" and "whispering in corners" only serve to irritate ; they cannot, in the long run, hide the real facts in the situation.

- P. 235. Liam O'Brian's comment on this page, "The M.C. were not to take action without sanction of S.C." is erroneous. The Supreme Council at the January meeting could have stipulated that when the definite date for the Rising would be selected it should receive the express ratification of the S.C. itself. *No such stipulation was made.* It was recognised that should "the earliest date possible" become apparent to the Military Council between that January meeting and the following Easter Sunday, the "Executive" of the S.C. was constitutionally empowered to ratify it. The Supreme Council had declared for War ; the date on which the Declaration was to be promulgated was a subsidiary matter.

Furthermore, should Clarke and MacDiarmada—with Pearse acquiescing—accept a definite date in the interim, and should their decision then be submitted to the Supreme Council, it was absolutely certain that such decision would be ratified by the Council as a whole. These three men were not alone recognised as leaders but they were cognisant of *all* the factors in the situation and were thus in the best position to pass judgment on such an important point.

When at the January 1916 meeting of the S.C. I moved that the next session of the latter be fixed for Easter Sunday, I had in mind that in the interim (a period of three months) the "Executive," and, through it, the Military Council, would have a free hand. Furthermore, at that moment I felt certain that Easter Sunday would see a "meeting" of a very different nature.

- P. 235. "The date of the rising was fixed as Easter Saturday, 22nd April, but this was subsequently altered to the evening of Easter Sunday."

Comment :

It would be of interest to know on what authority Easter *Saturday* is mentioned by Fox as the date.

That the selection of Easter *Sunday* held for some considerable time before the change was made on April 23rd (Sunday) to the following day, 24th April, is beyond doubt.

But there is some foundation for the assertion that the date originally fixed for the Rising was Good Friday. William O'Brien (of Liberty Hall—and an old I.R.B. man) told me in Richmond Barracks, May,

1916, that he had been informed (by Connolly, I think) that the original date was *Good Friday*. Madge Daly, writing to me, May, 1946, stated that Tom Clarke gave her a message late in January for her uncle, John Daly, to the effect that Good Friday had been selected as the date of the Rising.

- P. 237. "In *September* the I.R.B. Supreme Council appointed its *fourth Military Council*, the members being Thomas Clarke, Sean MacDiarmada, Joseph Plunkett and Pdraig Pearse."

Comment :

This is *all wrong*: The Military Council, or rather the "Military Committee" as it was called at first, was appointed by the "Executive" of the I.R.B. (not by the S.C.) in or about June 1915. (Sean MacD. had been arrested in May and I substituted for him as Secretary—and thus a member of the "Executive.") On my motion, Pdraig Pearse, Joseph Plunkett and Eamonn Ceannt were appointed as the Military Committee. When Sean MacD. was released from prison, he and Tom Clarke acted as *ex-officio* members of the Committee. At this stage the term "Military Council" may be said to be appropriate. There was no such term in use at any time as the "*Fourth*" Military Council. I think the word first appeared in Le Roux's *Life of Pearse* (which is full of errors).

- Pp. 238–239. *Comment :*

Elsewhere I have written the correct details about the interviews between members of the M.C. with MacNeill and Hobson.

- P. 240. *Comment :*

Same applies to the *Aud* and associated matters.

- P. 242. *Comment :*

Here Mr. Fox gives all the credit to Connolly for the Sunday forenoon meeting of the Military Council at Liberty Hall.

Comment :

Elsewhere I have recorded the facts of Easter *Saturday night* as regards MacDiarmada, Pearse, Plunkett and MacDonagh (in whose discussions I participated). They endeavoured to reach Clarke, Connolly and Ceannt. For some reason or reasons they were unsuccessful. Before parting, they decided to hold a meeting of the *Military Council at Liberty Hall next morning (Sunday)* and to take further steps to so inform Clarke, Ceannt and Connolly.

The Sunday meeting lasted from 9 a.m. to 1 p.m. A number of I.C.A. men and Irish Volunteers (including myself) were waiting in an ante-room and in the main hall until the meeting adjourned.

(In my comments on Fox's *History of the I.C.A.*, which I wrote later than the above, I have dealt further with this point) D.L.

- P. 243. "*Connolly had never believed in these wheels within wheels revolving in different directions. . . . Now, at the last moment, he exerted himself to create a firm centre of revolt, to save the plan from the wreck.*"

This was the *moment of Connolly's triumph*.

Comment :

Well, well! No one counted but Connolly! All the others—Clarke, Pearse, MacDiarmada, Plunkett, Ceannt, MacDonagh—were mere ciphers! I know the sentiments expressed by Pearse, MacDiarmada, Plunkett and MacDonagh after midnight Saturday, 22nd April, that the Rising should go ahead notwithstanding MacNeill's cancellation of the Sunday "parades."

- P. 244. *The Proclamation of the Republic.*

Fox writes: "This document bears evidence of being the work of Connolly and Pearse, possibly of others as well."

Comment :

Connolly to the fore again, Pearse taking second place, and the others—well, perhaps!

That the Proclamation covered the unanimous feelings of all seven members of the M.C. is, in my opinion, beyond question. Each of them was cognisant of the views of the others and I fail to see any point in the Proclamation on which these men could have differed. But, when we seek for internal evidence (apart from actual knowledge) as to which of them drafted the Proclamation, all discerning men are compelled to the conclusion that Pearse's style and masterful method of expression characterise it throughout.

From *The Irish Press*, 27th April, 1945:—

"Just before the Rising," says R. M. Fox in his book, *Rebel Irishmen*, "Connolly came to Mrs. Skeffington and said: 'You will be glad to know that in the Proclamation of the Irish Rebellion we are including equal citizenship for women.' 'I know who is responsible for that,' she replied. 'We are practically unanimous,' said Connolly. 'Only one questioned it.'"

Comment : Further on *Irish Press*, 27th April, 1946:

The excerpt from *Rebel Irishmen* is of interest, Connolly's opening remark to Mrs. Sheehy Skeffington—when speaking to her about the coming Rising—seems to me to have undergone some "editing." Anyway, Mrs. Skeffington's "bouquet" to Connolly is *not proof* that he was the individual responsible for inclusion of the clause: