Work in Progress. Last updated: 30 April 2020
1
The ‘Proposed Articles of Agreement’ were delieverd to the Irish Delegation. There were 18 clauses and an annex in which the naval and war facilities required by Britain were stated. Barton left at once for Dublin with a copy of the Articles. Griffith and Collins met with the British delegation in Downing Street where amendments were discussed until early Friday morning, December 2nd. Amongst the delegates, the general feeling amongst Barton, Duffy and Childers was that more could be gained from the British, with Griffith, Collins and Duggan feeling that all that could be attained, had been.
John W. Dulanty ( later the Irish Free State London representative ) reported to both the Irish deleagation and Dublin that Griffith Churchill had told him that ‘whatever else might be the outcome of the Treaty negotiaions, England would not embark on further military operations in Ireland.’ That the War Office was entirely opposed to the renewal of the campaign.
Arthur Mitchell ‘Revoloutionary Government in Ireland – Dail Eireann 1919-22’ Gill & McMillan 1996. P325
The German Mark jumps back to 750m per £1. More panic caused then when it was falling.
Britain's post-war recession (a.k.a. "the slump") worsens, with unemployment reaching 2 million (18 percent).
The ‘Proposed Articles of Agreement’ were delieverd to the Irish Delegation. There were 18 clauses and an annex in which the naval and war facilities required by Britain were stated. Barton left at once for Dublin with a copy of the Articles. Griffith and Collins met with the British delegation in Downing Street where amendments were discussed until early Friday morning, December 2nd. Amongst the delegates, the general feeling amongst Barton, Duffy and Childers was that more could be gained from the British, with Griffith, Collins and Duggan feeling that all that could be attained, had been.
John W. Dulanty ( later the Irish Free State London representative ) reported to both the Irish deleagation and Dublin that Griffith Churchill had told him that ‘whatever else might be the outcome of the Treaty negotiaions, England would not embark on further military operations in Ireland.’ That the War Office was entirely opposed to the renewal of the campaign.
Arthur Mitchell ‘Revoloutionary Government in Ireland – Dail Eireann 1919-22’ Gill & McMillan 1996. P325
The German Mark jumps back to 750m per £1. More panic caused then when it was falling.
Britain's post-war recession (a.k.a. "the slump") worsens, with unemployment reaching 2 million (18 percent).
2
The revised document was sent to the Irish Delegation at 1.30am. Griffith left London for Dublin on the early Mail train and at 11pm met with de Valera who promptly announced that he was unable to accept the terms outlined in the Proposed Articles and left any further arguments until the following day’s Cabinet meeting. The remaining Delegation left London at 8.45pm, were handed the latest amendments to the draft at the station. En-route to Dublin, the mail boat collided with a fishing smack killing three fishermen and had to return to Holyhead with dead and injured and to assess damage, resulting in a further delay.
A rescue attempt to free 3 IRA prisoners sentenced to hang in Derry Jail in February 1922 was made. The bid was foiled by police patrol that fired on men who had thrown a rope over the prison walls. Inside, Constable Michael Gorman (45) from Donegal and Special Constable William Lyttle had been killed in preparation for the break-out. 15 prisoners later stood trial for the murders with three sentenced to death.
The revised document was sent to the Irish Delegation at 1.30am. Griffith left London for Dublin on the early Mail train and at 11pm met with de Valera who promptly announced that he was unable to accept the terms outlined in the Proposed Articles and left any further arguments until the following day’s Cabinet meeting. The remaining Delegation left London at 8.45pm, were handed the latest amendments to the draft at the station. En-route to Dublin, the mail boat collided with a fishing smack killing three fishermen and had to return to Holyhead with dead and injured and to assess damage, resulting in a further delay.
A rescue attempt to free 3 IRA prisoners sentenced to hang in Derry Jail in February 1922 was made. The bid was foiled by police patrol that fired on men who had thrown a rope over the prison walls. Inside, Constable Michael Gorman (45) from Donegal and Special Constable William Lyttle had been killed in preparation for the break-out. 15 prisoners later stood trial for the murders with three sentenced to death.
3
Collins and the Delegation arrived exhausted as the Cabinet began its meeting at 11am.
In the Cabinet meeting, the proposed Treaty was discussed in detail. In it, Ireland was offered status of a British Dominion and title ‘Irish Free State’, coastal defence to be undertaken exclusively by British forces with a guarantee to receive whatever facilities may be required in event of war or strained relations. Northern Ireland had the right to opt out of the Free State if it so wished, and if so doing, an Arbitration Commission would set up to determine the boundaries. The Treaty once signed, would come into force 12 months later.
The items on Ulster and The Oath of Allegiance were subject of heated discussion, with De Valera opposing any concessions other than the paragraph they had agreed to on November 25th and instructed the delegation to insist on this agreement. Griffith believed that the Delegation should not take the responsibility of breaking the negotiation on the subject of the Crown and that the proposed Treaty would practically recognise the Republic. He advised that the Plenipotentaries should get as many concessions as possible, have Craig accept it and then sign.
Eamon Duggan was in favour of accepting the Treaty as it stood as he believed there would be no further concessions from London. Collins was for acceptance subject to further concessions on trade, defence and a vote by the electorate but was against the Oath of Allegiance to the monarch. Gavan Duffy was against acceptance, believing the Irish proposals with some reservations on defence and other matters could be obtained if inisisted on.
Barton was against acceptance as the proposal did not give Dominion Status and that Britain would not declare war on the question of allegiance. Childers believed the Treaty would give Ireland no national status and render neutrality impossible. Cathal Brugha also rejected the proposals along with Austin Stack. The majority of the Cabinet rejected the Dominion clauses as a whole.
De Valera believed that if the British Cabinet were made to realise that Ireland would face war rather than accept partition or inclusion in the Empire, such demands may well be withdrawn. He also could not approve of any document which included an oath of alelgiance to the Crown or allowed the North East to opt out of the State.
An alternative wording of the Oath was produced and Robert Barton appealed to de Valera to head the delegation pointing out that it was unfair to ask Griffith to return to London and secure terms which could lead to war when he obviously was not prepared to do so. Cathal Brugha now asked Griffith whether he realised that to sign such proposals as those before them would split the nation? Griffith gave an undertaking than he would not break on the Crown and would not sign an acceptance of allegiance or the ‘Proposed Articles of Agreement’. Any documents would be brought back for reference to the Dail and if necessary the people. On this assurance, the Cabinet voted unanimously for de Valera to remain in Ireland.
Mitchell argues that with this directive, de Valera planned in Michavaelian style to intervene in the negotiating process prior to any Treaty signing, presumably to wring further concessions from the British.
At the meeting, both Cathal Brugha and Austin Stack ‘slurred Michael Collins’ to the extent that he refused to be part of the negotiations with Lloyd George, but nevertheless travelled back to London with the delegation who all were ‘ tired, overwrought and in a hurry [ with ] little or no room for manoeuver’
George Dangerfield “ The Damnable Question - a study in Anglo-Irish relations” Constable, London. 1977. p337
The Cathal Brugha slur was that the selection of Griffith and Collins to attend all the sub-conferences was ‘because they were the two weakest men we had in the team and Lloyd George and his friends pretty soon discovered that; and that is how they came to select them out of the five’
Longford & O’Neill. “Eamon De Valera” Gill & McMillan. 1970. P161
At this, Griffith roe from his place at the Cabinet table, went up to Brugha and demanded he withdraw the accusation and implication. Brugha ‘with typical stubborness, refused.’. Griffith demanded it be recorded in the minutes which was done but later withdrawn. De Valera now advised that he thought the delegation had done their utmost and all that remained was for the Delegation to return to London and show if the document was not amended, the cabinet and the country were prepared to take the consequences of war or no war. Griffith stated that while he did not ‘like the British document [he] did not think it dishonourable. It would practically recognise the Republic and the first allegiance (in the oath ) would be to Ireland. Suddenly Brugha turned to him, saying ‘Don’t you realise that if you sign this thing, you will split Ireland from top to bottom?’
Longford & O’Neill. “Eamon De Valera” Gill & McMillan. 1970. P162
Griffith agreed saying that no document would be signed until ratified by the Dail.
The Irish delegation were now advised to return to London and ifnorm the British delegation that they could not sign the document, would be unable to accept the Oath as detailed, would not agree to either Allegiance or Parition without referal to the Dail and were prepared to return to warfare on those two points. The Delegates were given authority to meet with Sir James Craig if necessary. The meeting ended at 6pm.
The alternatives remaining were limited. Either the British would agree to concessions or with 72 hours notice, the Truce would end and a state of war would exist between Britain and Ireland. That night the Irish delegates returned to London and de Valera to the West of Ireland where he was reviwing Volunteer units.
In South Africa, British forces withdraw ending 125 years of service.
Collins and the Delegation arrived exhausted as the Cabinet began its meeting at 11am.
In the Cabinet meeting, the proposed Treaty was discussed in detail. In it, Ireland was offered status of a British Dominion and title ‘Irish Free State’, coastal defence to be undertaken exclusively by British forces with a guarantee to receive whatever facilities may be required in event of war or strained relations. Northern Ireland had the right to opt out of the Free State if it so wished, and if so doing, an Arbitration Commission would set up to determine the boundaries. The Treaty once signed, would come into force 12 months later.
The items on Ulster and The Oath of Allegiance were subject of heated discussion, with De Valera opposing any concessions other than the paragraph they had agreed to on November 25th and instructed the delegation to insist on this agreement. Griffith believed that the Delegation should not take the responsibility of breaking the negotiation on the subject of the Crown and that the proposed Treaty would practically recognise the Republic. He advised that the Plenipotentaries should get as many concessions as possible, have Craig accept it and then sign.
Eamon Duggan was in favour of accepting the Treaty as it stood as he believed there would be no further concessions from London. Collins was for acceptance subject to further concessions on trade, defence and a vote by the electorate but was against the Oath of Allegiance to the monarch. Gavan Duffy was against acceptance, believing the Irish proposals with some reservations on defence and other matters could be obtained if inisisted on.
Barton was against acceptance as the proposal did not give Dominion Status and that Britain would not declare war on the question of allegiance. Childers believed the Treaty would give Ireland no national status and render neutrality impossible. Cathal Brugha also rejected the proposals along with Austin Stack. The majority of the Cabinet rejected the Dominion clauses as a whole.
De Valera believed that if the British Cabinet were made to realise that Ireland would face war rather than accept partition or inclusion in the Empire, such demands may well be withdrawn. He also could not approve of any document which included an oath of alelgiance to the Crown or allowed the North East to opt out of the State.
An alternative wording of the Oath was produced and Robert Barton appealed to de Valera to head the delegation pointing out that it was unfair to ask Griffith to return to London and secure terms which could lead to war when he obviously was not prepared to do so. Cathal Brugha now asked Griffith whether he realised that to sign such proposals as those before them would split the nation? Griffith gave an undertaking than he would not break on the Crown and would not sign an acceptance of allegiance or the ‘Proposed Articles of Agreement’. Any documents would be brought back for reference to the Dail and if necessary the people. On this assurance, the Cabinet voted unanimously for de Valera to remain in Ireland.
Mitchell argues that with this directive, de Valera planned in Michavaelian style to intervene in the negotiating process prior to any Treaty signing, presumably to wring further concessions from the British.
At the meeting, both Cathal Brugha and Austin Stack ‘slurred Michael Collins’ to the extent that he refused to be part of the negotiations with Lloyd George, but nevertheless travelled back to London with the delegation who all were ‘ tired, overwrought and in a hurry [ with ] little or no room for manoeuver’
George Dangerfield “ The Damnable Question - a study in Anglo-Irish relations” Constable, London. 1977. p337
The Cathal Brugha slur was that the selection of Griffith and Collins to attend all the sub-conferences was ‘because they were the two weakest men we had in the team and Lloyd George and his friends pretty soon discovered that; and that is how they came to select them out of the five’
Longford & O’Neill. “Eamon De Valera” Gill & McMillan. 1970. P161
At this, Griffith roe from his place at the Cabinet table, went up to Brugha and demanded he withdraw the accusation and implication. Brugha ‘with typical stubborness, refused.’. Griffith demanded it be recorded in the minutes which was done but later withdrawn. De Valera now advised that he thought the delegation had done their utmost and all that remained was for the Delegation to return to London and show if the document was not amended, the cabinet and the country were prepared to take the consequences of war or no war. Griffith stated that while he did not ‘like the British document [he] did not think it dishonourable. It would practically recognise the Republic and the first allegiance (in the oath ) would be to Ireland. Suddenly Brugha turned to him, saying ‘Don’t you realise that if you sign this thing, you will split Ireland from top to bottom?’
Longford & O’Neill. “Eamon De Valera” Gill & McMillan. 1970. P162
Griffith agreed saying that no document would be signed until ratified by the Dail.
The Irish delegation were now advised to return to London and ifnorm the British delegation that they could not sign the document, would be unable to accept the Oath as detailed, would not agree to either Allegiance or Parition without referal to the Dail and were prepared to return to warfare on those two points. The Delegates were given authority to meet with Sir James Craig if necessary. The meeting ended at 6pm.
The alternatives remaining were limited. Either the British would agree to concessions or with 72 hours notice, the Truce would end and a state of war would exist between Britain and Ireland. That night the Irish delegates returned to London and de Valera to the West of Ireland where he was reviwing Volunteer units.
In South Africa, British forces withdraw ending 125 years of service.
4
Back in London, Gavan Duffy, Erskine Childres and Robert Barton drafted counter proposals as outlined at the previous day’s Cabinet meeting. When completed, Griffith and Collins announced that they had ‘abandoned all idea of urging counter proposals; they did not intend to go to the British with this or any other draft; they and Duggan also, refused to go to Downing Street; Collins said that those who wanted to break should present it’
Macardle. ’ The Irish Republic’ Irish Press, Dublin 1957. P.581
In the discussion that followed, Collins, Griffith and Duggan insisted on making certain alterations, taking out the Irish demand for complete control of their own trade after 10 years and altering the Oath clause. When the amendments were finalised, Collins and Duggan refused to go to Downing Street with the proposals. Gavan Duffy and Barton stated that they would go alone, Griffith eventually agreeing to go also.
Macardle states that ‘Collins attitude was disastrous. Unless urged with all the force of a united Irish delegation, the Irish counter proposals had no chance whatever of receiving serious consideration from the British at this stage; it was evident, too that Griffith would have no heart in insisting upon them’
Macardle. ’ The Irish Republic’ Irish Press, Dublin 1957. P.582
Griffith, Gavan Duffy and Robert Barton went to Downing Street to present the revised proposals where they were read by Birkenhead, Horne, Chamberlain and Lloyd George, retiring to discuss them. When they returned, they declared that the proposals were a turnaround on all previous negotiations and were a definite refusal of fundamental conditions. Griffith ‘defended the proposals with unexpected tenacity’. He made an attempt to highlight Craig’s refusal of an All-Ireland parliament the dominant issue which failed as the British commented that with or without Craig’s approval, the Ulster proposal remained. If the Irish delegates signed the Treaty, the British Ministers guaranteed to call Parliament, pass an Act to ratify it before Christmas, withdraw their troops and hand over the administration to Dail Eireann.
Robert Barton now spoke of the necessity of settlement based on good will, followed by Gavan Duffy saying ‘The difficulty is coming into the Empire’. Macardle comments ‘As if by a prearranged signal the Englishmen sprang to their feet. In tones as excited as though the objection to inclusion in the Empire was something new to them, they declared that the conference was at an end. It seemed as though, regarding Gavan Duffy, as the most obstructive of their opponents, they had seized the opportunity to cast responsibility on him. They said they would send word to Sir James Craig that the negotiations had broken down’
Macardle. ’ The Irish Republic’ Irish Press, Dublin 1957. P583
The delegation returned to their Headquarters. Griffith was reported to be ‘gloomy. If this was indeed the end, they had failed doubly – failed not only to make peace but to ensure that the break should be on the Ulster question’
Later that evening, Thomas Jones arrived and met with Griffith. When he left, Griffith told Collins that Lloyd George wished to see him the following morning before meeting with the King. The other delegates were not consulted on the subject of a morning meeting between Collins and the Prime Minister.
According to Sinead McCoole, Collins now went to visit the Lavery’s in Cromwell Place. Sir John recalled some 20 years after the event that ‘Hazel had given up Erskine Childers as impossible to move, but she had overcome Arthur Griffith’s objections, Michael Collins stood firm to the last minute. He seemed to have lost his temper…eventually after hours of persuasion, Hazel prevailed. She took him to Downing Street in her car that last evening, and he gave in.’
McCoole comments that Hazel had some influence over Collins, presumably aware that the British offer was final, reportedly counselled Collins ‘Take what you can get now and get the rest later’.
De Valera, Brugha and Mulcahy in the West continued their review of Irish Volunteer units.
Back in London, Gavan Duffy, Erskine Childres and Robert Barton drafted counter proposals as outlined at the previous day’s Cabinet meeting. When completed, Griffith and Collins announced that they had ‘abandoned all idea of urging counter proposals; they did not intend to go to the British with this or any other draft; they and Duggan also, refused to go to Downing Street; Collins said that those who wanted to break should present it’
Macardle. ’ The Irish Republic’ Irish Press, Dublin 1957. P.581
In the discussion that followed, Collins, Griffith and Duggan insisted on making certain alterations, taking out the Irish demand for complete control of their own trade after 10 years and altering the Oath clause. When the amendments were finalised, Collins and Duggan refused to go to Downing Street with the proposals. Gavan Duffy and Barton stated that they would go alone, Griffith eventually agreeing to go also.
Macardle states that ‘Collins attitude was disastrous. Unless urged with all the force of a united Irish delegation, the Irish counter proposals had no chance whatever of receiving serious consideration from the British at this stage; it was evident, too that Griffith would have no heart in insisting upon them’
Macardle. ’ The Irish Republic’ Irish Press, Dublin 1957. P.582
Griffith, Gavan Duffy and Robert Barton went to Downing Street to present the revised proposals where they were read by Birkenhead, Horne, Chamberlain and Lloyd George, retiring to discuss them. When they returned, they declared that the proposals were a turnaround on all previous negotiations and were a definite refusal of fundamental conditions. Griffith ‘defended the proposals with unexpected tenacity’. He made an attempt to highlight Craig’s refusal of an All-Ireland parliament the dominant issue which failed as the British commented that with or without Craig’s approval, the Ulster proposal remained. If the Irish delegates signed the Treaty, the British Ministers guaranteed to call Parliament, pass an Act to ratify it before Christmas, withdraw their troops and hand over the administration to Dail Eireann.
Robert Barton now spoke of the necessity of settlement based on good will, followed by Gavan Duffy saying ‘The difficulty is coming into the Empire’. Macardle comments ‘As if by a prearranged signal the Englishmen sprang to their feet. In tones as excited as though the objection to inclusion in the Empire was something new to them, they declared that the conference was at an end. It seemed as though, regarding Gavan Duffy, as the most obstructive of their opponents, they had seized the opportunity to cast responsibility on him. They said they would send word to Sir James Craig that the negotiations had broken down’
Macardle. ’ The Irish Republic’ Irish Press, Dublin 1957. P583
The delegation returned to their Headquarters. Griffith was reported to be ‘gloomy. If this was indeed the end, they had failed doubly – failed not only to make peace but to ensure that the break should be on the Ulster question’
Later that evening, Thomas Jones arrived and met with Griffith. When he left, Griffith told Collins that Lloyd George wished to see him the following morning before meeting with the King. The other delegates were not consulted on the subject of a morning meeting between Collins and the Prime Minister.
According to Sinead McCoole, Collins now went to visit the Lavery’s in Cromwell Place. Sir John recalled some 20 years after the event that ‘Hazel had given up Erskine Childers as impossible to move, but she had overcome Arthur Griffith’s objections, Michael Collins stood firm to the last minute. He seemed to have lost his temper…eventually after hours of persuasion, Hazel prevailed. She took him to Downing Street in her car that last evening, and he gave in.’
McCoole comments that Hazel had some influence over Collins, presumably aware that the British offer was final, reportedly counselled Collins ‘Take what you can get now and get the rest later’.
De Valera, Brugha and Mulcahy in the West continued their review of Irish Volunteer units.
5
Harry Boland was sent back to the United States to ‘prepare the American people for the acceptance of something short of a Republic’.
The British morning papers had central theme, the possible failure of the conference. The Daily Chronicle commented ‘Little hope of settlement now entertained’. The Daily Express dared the headline ‘Irish Conference fails’. The Times was less dramatic and felt only able to say ‘the negotiations are not broken off’.
Longford & O’Neill. “Eamon De Valera” Gill & McMillan. 1970. P158
‘According to Clemmie Churchill, it was widely known that Hazel, dressed in her favourite opera cloak, brought Collins to Downing Street’
Sinead McCoole ‘Hazel – A Life of Lady Lavery 1880-1935’. Lilliput Press, Dublin 1996. P81 – from letters to Audrey Morris in the 1950’s.
Collins met with Lloyd George in Downing St at 9.30am. There the P.M. advised him that he had called a cabinet meeting for midday and that the breakdown in negotiations was on the question of ‘within or without the Empire’.Collins told him that he was dissatisfied with the position of Ulster. Lloyd George in turn assured him that the Boundary Commission clause would ‘save ireland from partition and it was arranged that Collins should ask his colleagues to meet the Prime Minister in the afternoon’.
When Collins reported the meeting at the Irish Delegates HQ, there was some reluctance to meet the PM again. Griffith persuaded the team to return with the purpose of ‘narrowing the issue down, if possible, to the Ulster question or of securing terms to be submitted to the Dail.
The Cabinet meeting minutes report held that there was little prospect of settlement.
‘It was clear that the Irish Cabinet had no intention of coming within the British Empire, but wished Ireland to remain an independent republic, associated with the British Empire for certain specific purposes and bearing no allegiance to the King, but merely recognising him as the head of associated states. The Cabinet were informed that Mr. Arthur Griffith and Mr. Michael Collins were greatly disappointed at the rejection of the British proposals’
Longford & O’Neill. “Eamon De Valera” Gill & McMillan. 1970. P158
At 3pm, Griffith, Collins and Barton met the British Delegation in Downing Street. On the conference table before each delegate were copies of the Articles of Agreement previously proposed by the British but with some minor alterations. Llloyd George opened by referring to the Ulster proposal in the documents and that Griffith had previously agreed to this and had stated he would ‘not let him down’ in reference to the letter that had been given in November prior to negotiations with Craig. Griffith countered by stating he would not let him down but he required a definitive statement from Craig either accepting or rejecting Irish unity.
Chamberlain now stated that he and his colleagues had ‘staked their political future in Liverpool on the understanding that they would not be let down and that this demand was contrary to the undertaking’
Collins replied by insisting that ‘every proposal made by the Irish delegates for the association of Ireland with the Commonwealth had been conditional upon the unity of Ireland and that without Craig’s acceptance, unity was not assured’. The British delegation was that Craig would not commit himself to such a letter and that the British were continuing with their Ulster proposals irrespective of Craig.
The discussion lapsed again on the subjects of defence, trade, finance and the wording of the Oath. The British retired leaving the Irish to consult together. Irrespective of what had taken place, they would demand a statement from Craig.
Meanwhile the British were hunting around the Prime Minister’s bedroom for a pair of his trousers! In them he had left Griffith’s letter containing the promise that an independent Ireland would grant the six ulster counties the right to secede and in effect a recognition of the inevitability of partition. When the British delegation returned, Lloyd George was not with them. He returned 10 minutes later with ‘a long envelope with its contents partly withdrawn, and again charged Griffith with letting him down. Griffith answered with some heat that he had never left a friend or an enemy down on an undertaking and would not do so now.’
Llloyd George now spoke of having Griffith’ approval to his Ulster proposals. Barton and Collins were unaware of any such approval as Chamberlain passed a paper across the table. It was a memorandum by the P.M. on his Ulster proposal outlining that if Ulster was not prepared to join an All-Ireland Parliament, she would be allowed to create a separate parliament subject to the British Parliament. The Boundary Commission would be instigated to adjust the Ulster border ‘both by inclusion and exclusion so as to make the boundary conform as closely as possible to the wishes of the population’.
Griffith honoured publicly what had been a private assurance and announced he would sign the Treaty. Both Barton and Collins refusing until such stage as they received a reply from Craig. Macardle comments that Griffith’s willingness to sign the Treaty ‘could hardly have happened if [he] had not in his own mind been satisfied with the prospect of an Ireland within the Empire, under the Crown.' Damned by faint praise indeed.
From the British side comes this description of the events on the night of the 5th/6th in the Whitehall Diary by Lloyd George’s Private secretary, Thomas Jones:
“ The Ulster parliament was due to meet the next day and Lloyd George had promised to give Craig the result of the Irish Conference before then. He opened therefore by asking for the delegates final answer on Ulster - were the British proposals ( including the boundary commission ) those to which Arthur Griffith had agreed on 12 November? Vainly the Irish insisted on knowing Craig’s response first.
Much easier to settle was the question of the Oath, where great efforts were made to assimilate the words to the susceptibilities of both sides. The result was a mishmash of legal verbiage, making the oath almost meaningless, satisfactory at the time, but not afterwards. On trade and defence, the course was much harder but not impossible. Lloyd George offered the Free State full fiscal autonomy - the right , if they wished, to impose a tariff.
The ultimate choice remained: status within the Empire or nothing. Lloyd George refused even to consider Griffith’s plea to refer this to the Dail. The messengers, he said, must sail for Belfast that night and the destroyer was already waiting at Hollyhead. If the answer was no, it was war.
The Irish had to sign and disregard whatever their Sinn Fein mandate said, or, if they believed the Prime Minister, face the accumulated might of the British Forces. Griffith undertook, whatever the reply, to sign the Treaty himself. “A braver man than Arthur Griffith “ wrote Chamberlain, “I have never met”. But this was not enough for the Prime Minister, who wanted the same assurances from Collins and Barton. Finally in a famous gesture, he held up two letters, addressed to Craig - one containing the articles of agreement, the other the refusal of Sinn Fein to come to terms. The ultimatum of war within three days was matched by the equally impressive appeal to preserve the peace.
T.Jones. “Whitehall Diary Vol..111. Ed J Middleman. London 1971. p.183
Winston Churchill described the scene:
‘Mr Griffith said, speaking in his soft voice, and with his modest manner ‘I will give the answer of the Irish delegates at nine tonight; but, Mr. Prime Minister, I personally will sign this agreement and will recommend it to my countrymen’. ‘Do I understand Mr. Griffith ‘ said Lloyd George ‘that thought everyone else refuses you will nevertheless agree to sign?’ ‘Yes, that is so, Mr. Prime Minister’ replied this quiet little man of great heart and of great purpose. Michael Collins rose, looking as though he was going to shoot somebody, preferably himself. In all my life I never saw so much passion and suffering in restraint’
Macardle. ’ The Irish Republic’ Irish Press, Dublin 1957. P583
Lloyd George noted the hesitation of Michael Collins, writing later commented that both Collins and Griffith ‘saw the shadow of doom clouding over that fateful paper – their own doom….Michael Collins was not appalled by the spectre of death, but he had an Irishman's fear of encountering the charge that comes so readily to the lips of the oppressed – that of having sucumbed to alien will and betrayed their country… he asked for a few hours to consider, promising a reply by nine o’clock. Nine passed, but the Irish leaders did not return. Ten, eleven, and they were not back yet. We had no doubts a to whether we should see them again.’
The Irish withdrew, to resume at 10pm. They had won another concession, by the reduction of the period I which Ulster must decide to join from 12 months to 1; but the result of their conference was by no means foregone. The last wrangle began in Hans Place; tragedy for the Republicans and then gloomy apprehension for all, as Collins first, Duggan and finally, after desperate Heart searching, Barton and Duffy declared that they would follow Griffith and sign. Strangely no one, not even Childers, invoked the Cabinet mandate they had had the day before and no one thought to use the telephone to Dublin.
T.Jones. “Whitehall Diary Vol..111. Ed J Middleman. London 1971. p.183
In Hans Place, Griffith supported the Treaty strongly saying should they call more young men to die in a hopeless cause and that no other settlement could be obtained. Duggan agreed. Collins ‘said little…it must have seemed to him a bitter conclusion of the great labours of the Republic of Ireland; but his decision was to sign’
Macardle. ’ The Irish Republic’ Irish Press, Dublin 1957. P588
Lloyd George stated to the Irish delegation ‘I have to communicate with Sir James Craig tonight; here are the alternative letters I have prepared; one enclosing the Articles of Agreement reached by His Majesty’s Government and yourselves, the other saying that the Sinn Fein represenatives refuse the oath of allegiance and refuse to come within the Empire. If I send this [ second ] letter it is war - and war within three days! Which letter am I to send?…we must know your answer by 10pm tonight. You can have until then but no longer to decide whether you will give peace or war to your country..’
The conclusions made on Collins acceptance of the articles, ranged from his belief that Lloyd George was not bluffing on ‘war in three days’ and to his intimate knowledge of the I.R.B, IRA and reserves, knowing that they could not survive a renewed British assault. The truce had removed his greatest weapon, secrecy, the population wanted peace and the military movement had lost momentum. In addition, the British had made it public since May, that any future action against Sinn Fein would involve the entire nation with martial law declared, government control of all transportation, newspapers, civil rights, the introduction of 100,000 troops and as Churchill said: ‘putting the three southern provinces under a network of barbed wire and blockhouses’ Collins also believed that the Boundary Commission under the Treaty would reduce the 6 counties to a mere 4, economically and numerically non-viable leading to the eventual economic and survivalist decision to join with the 26 counties.
Barton refused until it was pointed out that unless he signed, he was making himself responsible for bringing war on the Irish people. ‘it occurred to him that, though the Delegates might sign, the Cabinet would be free to repudiate their signature as a betrayal of trust…he consented to sign’
Gavan Duffy also agreed to sing, but only under duress.
Harry Boland was sent back to the United States to ‘prepare the American people for the acceptance of something short of a Republic’.
The British morning papers had central theme, the possible failure of the conference. The Daily Chronicle commented ‘Little hope of settlement now entertained’. The Daily Express dared the headline ‘Irish Conference fails’. The Times was less dramatic and felt only able to say ‘the negotiations are not broken off’.
Longford & O’Neill. “Eamon De Valera” Gill & McMillan. 1970. P158
‘According to Clemmie Churchill, it was widely known that Hazel, dressed in her favourite opera cloak, brought Collins to Downing Street’
Sinead McCoole ‘Hazel – A Life of Lady Lavery 1880-1935’. Lilliput Press, Dublin 1996. P81 – from letters to Audrey Morris in the 1950’s.
Collins met with Lloyd George in Downing St at 9.30am. There the P.M. advised him that he had called a cabinet meeting for midday and that the breakdown in negotiations was on the question of ‘within or without the Empire’.Collins told him that he was dissatisfied with the position of Ulster. Lloyd George in turn assured him that the Boundary Commission clause would ‘save ireland from partition and it was arranged that Collins should ask his colleagues to meet the Prime Minister in the afternoon’.
When Collins reported the meeting at the Irish Delegates HQ, there was some reluctance to meet the PM again. Griffith persuaded the team to return with the purpose of ‘narrowing the issue down, if possible, to the Ulster question or of securing terms to be submitted to the Dail.
The Cabinet meeting minutes report held that there was little prospect of settlement.
‘It was clear that the Irish Cabinet had no intention of coming within the British Empire, but wished Ireland to remain an independent republic, associated with the British Empire for certain specific purposes and bearing no allegiance to the King, but merely recognising him as the head of associated states. The Cabinet were informed that Mr. Arthur Griffith and Mr. Michael Collins were greatly disappointed at the rejection of the British proposals’
Longford & O’Neill. “Eamon De Valera” Gill & McMillan. 1970. P158
At 3pm, Griffith, Collins and Barton met the British Delegation in Downing Street. On the conference table before each delegate were copies of the Articles of Agreement previously proposed by the British but with some minor alterations. Llloyd George opened by referring to the Ulster proposal in the documents and that Griffith had previously agreed to this and had stated he would ‘not let him down’ in reference to the letter that had been given in November prior to negotiations with Craig. Griffith countered by stating he would not let him down but he required a definitive statement from Craig either accepting or rejecting Irish unity.
Chamberlain now stated that he and his colleagues had ‘staked their political future in Liverpool on the understanding that they would not be let down and that this demand was contrary to the undertaking’
Collins replied by insisting that ‘every proposal made by the Irish delegates for the association of Ireland with the Commonwealth had been conditional upon the unity of Ireland and that without Craig’s acceptance, unity was not assured’. The British delegation was that Craig would not commit himself to such a letter and that the British were continuing with their Ulster proposals irrespective of Craig.
The discussion lapsed again on the subjects of defence, trade, finance and the wording of the Oath. The British retired leaving the Irish to consult together. Irrespective of what had taken place, they would demand a statement from Craig.
Meanwhile the British were hunting around the Prime Minister’s bedroom for a pair of his trousers! In them he had left Griffith’s letter containing the promise that an independent Ireland would grant the six ulster counties the right to secede and in effect a recognition of the inevitability of partition. When the British delegation returned, Lloyd George was not with them. He returned 10 minutes later with ‘a long envelope with its contents partly withdrawn, and again charged Griffith with letting him down. Griffith answered with some heat that he had never left a friend or an enemy down on an undertaking and would not do so now.’
Llloyd George now spoke of having Griffith’ approval to his Ulster proposals. Barton and Collins were unaware of any such approval as Chamberlain passed a paper across the table. It was a memorandum by the P.M. on his Ulster proposal outlining that if Ulster was not prepared to join an All-Ireland Parliament, she would be allowed to create a separate parliament subject to the British Parliament. The Boundary Commission would be instigated to adjust the Ulster border ‘both by inclusion and exclusion so as to make the boundary conform as closely as possible to the wishes of the population’.
Griffith honoured publicly what had been a private assurance and announced he would sign the Treaty. Both Barton and Collins refusing until such stage as they received a reply from Craig. Macardle comments that Griffith’s willingness to sign the Treaty ‘could hardly have happened if [he] had not in his own mind been satisfied with the prospect of an Ireland within the Empire, under the Crown.' Damned by faint praise indeed.
From the British side comes this description of the events on the night of the 5th/6th in the Whitehall Diary by Lloyd George’s Private secretary, Thomas Jones:
“ The Ulster parliament was due to meet the next day and Lloyd George had promised to give Craig the result of the Irish Conference before then. He opened therefore by asking for the delegates final answer on Ulster - were the British proposals ( including the boundary commission ) those to which Arthur Griffith had agreed on 12 November? Vainly the Irish insisted on knowing Craig’s response first.
Much easier to settle was the question of the Oath, where great efforts were made to assimilate the words to the susceptibilities of both sides. The result was a mishmash of legal verbiage, making the oath almost meaningless, satisfactory at the time, but not afterwards. On trade and defence, the course was much harder but not impossible. Lloyd George offered the Free State full fiscal autonomy - the right , if they wished, to impose a tariff.
The ultimate choice remained: status within the Empire or nothing. Lloyd George refused even to consider Griffith’s plea to refer this to the Dail. The messengers, he said, must sail for Belfast that night and the destroyer was already waiting at Hollyhead. If the answer was no, it was war.
The Irish had to sign and disregard whatever their Sinn Fein mandate said, or, if they believed the Prime Minister, face the accumulated might of the British Forces. Griffith undertook, whatever the reply, to sign the Treaty himself. “A braver man than Arthur Griffith “ wrote Chamberlain, “I have never met”. But this was not enough for the Prime Minister, who wanted the same assurances from Collins and Barton. Finally in a famous gesture, he held up two letters, addressed to Craig - one containing the articles of agreement, the other the refusal of Sinn Fein to come to terms. The ultimatum of war within three days was matched by the equally impressive appeal to preserve the peace.
T.Jones. “Whitehall Diary Vol..111. Ed J Middleman. London 1971. p.183
Winston Churchill described the scene:
‘Mr Griffith said, speaking in his soft voice, and with his modest manner ‘I will give the answer of the Irish delegates at nine tonight; but, Mr. Prime Minister, I personally will sign this agreement and will recommend it to my countrymen’. ‘Do I understand Mr. Griffith ‘ said Lloyd George ‘that thought everyone else refuses you will nevertheless agree to sign?’ ‘Yes, that is so, Mr. Prime Minister’ replied this quiet little man of great heart and of great purpose. Michael Collins rose, looking as though he was going to shoot somebody, preferably himself. In all my life I never saw so much passion and suffering in restraint’
Macardle. ’ The Irish Republic’ Irish Press, Dublin 1957. P583
Lloyd George noted the hesitation of Michael Collins, writing later commented that both Collins and Griffith ‘saw the shadow of doom clouding over that fateful paper – their own doom….Michael Collins was not appalled by the spectre of death, but he had an Irishman's fear of encountering the charge that comes so readily to the lips of the oppressed – that of having sucumbed to alien will and betrayed their country… he asked for a few hours to consider, promising a reply by nine o’clock. Nine passed, but the Irish leaders did not return. Ten, eleven, and they were not back yet. We had no doubts a to whether we should see them again.’
The Irish withdrew, to resume at 10pm. They had won another concession, by the reduction of the period I which Ulster must decide to join from 12 months to 1; but the result of their conference was by no means foregone. The last wrangle began in Hans Place; tragedy for the Republicans and then gloomy apprehension for all, as Collins first, Duggan and finally, after desperate Heart searching, Barton and Duffy declared that they would follow Griffith and sign. Strangely no one, not even Childers, invoked the Cabinet mandate they had had the day before and no one thought to use the telephone to Dublin.
T.Jones. “Whitehall Diary Vol..111. Ed J Middleman. London 1971. p.183
In Hans Place, Griffith supported the Treaty strongly saying should they call more young men to die in a hopeless cause and that no other settlement could be obtained. Duggan agreed. Collins ‘said little…it must have seemed to him a bitter conclusion of the great labours of the Republic of Ireland; but his decision was to sign’
Macardle. ’ The Irish Republic’ Irish Press, Dublin 1957. P588
Lloyd George stated to the Irish delegation ‘I have to communicate with Sir James Craig tonight; here are the alternative letters I have prepared; one enclosing the Articles of Agreement reached by His Majesty’s Government and yourselves, the other saying that the Sinn Fein represenatives refuse the oath of allegiance and refuse to come within the Empire. If I send this [ second ] letter it is war - and war within three days! Which letter am I to send?…we must know your answer by 10pm tonight. You can have until then but no longer to decide whether you will give peace or war to your country..’
The conclusions made on Collins acceptance of the articles, ranged from his belief that Lloyd George was not bluffing on ‘war in three days’ and to his intimate knowledge of the I.R.B, IRA and reserves, knowing that they could not survive a renewed British assault. The truce had removed his greatest weapon, secrecy, the population wanted peace and the military movement had lost momentum. In addition, the British had made it public since May, that any future action against Sinn Fein would involve the entire nation with martial law declared, government control of all transportation, newspapers, civil rights, the introduction of 100,000 troops and as Churchill said: ‘putting the three southern provinces under a network of barbed wire and blockhouses’ Collins also believed that the Boundary Commission under the Treaty would reduce the 6 counties to a mere 4, economically and numerically non-viable leading to the eventual economic and survivalist decision to join with the 26 counties.
Barton refused until it was pointed out that unless he signed, he was making himself responsible for bringing war on the Irish people. ‘it occurred to him that, though the Delegates might sign, the Cabinet would be free to repudiate their signature as a betrayal of trust…he consented to sign’
Gavan Duffy also agreed to sing, but only under duress.
6
The party now returned to Downing Street just after midnight. Churchill recorded how he and the rest of the British Delegation expected any of the Irish Team except Griffith to sign the Treaty. Griffith announced the Irish delegation was willing to sign subject to some corrections.
In Downing Street after the climactic announcements had been made, the British and Irish made a few last drafting adjustments. Then all signed and for the first time since Lloyd George had introduced them across the table to obviate the need for “shaking hands with murderers”, the British representatives walked round and shook hands with the men they had come to respect.
T.Jones. “Whitehall Diary Vol..111. Ed J Middleman. London 1971. p.183
At 2.10am, the Treaty or Draft of Articles of Agreement were signed.
The Treaty set up the Irish Free State as a self-governing dominion of the British Empire, according Ireland the same constitutional status as Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. The representative of the Crown would be appointed in the same way as a dominion governor-general. The members of the Irish legislature were to take an oath of allegiance to the Constitution of the Irish Free State which pledged them to be “faithful to His Majesty, Kong George V, his heirs and successors”, a vague commitment even then.
The Treaty provided for the right of Northern Ireland to withdraw from the jurisdiction of the Dublin parliament. The Free State had to assume some of the responsibility for part of the public debt of the United Kingdom, a proportion of War pensions, yield certain defence facilities to the British Forces in Berehaven, Cobh, Lough Swilly and Belfast Lough, and in time of war give whatever assistance might be required by His Majesty’s Government.
These were the terms agreed by the signatories, but the entire proposition would require Dail Eireann debate and vote and possibly a nationwide referendum before acceptance.
This was the first Treaty with Britain in almost 750 years.
The party now returned to Downing Street just after midnight. Churchill recorded how he and the rest of the British Delegation expected any of the Irish Team except Griffith to sign the Treaty. Griffith announced the Irish delegation was willing to sign subject to some corrections.
In Downing Street after the climactic announcements had been made, the British and Irish made a few last drafting adjustments. Then all signed and for the first time since Lloyd George had introduced them across the table to obviate the need for “shaking hands with murderers”, the British representatives walked round and shook hands with the men they had come to respect.
T.Jones. “Whitehall Diary Vol..111. Ed J Middleman. London 1971. p.183
At 2.10am, the Treaty or Draft of Articles of Agreement were signed.
The Treaty set up the Irish Free State as a self-governing dominion of the British Empire, according Ireland the same constitutional status as Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. The representative of the Crown would be appointed in the same way as a dominion governor-general. The members of the Irish legislature were to take an oath of allegiance to the Constitution of the Irish Free State which pledged them to be “faithful to His Majesty, Kong George V, his heirs and successors”, a vague commitment even then.
The Treaty provided for the right of Northern Ireland to withdraw from the jurisdiction of the Dublin parliament. The Free State had to assume some of the responsibility for part of the public debt of the United Kingdom, a proportion of War pensions, yield certain defence facilities to the British Forces in Berehaven, Cobh, Lough Swilly and Belfast Lough, and in time of war give whatever assistance might be required by His Majesty’s Government.
These were the terms agreed by the signatories, but the entire proposition would require Dail Eireann debate and vote and possibly a nationwide referendum before acceptance.
This was the first Treaty with Britain in almost 750 years.
Section 4: The Anglo-Irish Treaty No. NAI DE 2/304/1
Notes by Robert Barton of two sub-conferences held on December 5/6, 1921 at 10 Downing St.
London, 5/6 December 1921.
PRESENT:
BRITISH REPRESENTATIVES
MR. LLOYD GEORGE
MR. CHAMBERLAIN
LORD BIRKENHEAD
MR. CHURCHILL
IRISH REPRESENTATIVES.
MR. GRIFFITH
MR. COLLINS
MR. BARTON
SUB-CONFERENCE NO. 1. 3 P.M.
The Conference opened by LLOYD GEORGE saying that he must know once and for all exactly where we stood as regards the Ulster proposals. He said that the Ulster proposals in the document now before us were exactly those to which Arthur Griffith had agreed and on which he had undertaken not to let him (Lloyd George) down.
ARTHUR GRIFFITH replied that he had not let him down and did not intend to do so, but that before he gave a decision on the earlier articles in the document he must have a reply from Craig either accepting or refusing the unity of Ireland.
CHAMBERLAIN and LLOYD GEORGE argued that such a proposition was inadmissible, unreasonable and contrary to the undertaking not to let Lloyd George down.
MR. CHAMBERLAIN stated that it was due to the confidence they had in our undertaking that they would not be let down by us that his colleagues and he had adopted the attitude they did at the Liverpool meeting and staked thereon their political future.
MICHAEL COLLINS said that for us to agree to any conditions defining the future relations of Great Britain and Ireland prior to Craig’s giving his assent to the unity of Ireland was impossible, that to do so would be to surrender our whole fighting position. That every document we ever sent them stated that any proposals for the association of Ireland with the British Commonwealth of Nations was conditional upon the unity of Ireland. That, unless Craig accepted inclusion under the All-Ireland Parliament, the unity of Ireland was not assured and that if he refused inclusion we should be left in the position of having surrendered our position without having even secured the essential unity of Ireland.
LLOYD GEORGE got excited. He shook his papers in the air, declared that we were trying deliberately to bring about a break on Ulster because our people in Ireland had refused to come within the Empire and that Arthur Griffith was letting him down where he had promised not to do so. He produced a paper from an envelope, stated that he had shewn it to Arthur Griffith at ‘s house and that Arthur Griffith had agreed to its contents. Lloyd George referred to this document as a letter and thereby mystified me and appeared to mystify Michael Collins. I could not recollect the existence of any letter on this subject other than the one Arthur Griffith wrote to Lloyd George on November 2nd after consultation with the other members of the Delegation. The paper was then passed across the table. It proved to be a memorandum, not a letter, and read as follows:-
‘If Ulster did not see her way to accept immediately the principle of a Parliament of All-Ireland — coupled with the retention by the Parliament of Northern Ireland of the powers conferred upon it by the Act of 1920 and such other safeguards as have already been suggested in my letter of 10th November — we should then propose to create such Parliament for All-Ireland but to allow Ulster the right within a specified time on an address to the Throne carried in both houses of the Ulster Parliament to elect to remain subject to the Imperial Parliament for all the reserved services. In this case she would continue to exercise through her own Parliament all her present rights; she would continue to be represented in the British Parliament and she would continue subject to British taxation except in so far as already modified by the Act of 1920. In this case, however, it would be necessary to revise the boundary of Northern Ireland. This might be done by a Boundary Commission which would be directed to adjust the line both by inclusion and exclusion so as to make the Boundary conform as closely as possible to the wishes of the population.’
ARTHUR GRIFFITH declared his adhesion to his undertaking but argued that it was not unreasonable for us to require that Craig should reply before we refused or accepted the proposals now before us.
LLOYD GEORGE declared that to make receipt of such a reply conditional before accepting or refusing was letting him down on his proposals because the only alternative to Craig’s acceptance of the unity of Ireland was the Boundary Commission and that his Government would carry the Boundary Commission proposal into effect with strict fidelity. He then said that they would have to withdraw to discuss the matter amongst themselves but first he would hear what objections or alterations we had to the proposal.
ARTHUR GRIFFITH replied that he understood from Michael Collins’ interview with Lloyd George that certain alterations might possibly be made in the proposals.
LLOYD GEORGE asked what were the alterations we suggested but that we must understand that the first three Clauses were absolutely essential. There could be no discussion about these.
ARTHUR GRIFFITH replied that some alteration might be made in the Oath.
BIRKENHEAD said that Mr. Collins had handed in to him that morning a form of oath on which he (Mr. Collins) had been working and then produced it with his (Birkenhead’s) alterations. We objected to the final words being ‘British Empire’ and suggested ‘British Commonwealth of Nations.’
LLOYD GEORGE asked for any further objections.
WE objected to ‘shall contribute’ in Clause 5. and desired insertion of ‘if any’ after ‘such sums’ and elsewhere.
CHAMBERLAIN said that these alterations were matters of wording only. On Clause 6 we argued at great length that the word ‘exclusively’ precluded us from commencing to build vessels or make any preparations for taking over our own coastal defence at any time, and that the ‘Conference for Review’ referred to in the second paragraph might never be held if the British did not wish to reconsider the subject. There was a long argument over this in which Churchill, Michael Collins and myself went over all the arguments again.
CHURCHILL stated that if Ireland were permitted any navy it would be impossible to get the Treaty through Parliament. That the English people would believe that we were going to build ships which in war might be used against them. That the possibility of our building submarines of mine-laying vessels to attack their food ships would be argued from every angle. The discussion lasted a long time. We demanded the removal of the word ‘exclusively’; this was grudgingly accorded. We then sought to get it explicitly stated that Ireland should be required to build one or more ships for her coastal protection; this was absolutely refused, except as regards revenue and fishery protection ships, and CHURCHILL stated that he would definitely oppose any provision that Ireland should have a navy of her own and would even oppose it five years hence if he had the opportunity.
MICHAEL COLLINS then took up the Trade Clause and said that Lloyd George had intimated that freedom on both sides might be accorded. He also dealt with the suggestion that the safeguards for Ulster should be a matter for discussion between ourselves and the Ulster representatives.
THE BRITISH then withdrew and we consulted amongst ourselves and decided that if they came back to break on our refusal to accept or refuse pending Craig’s answer that Arthur Griffith’s last card was to demand reference to the Colonial Premiers.
BIRKENHEAD then returned alone and took note again of the particular points we required changed.
On their return we again took up the points in dispute. First in Clause 6, to which CHURCHILL agreed to add ‘with a view to the undertaking by Ireland of a share of her own coastal defence,’ and to a date five years hence being fixed for the Conference to review the clause, but refused every proposition to make this apply to (b) facilities in time of war. He refused to take ‘Queenstown’ out of the Annex, and explained that care and maintenance parties meant gunners and trained men to take charge drawn from the R.G.A. and R.E., numbering 1,060 men and 69 officers or thereabouts. He also stated that ‘Admiralty property and rights’ at Berehaven did not mean that they would demand compensation if at any time the docks etc. passed to us. BIRKENHEAD said that if they were handed over to the Crown representative in Ireland the Crown could not demand payment from the Crown.
LLOYD GEORGE said that on Trade he was prepared to agree provisionally that there should be freedom on both sides to impose any tariffs either liked subject to the Articles of Agreement being accepted by us. That he himself had been the strongest on their side on the compulsory Free State Clauses, but that he would withdraw his opposition on the conditions stated.
WE then went back to Ulster.
ARTHUR GRIFFITH agreed that he personally would sign the Treaty whether Craig accepted or not, but that his colleagues were in a different position from himself in that they were not party to the promise not to let Lloyd George down, and that it was not fair to demand acceptance or refusal from them before Craig replied.
Considerable discussion took place here on the justice and injustice of our being asked to agree or disagree before Craig replied and
ARTHUR GRIFFITH made repeated efforts to avoid the question being put to Michael Collins and myself.
LLOYD GEORGE stated that he had always taken it that Arthur Griffith spoke for the Delegation, that we were all plenipotentiaries and that it was now a matter of peace or war and we must each of us make up our minds. He required that every delegate should sign the document and recommend it, or there was no agreement. He said that they as a body had hazarded their political future and we must do likewise and take the same risks. At one time he particularly addressed himself to me and said very solemnly that those who were not for peace must take full responsibility for the war that would immediately follow refusal by any Delegate to sign the Articles of Agreement.
He then produced two letters one of which he said he must that night send to Craig. One was a covering letter to H.M. Government’s proposals for the future relations of Ireland and Great Britain and stated that the Irish Delegation had agreed to recommend them for acceptance by Dail Eireann. The other stated that the Irish Delegation had failed to come to an agreement with H.M. Government and therefore he had no proposals to send to Craig.
LLOYD GEORGE stated that he would have to have our agreement or refusal to the proposals by 10 p.m. that evening. That a special train and destroyer were ready to carry either one letter or the other to Belfast and that he would give us until ten o’clock to decide.
We then argued that the twelve months transition period was of the greatest danger to our people. Craig could say ‘Yes’ at any time; he could say ‘No’ finally before six months but he need not say ‘No’ for twelve months, so that for twelve months we might not know whether there was to be unity or not. Meantime life might be made intolerable for our people in Ulster.
LLOYD GEORGE argued that that contingency had been apparent from the first, but if it were a serious stumbling block we could shorten the transition period at any time we chose.
MICHAEL COLLINS said that the recent occurrences in Tyrone — the seizure of the County Council books, etc., and the support of the Ulster Government with English troops had shaken our confidence in their fidelity.
LLOYD GEORGE answered that they had no jurisdiction on this matter in Ulster. It was a matter over which the Northern Government had complete control under the 1920 Act. He then suggested that they should withdraw in order that we might discuss the duration of the transition period amongst ourselves. They did so.
WE decided to reduce the period to one month. Rang for them to return and stated our decision.
LLOYD GEORGE said he considered the decision ill advised as a month did not give the Ulster people sufficient time to reflect. He affirmed that Craig was going to refuse the terms and that he (Lloyd George) knew this for certain. However, as we preferred one month, he was prepared to accept the alteration and redraft the Clauses. A month was the least possible that could be given Craig to make a final decision. He then proposed that we dismiss and reassemble again at 10 to give him our final decision.
There was a discussion amongst ourselves lasting from 9 to 11.15 at 22, Hans Place, at which a decision was eventually reached to recommend the Treaty to the Dail.
SUB-CONFERENCE NO. II
11.15 p.m. — 2.20 a.m.
At 11.30 we returned to Downing street and attacked the document again. We endeavoured to get Clause 3 removed, but failed. We, however, succeeded in getting the word ‘Governor-General’ out, it being left to us to decide upon a term. The title ‘President’ Chamberlain stated, was inadmissible.
MICHAEL COLLINS demanded and secured the removal of the word ‘local’ as a prefix to the Irish Free State’s military defence force.
They agreed to the verbal changes in financial clause 5. CHAMBERLAIN took exception to the ‘if anys’ going in, as he said it was too late to quibble over such small points. We pointed out that Clause 9 was still left intact and that it should have been removed under the agreement on 8. LLOYD GEORGE said that it referred to transport only. It meant ships entering harbours and that there must be provision to prevent boycotting of English shipping.
BIRKENHEAD said that the wording of the clause was ambiguous now that the compulsory Free Trade clause was gone and suggested redrafting it. This was done immediately.
MICHAEL COLLINS required the removal of Clause 14 (e). (the Ulster Army) and that its substance be got into the safeguards for Ulster clause. This was agreed to.
MICHAEL COLLINS queried the reference to summoning of the Southern-Ireland Parliament in Clauses 15 and 17, and BIRKENHEAD immediately drafted an explanatory memorandum as follows:-
‘It is intended by Clauses 15 and 17 to make it plain that the functions therein referred to shall be discharged by the Provisional Government of Southern Ireland and that for that purpose a transfer shall be made by them of the necessary powers under the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, as soon as the mutual ratifications have been exchanged.
The Provisional Government will it is contemplated upon such ratification undertake the Govert. of S. Ireland immediately until the necessary Acts in statutory authority contemplated in this instrument. (both Parliaments confer upon it the) ‘B.’
LLOYD GEORGE then asked whether we as a Delegation were prepared to accept these Articles of Agreement and to stand by them in our Parliament as they as a Delegation would stand by them in theirs.
ARTHUR GRIFFITH replied ‘We do.’
WE then discussed the release of the prisoners and procedure for ratification and other matters whilst awaiting the final draft.
The final draft was read over, agreed to and signed; also the Annex.
No. DE 2/304/1
Final text of the Articles of Agreement for a Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland as signed. London, 6 December 1921.I ……. do solemnly swear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of the Irish Free State as by law established and that I will be faithful to H.M. King George V., his heirs and successors by law, in virtue of the common citizenship of Ireland with Great Britain and her adherence to and membership of the group of nations forming the British Commonwealth of Nations.
- Ireland shall have the same constitutional status in the Community of Nations known as the British Empire as the Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, the Dominion of New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa with a Parliament having powers to make laws for the peace order and good government of Ireland and an Executive responsible to that Parliament, and shall be styled and known as the Irish Free State.
- Subject to the provisions hereinafter set out the position of the Irish Free State in relation to the Imperial Parliament and Government and otherwise shall be that of the Dominion of Canada, and the law, practice and constitutional usage governing the relationship of the Crown or the representative of the Crown and of the Imperial Parliament to the Dominion of Canada shall govern their relationship to the Irish Free State.
- The representative of the Crown in Ireland shall be appointed in like manner as the Governor-General of Canada and in accordance with the practice observed in the making of such appointments.
- The oath to be taken by Members of the Parliament of the Irish Free State shall be in the following form:-
(a) In the time of peace such harbour and other facilities as are indicated in the Annex hereto, or such other facilities as may from time to time be agreed between the British Government and the Government of the Irish Free State; and
- The Irish Free State shall assume liability for the service of the Public Debt of the United Kingdom as existing as the date hereof and towards the payment of War Pensions as existing at that date in such proportion as may be fair and equitable, having regard to any just claim on the part of Ireland by way of set-off or counter claim, the amount of such sums being determined in default of agreement by the arbitration of one or more independent persons being citizens of the British Empire
- Until an arrangement has been made between the British and Irish Governments whereby the Irish Free State undertakes her own coastal defence, the defence by sea of Great Britain and Ireland shall be undertaken by His Majesty’s Imperial Forces, but this shall not prevent the construction or maintenance by the Government of the Irish Free State of such vessels as are necessary for the protection of the Revenue or the Fisheries. The foregoing provisions of this article shall be reviewed at a conference of Representatives of the British and Irish governments, to be held at the expiration of five years from the date hereof with a view to the undertaking by Ireland of a share in her own coastal defence
- The Government of the Irish Free State shall afford to His Majesty’s Imperial Forces
(b) In time of war or of strained relations with a Foreign Power such harbour and other facilities as the British Government may require for the purposes of such defence as aforesaid.Provided that this agreement shall not apply to members of the Auxiliary Police Force or to persons recruited in Great Britain for the Royal Irish Constabulary during the two years next preceding the date hereof. The British Government will assume responsibility for such compensation or pensions as may be payable to any of these excepted persons.
- With a view to securing the observance of the principle of international limitation of armaments, if the Government of the Irish Free State establishes and maintains a military defence force, the establishments thereof shall not exceed in size such proportion of the military establishes maintained in Great Britain as that which the population of Ireland bears to the population of Great Britain.
- The ports of Great Britain and the Irish Free State shall be freely open to the ships of the other country on payment of the customary port and other dues.
- The Government of the Irish Free State agrees to pay fair compensation on terms not less favourable than those accorded by the Act of 1920 to judges, officials, members of Police Forces and other Public Servants who are discharged by it or who retire in consequence of the change of government effected in pursuance hereof.
Provided that if such an address is so presented a Commission consisting of three persons, one to be appointed by the Government of the Irish Free State, one to be appointed by the Government of Northern Ireland, and one who shall be Chairman to be appointed by the British Government shall determine in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants, so far as may be compatible with economic and geographic conditions the boundaries between Northern Ireland and the rest of Ireland, and for the purposes of the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, and of this instrument, the boundary of Northern Ireland shall be such as may be determined by such Commission.
- Until the expiration of one month from the passing of the Act of Parliament for the ratification of this instrument, the powers of the Parliament and the Government of the Irish Free State shall not be exercisable as respects Northern Ireland, and the provisions of the Government of Ireland Act 1920, shall, so far as they relate to Northern Ireland remain of full force and effect, and no election shall be held for the return of members to serve in the Parliament of the Irish Free State for constituencies in Northern Ireland, unless a resolution is passed by both Houses of the Parliament of Northern Ireland in favour of the holding of such elections before the end of the said month.
- If before the expiration of the said month, an address is presented to His Majesty by both Houses of the Parliament of Northern Ireland to that effect, the powers of the Parliament and the Government of the Irish Free State shall no longer extend to Northern Ireland, and the provisions of the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, (including those relating to the Council of Ireland) shall so far as they relate to Northern Ireland, continue to be of full force and effect, and this instrument shall have effect subject to the necessary modifications.
- For the purpose of the last foregoing article, the powers of the Parliament of Southern Ireland under the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, to elect members of the Council of Ireland shall after the Parliament of the Irish Free State is constituted be exercised by that Parliament.
- After the expiration of the said month, if no such address as is mentioned in Article 12 hereof is presented, the Parliament and Government of Northern Ireland shall continue to exercise as respects Northern Ireland the powers conferred on them by the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, but the Parliament and Government of the Irish Free State shall in Northern Ireland have in relation to matters in respect of which the Parliament of Northern Ireland has not the power to make laws under the Act (including matters which under the said Act are within the jurisdiction of the Council of Ireland) the same powers as in the rest of Ireland, subject to such other provisions as may be agreed in manner hereinafter appearing.
- At any time after the date hereof the Government of Northern Ireland and the provisional Government of Southern Ireland hereinafter constituted may meet for the purpose of discussing the provisions subject to which the last foregoing Article is to operate in the event of no such address as is therein mentioned being presented and those provisions may include:-
(Signed)
- Safeguards with regard to patronage in Northern Ireland.
- Safeguards with regard to the collection of revenue in Northern Ireland.
- Safeguards with regard to import and export duties affecting the trade or industry of Northern Ireland.
- Safeguards for minorities in Northern Ireland.
- The settlement of the financial relations between Northern Ireland and the Irish Free State.
- The establishment and powers of a local militia in Northern Ireland and the relation of the Defence Forces of the Irish Free State and of Northern Ireland respectively, and if at any such meeting provisions are agreed to, the same shall have effect as if they were included amongst the provisions subject to which the powers of the Parliament and the Government of the Irish Free State are to be exercisable in Northern Ireland under Article 14 hereof.
- Neither the Parliament of the Irish Free State nor the Parliament of Northern Ireland shall make any law so as either directly or indirectly to endow any religion or prohibit or restrict the free exercise thereof or give any preference or impose any disability on account of religious belief or religious status or affect prejudicially the right of any child to attend a school receiving public money without attending the religious instruction at the school or make any discrimination as respects State aid between schools under the management of different religious denominations or divert from any religious denomination or any educational institution any of its property except for public utility purposes and on payment of compensation.
- By way of provisional arrangement for the administration of Southern Ireland during the interval which must elapse between the date hereof and the constitution of a Parliament and Government of the Irish Free State in accordance therewith, steps shall be taken forthwith for summoning a meeting of members of Parliament elected for constituencies in Southern Ireland since the passing of the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, and for constituting a provisional Government, and the British Government shall take the steps necessary to transfer to such provisional Government the powers and machinery requisite for the discharge of its duties, provided that every member of such provisional Government shall have signified in writing his or her acceptance of this instrument. But this arrangement shall not continue in force beyond the expiration of twelve months from the date hereof.
- This instrument shall be submitted forthwith by His Majesty’s Government for the approval of Parliament and by the Irish signatories to a meeting summoned for the purpose of the members elected to sit in the House of Commons of Southern Ireland and if approved shall be ratified by the necessary legislation.
BRITISH REPRESENTATIVES
MR. LLOYD GEORGE
MR. CHAMBERLAIN
LORD BIRKENHEAD
MR. CHURCHILL
IRISH REPRESENTATIVES.
MR. GRIFFITH
MR. COLLINS
MR. BARTON
6th December, 1921.
ANNEX.
1. The following are the specific facilities required:-
Dockyard Port at Berehaven.
(a) Admiralty property and rights to be retained as at the date hereof. Harbour defences to remain in charge of British care and maintenance parties.
Queenstown.
(b) Harbour defences to remain in charge of British care and maintenance parties. Certain mooring buoys to be retained for use of His Majesty’s ships.
Belfast Lough.
(c) Harbour defences to remain in charge of British care and maintenance parties.
Lough Swilly.
(d)Harbour defences to remain in charge of British care and maintenance parties.
AVIATION.
(e) Facilities in the neighbourhood of the above ports for coastal defence by air.
OIL FUEL STORAGE.
(f) Haulbowline: To be offered for sale to commercial companies under guarantee that purchasers
Rathmullen : shall maintain a certain minimum stock for Admiralty purposes.
2. A Convention shall be made between the British Government and the Government of the Irish Free State to give effect to the following conditions:-
(a) That submarine cables shall not be landed or wireless stations for communication with places outside Ireland be established except by agreement with the British Government; that the existing cable landing rights and wireless concessions shall not be withdrawn except by agreement with the British Government; and that the British Government shall be entitled to land additional submarine cables or establish additional wireless stations for communication with places outside Ireland.
(b) That lighthouses, buoys, beacons, and any navigational marks or navigational aids shall be maintained by the Government of the Irish Free State as at the date hereof and shall not be removed or added to except by agreement with the British Government […]*
(c) That war signal stations shall be closed down and left in charge of care and maintenance parties, the Government of the Irish Free State being offered the option of taking them over and working them for commercial purposes subject to Admiralty inspection, and guaranteeing the upkeep of existing telegraphic communication therewith.
3. A Convention shall be made between the same Governments for the regulation of Civil Communication by Air.
Macardle comments that the Irish Delegation ‘had contravened their instructions and in promising to recommend an agreement, they had exceeded their powers.’ Perhaps so, but of the Cabinet, three members were actual signatories in London with four remaining in Dublin, of which Cosgrave may have previously indicated to Collins that he approved a settlement. Initial Cabinet approval on a Treaty would have been approved 4 to 3.
The same day, Collins wrote to a friend “Will anyone be satisfied at the bargain?…. earlier this morning I signed my death warrant – a bullet might just as well have done the job five years ago….these signatures are the first real step for Ireland. If people will only remember that – the first real step”.
In a letter to Kitty Kiernan he wrote ‘I don’t know how things will go now, but with God’s help we have brought peace this land of ours, a peace that will end this old strife of ours, forever’
Lloyd George called the treaty “ ..a just and righteous settlement of the Irish Question”
Gavan-Duffy commenting some years later on the acceptance of the Treaty, that Griffith had reasoned that ‘if force did not follow rejection, then Lloyd George ‘would appeal over our heads to the country’ which was ‘likely to expose the weakness of the really national elements and perhaps to reveal an insistent yearning for peace’.
Arthur Mitchell ‘Revoloutionary Government in Ireland – Dail Eireann 1919-22’ Gill & McMillan 1996. P325
Professor J.J.Lee argues that the Treaty now signalled the beginning of ‘a bitter struggle between Collins and de Valera, both now fully alert to the incompatibility between their policies and personalities. Neither could reconcile himself for long to the role of second-in-command. Two ruthless men would inevitably be locked in a struggle for leadership, de Valera with the ruthlessness of righteousness, Collins with the ruthlessness of necessity.’ J.J.Lee ‘Ireland 1912-88 Politics & Society’ p.54
On the evening of the 6th, de Valera presiding at a Dante Commemoration in the Mansion House was met in the Lord Mayor’s office by Austin Stack with a copy of the Evening Mail newspaper carrying some details of the settlement terms of the document. Within minutes, Eamon Duggan and Desmond Fitzgerald brought the terms to Dublin ahead of the rest of the delegation and the news that the British Cabinet had approved publication of the terms ‘without reference to the Republican Cabinet’. De Valera initialled refused to accept the letter, but when advised of the 8pm press release, opened the envelope and scanned the contents.
The same day, Collins wrote to a friend “Will anyone be satisfied at the bargain?…. earlier this morning I signed my death warrant – a bullet might just as well have done the job five years ago….these signatures are the first real step for Ireland. If people will only remember that – the first real step”.
In a letter to Kitty Kiernan he wrote ‘I don’t know how things will go now, but with God’s help we have brought peace this land of ours, a peace that will end this old strife of ours, forever’
Lloyd George called the treaty “ ..a just and righteous settlement of the Irish Question”
Gavan-Duffy commenting some years later on the acceptance of the Treaty, that Griffith had reasoned that ‘if force did not follow rejection, then Lloyd George ‘would appeal over our heads to the country’ which was ‘likely to expose the weakness of the really national elements and perhaps to reveal an insistent yearning for peace’.
Arthur Mitchell ‘Revoloutionary Government in Ireland – Dail Eireann 1919-22’ Gill & McMillan 1996. P325
Professor J.J.Lee argues that the Treaty now signalled the beginning of ‘a bitter struggle between Collins and de Valera, both now fully alert to the incompatibility between their policies and personalities. Neither could reconcile himself for long to the role of second-in-command. Two ruthless men would inevitably be locked in a struggle for leadership, de Valera with the ruthlessness of righteousness, Collins with the ruthlessness of necessity.’ J.J.Lee ‘Ireland 1912-88 Politics & Society’ p.54
On the evening of the 6th, de Valera presiding at a Dante Commemoration in the Mansion House was met in the Lord Mayor’s office by Austin Stack with a copy of the Evening Mail newspaper carrying some details of the settlement terms of the document. Within minutes, Eamon Duggan and Desmond Fitzgerald brought the terms to Dublin ahead of the rest of the delegation and the news that the British Cabinet had approved publication of the terms ‘without reference to the Republican Cabinet’. De Valera initialled refused to accept the letter, but when advised of the 8pm press release, opened the envelope and scanned the contents.
7
The morning papers published the terms of the Treaty:
‘Reason has prevailed…the beginning of a new era of happiness and mutual understanding’. The Times
‘It is a splendid achievement’ – The Manchester Guardian.
‘Their names will live forever because the pact that brings to an end the centuries of irish strife is one of the most memorable documents in history’ The Daily Express
The Treaty from The Irish Times 7 December 1921
'The Irish situation has undergone a swift and almost bewildering change. Men rubbed their eyes yesterday like people who step suddenly from darkness into sunshine. Forty-eight hours ago a renewal of civil warfare seemed imminent. Today we are offered, in Lord Birkenhead's words, 'the sure and certain hope' of peace - not only of peace in Ireland, but of a pax Hibernica throughout the English-speaking world. 'A Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland' was signed in the small hours of yesterday morning by the leaders of the British Government and the plenipotentiaries of Sinn Féin. If the Treaty is ratified by the British Parliament and by the Southern Irish Parliament, the Free State of Ireland will come into existence before the end of 1922. It will have the same status as Canada in the community of nations known as the British Empire. In other words, it will have complete control of its own finance, customs and excise, and internal affairs. The British Government retains certain naval rights which satisfy the Admiralty; but Ireland may establish a military defence force on a proportional basis. The members of her Legislatures will take an oath of allegiance to the Free State and will swear fidelity to the King as Head of the Empire. She will pay her share of the war debt, subject to legitimate counter-claims which will be decided by arbitration. No law of the new State shall impose disabilities on account of religious belief or in the field of education. An important article of the treaty safeguards the rights of judges, police, and other public servants under the Government of Ireland Act. Such are the main terms of the charter which, if it is ratified and executed, will constitute the greatest transaction in Anglo-Irish history. If the plans of Downing Street and Washington prove to be equally successful, 1921 will stand as an annus mirabilis in the records of the world. The King has been 'overjoyed to hear the splendid news.'
One question remains. Will the Treaty hasten the event towards which everything that was best in the heart and soul and brain of the Irish people has yearned for a hundred years? Will it give us now, or in the near future, a united Ireland? Everything will depend on the spirit in which the Free State applies itself to its greatest task. Here will be the supreme test of its fitness for the tremendous responsibilities which the Imperial Parliament will be asked to confer upon it. The machinery which the Conference has contrived for bringing Ulster into the national fold is exceedingly ingenious. We may agree with Lord Birkenhead that the Government has kept its promise to Ulster. She remains free from coercion and she will be protected against any menace of coercion. Nevertheless, strong inducements towards unity will begin to accumulate from the moment when the Free State is formed. The State will include North-East Ulster; but within a month from the passing of the Act she may withdraw herself by means of an address to the King. In that event Ulster will retain all her existing powers and privileges under the Government of Ireland Act; but her decision will involve a new delimitation of the Northern boundaries. She will continue to pay her taxes to the Imperial Exchequer and, if Southern Ireland is so well and economically governed that Southern taxation is lower than Imperial taxation, a mighty lever in favour of unity will begin to operate in the commercial North. If and when Belfast turns its face towards Dublin, the Treaty offers it a variety of safeguards for its fiscal and industrial interests and for the protection of minorities. At this stage we can say only - but we say it with sincere satisfaction - that at last the foundations of Irish unity have been laid. Will Ireland build upon them?
We shall not indulge in premature felicitations. Though the whole outlook has been transformed, the future is still uncertain. It is possible that the Imperial Parliament may hold that the promise of Irish peace has been bought too dearly. It is possible that Dáil ƒireann may raise objections on the question of allegiance. The decisions of both assemblies may be affected by Ulster's attitude to the new agreement.
One thing, however, is certain. If this Treaty is ratified, if Irishmen of all creeds and parties combine to administer it in a spirit of broad-minded patriotism, if it bridges the gap between North and South, if it reconciles Ireland to the Empire - if it gives us all these blessings, it will be one of the most fruitful and most glorious achievements of modern statesmanship. It will close a hideous era of strife and bloodshed and will open a new era of material and intellectual progress. It will give to the rising generation in Ireland a scope for effort and prospects of happiness that their fathers never knew. Nobody will welcome it more gladly than the loyalists of Southern Ireland. For them Ireland does not exist, and never will exist, apart from the Empire which the blood of their sires and sons has cemented. If Ireland accepts the Empire with her heart, and not merely in the cautious wording of an oath, and if she accepts themselves as Imperial Irishmen, they will come joyfully to her aid. The Southern loyalists' gifts of education, character, and experience are essential to the building up of a new nationhood. They will rejoice to put those gifts into the common stock. During the darkest hours, they never lost their faith in Ireland's high destiny. Will that faith be rewarded now?
De Valera, Brugha, Stack and Cosgrave met to discuss the terms of the Treaty. De Valera insisted that the other three repudiate the Treaty and remove from the cabinet, Collins, Griffith and Barton. Brugha & Stack agreed with de Valera but Cosgrave refused on the point that the delegates should be heard first and given an opportunity to explain their actions. This was also the first indication for de Valera that perhaps 4 of the 7 inner Cabinet supported the Treaty.
Dail Eireann issued only one statement that day to the effect that the London delegation had been summonsed to report so that a cabinet decision could be made at midday on the 8th.
In London, Griffith issued a statement to the International News Service of America
‘These proposals do give Ireland control of her own destinies. They put our future in our own hands – enable us to stand on our own feet, develop our civilisation and national distinctiveness. In short we have won liberty after the struggle of centuries’
King George V ordered the release of all Sinn Fein prisoners following the signing of the treaty and on two occasions, returning prisoners aboard trains were bombed in Co. Down and Thurles, resulting in one fatality.
US Reaction
In the US, Diarmuid Lynch’s reaction to the Treaty is best described in this statement he made to the Press:
“...with Irish coastal fortifications under British Control, with power in the hands of the English Government to appoint a governor-general for Ireland, with the Irish Government restricted in a dozen different ways by England, with an Ireland swearing allegiance to a foreign king, the use of the term ‘Irish Free State’ is an insult to the dead who died fighting for an Independent Irish Republic. It is also an insult to the intelligence of the living men and women in Ireland who will still continue to fight for absolute separation from England, and the intelligence of millions of Americans who appreciate the difference between a free country and a Colony of England.”
Lynch Family Archives.
The Friends of Irish Freedom issued a statement on the Treaty:
‘well meaning men have suggested that the Friends of Irish Freedom should endorse the Free State. They are wrong. This organisation will never endorse the Free State and individual members should not do so. We were not consulted regarding the agreement made at London, nor regarding the conversations leading up to that agreement. If we had been consulted we would not have approved...on the contrary we can best serve the Race by refusing to endorse because we can always show historically by the conclusive testimony of men who took part on the conversations at London that the agreement or Treaty was entered into under duress - so far as Ireland was concerned - under much duress that the compromise made can never be morally binding, upon this or future generations of the Race - unless that compromise is now ratified and approved by the free will of the Race at home and abroad.
While the indications are that at a proposed general election, the people of Ireland may, by a majority, vote for the Free State Government, we assert that, in view of their repeated declarations for an independent Republic in recent years, such coming vote will not represent the free will of the Irish people, but will be given merely to escape the ever present English threat of a renewal of the war of devastation and extermination.
One of the main purposes for which the Friends of Irish Freedom exists is to aid in securing the absolute independence of Ireland...we have not deviated and we will not deviate from that policy. We are opposed to external as well as internal association of Ireland with the British Empire. We reaffirm our belief that Ireland can never achieve liberty nor reach a place of equality with independent nations while any connection with England remains, and that a free and independent Republic, separated from the empire and controlling the destinies of the Irish people, is the only solution of the Irish national problem.’
Diarmuid Lynch "The I.R.B. and the 1916 Rising" Mercier Press. 1957. p215
The New York Times interviewed three of the Irish-American leaders for it’s header on the Treaty with Britain. The leaders of the Friends of Irish Freedom, Diarmuid Lynch, Judge Cohalan and John Devoy spoke out against the Treaty, and as for the President of the American Association for the Recognition of the Irish Republic, Edward Doheny, he felt that: ‘It is a great event throughout the British Dominions, but nowhere more portentous than here in America. It removes the greatest obstruction to a frank and friendly intercourse between this country and Great Britain..’
Diarmuid Lynch was more forthright in his condemnation of the Treaty, with his opinion that ‘with Irish coastal fortifications under British control...with an Ireland swearing allegiance to a foreign King, the use of the term ‘Irish Free State’ is an insult to the dead who died fighting for an independent Irish Republic’
Lynch Family Archives.
Judge Cohalan was equally caustic in his comments: ‘Lloyd George has won the greatest diplomatic triumph of his career. He has braced up the tottering British Empire for the moment by attaching it to an apparently satisfied Ireland. He hopes, largely as a consequence, as the London papers and their echoes here show, to proceed now to similarly attach America.’
The veteran Fenian, John Devoy seemed somewhat muted in his response: "The agreement will undoubtedly be altered to some extent; but whatever alterations are made in it, Ireland will remain under it an integral part of the British Empire. Parnell said that no man can set limits to the onward march of a nation; and this Agreement won't set limits to the onward march of the Irish nation to the only goal that is worth having - that is, to the Irish Republic."
Below: Press statement drafts by Diarmuid Lynch, Judge Cohalan and John Devoy issued December 7, 1921.
The morning papers published the terms of the Treaty:
‘Reason has prevailed…the beginning of a new era of happiness and mutual understanding’. The Times
‘It is a splendid achievement’ – The Manchester Guardian.
‘Their names will live forever because the pact that brings to an end the centuries of irish strife is one of the most memorable documents in history’ The Daily Express
The Treaty from The Irish Times 7 December 1921
'The Irish situation has undergone a swift and almost bewildering change. Men rubbed their eyes yesterday like people who step suddenly from darkness into sunshine. Forty-eight hours ago a renewal of civil warfare seemed imminent. Today we are offered, in Lord Birkenhead's words, 'the sure and certain hope' of peace - not only of peace in Ireland, but of a pax Hibernica throughout the English-speaking world. 'A Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland' was signed in the small hours of yesterday morning by the leaders of the British Government and the plenipotentiaries of Sinn Féin. If the Treaty is ratified by the British Parliament and by the Southern Irish Parliament, the Free State of Ireland will come into existence before the end of 1922. It will have the same status as Canada in the community of nations known as the British Empire. In other words, it will have complete control of its own finance, customs and excise, and internal affairs. The British Government retains certain naval rights which satisfy the Admiralty; but Ireland may establish a military defence force on a proportional basis. The members of her Legislatures will take an oath of allegiance to the Free State and will swear fidelity to the King as Head of the Empire. She will pay her share of the war debt, subject to legitimate counter-claims which will be decided by arbitration. No law of the new State shall impose disabilities on account of religious belief or in the field of education. An important article of the treaty safeguards the rights of judges, police, and other public servants under the Government of Ireland Act. Such are the main terms of the charter which, if it is ratified and executed, will constitute the greatest transaction in Anglo-Irish history. If the plans of Downing Street and Washington prove to be equally successful, 1921 will stand as an annus mirabilis in the records of the world. The King has been 'overjoyed to hear the splendid news.'
One question remains. Will the Treaty hasten the event towards which everything that was best in the heart and soul and brain of the Irish people has yearned for a hundred years? Will it give us now, or in the near future, a united Ireland? Everything will depend on the spirit in which the Free State applies itself to its greatest task. Here will be the supreme test of its fitness for the tremendous responsibilities which the Imperial Parliament will be asked to confer upon it. The machinery which the Conference has contrived for bringing Ulster into the national fold is exceedingly ingenious. We may agree with Lord Birkenhead that the Government has kept its promise to Ulster. She remains free from coercion and she will be protected against any menace of coercion. Nevertheless, strong inducements towards unity will begin to accumulate from the moment when the Free State is formed. The State will include North-East Ulster; but within a month from the passing of the Act she may withdraw herself by means of an address to the King. In that event Ulster will retain all her existing powers and privileges under the Government of Ireland Act; but her decision will involve a new delimitation of the Northern boundaries. She will continue to pay her taxes to the Imperial Exchequer and, if Southern Ireland is so well and economically governed that Southern taxation is lower than Imperial taxation, a mighty lever in favour of unity will begin to operate in the commercial North. If and when Belfast turns its face towards Dublin, the Treaty offers it a variety of safeguards for its fiscal and industrial interests and for the protection of minorities. At this stage we can say only - but we say it with sincere satisfaction - that at last the foundations of Irish unity have been laid. Will Ireland build upon them?
We shall not indulge in premature felicitations. Though the whole outlook has been transformed, the future is still uncertain. It is possible that the Imperial Parliament may hold that the promise of Irish peace has been bought too dearly. It is possible that Dáil ƒireann may raise objections on the question of allegiance. The decisions of both assemblies may be affected by Ulster's attitude to the new agreement.
One thing, however, is certain. If this Treaty is ratified, if Irishmen of all creeds and parties combine to administer it in a spirit of broad-minded patriotism, if it bridges the gap between North and South, if it reconciles Ireland to the Empire - if it gives us all these blessings, it will be one of the most fruitful and most glorious achievements of modern statesmanship. It will close a hideous era of strife and bloodshed and will open a new era of material and intellectual progress. It will give to the rising generation in Ireland a scope for effort and prospects of happiness that their fathers never knew. Nobody will welcome it more gladly than the loyalists of Southern Ireland. For them Ireland does not exist, and never will exist, apart from the Empire which the blood of their sires and sons has cemented. If Ireland accepts the Empire with her heart, and not merely in the cautious wording of an oath, and if she accepts themselves as Imperial Irishmen, they will come joyfully to her aid. The Southern loyalists' gifts of education, character, and experience are essential to the building up of a new nationhood. They will rejoice to put those gifts into the common stock. During the darkest hours, they never lost their faith in Ireland's high destiny. Will that faith be rewarded now?
De Valera, Brugha, Stack and Cosgrave met to discuss the terms of the Treaty. De Valera insisted that the other three repudiate the Treaty and remove from the cabinet, Collins, Griffith and Barton. Brugha & Stack agreed with de Valera but Cosgrave refused on the point that the delegates should be heard first and given an opportunity to explain their actions. This was also the first indication for de Valera that perhaps 4 of the 7 inner Cabinet supported the Treaty.
Dail Eireann issued only one statement that day to the effect that the London delegation had been summonsed to report so that a cabinet decision could be made at midday on the 8th.
In London, Griffith issued a statement to the International News Service of America
‘These proposals do give Ireland control of her own destinies. They put our future in our own hands – enable us to stand on our own feet, develop our civilisation and national distinctiveness. In short we have won liberty after the struggle of centuries’
King George V ordered the release of all Sinn Fein prisoners following the signing of the treaty and on two occasions, returning prisoners aboard trains were bombed in Co. Down and Thurles, resulting in one fatality.
US Reaction
In the US, Diarmuid Lynch’s reaction to the Treaty is best described in this statement he made to the Press:
“...with Irish coastal fortifications under British Control, with power in the hands of the English Government to appoint a governor-general for Ireland, with the Irish Government restricted in a dozen different ways by England, with an Ireland swearing allegiance to a foreign king, the use of the term ‘Irish Free State’ is an insult to the dead who died fighting for an Independent Irish Republic. It is also an insult to the intelligence of the living men and women in Ireland who will still continue to fight for absolute separation from England, and the intelligence of millions of Americans who appreciate the difference between a free country and a Colony of England.”
Lynch Family Archives.
The Friends of Irish Freedom issued a statement on the Treaty:
‘well meaning men have suggested that the Friends of Irish Freedom should endorse the Free State. They are wrong. This organisation will never endorse the Free State and individual members should not do so. We were not consulted regarding the agreement made at London, nor regarding the conversations leading up to that agreement. If we had been consulted we would not have approved...on the contrary we can best serve the Race by refusing to endorse because we can always show historically by the conclusive testimony of men who took part on the conversations at London that the agreement or Treaty was entered into under duress - so far as Ireland was concerned - under much duress that the compromise made can never be morally binding, upon this or future generations of the Race - unless that compromise is now ratified and approved by the free will of the Race at home and abroad.
While the indications are that at a proposed general election, the people of Ireland may, by a majority, vote for the Free State Government, we assert that, in view of their repeated declarations for an independent Republic in recent years, such coming vote will not represent the free will of the Irish people, but will be given merely to escape the ever present English threat of a renewal of the war of devastation and extermination.
One of the main purposes for which the Friends of Irish Freedom exists is to aid in securing the absolute independence of Ireland...we have not deviated and we will not deviate from that policy. We are opposed to external as well as internal association of Ireland with the British Empire. We reaffirm our belief that Ireland can never achieve liberty nor reach a place of equality with independent nations while any connection with England remains, and that a free and independent Republic, separated from the empire and controlling the destinies of the Irish people, is the only solution of the Irish national problem.’
Diarmuid Lynch "The I.R.B. and the 1916 Rising" Mercier Press. 1957. p215
The New York Times interviewed three of the Irish-American leaders for it’s header on the Treaty with Britain. The leaders of the Friends of Irish Freedom, Diarmuid Lynch, Judge Cohalan and John Devoy spoke out against the Treaty, and as for the President of the American Association for the Recognition of the Irish Republic, Edward Doheny, he felt that: ‘It is a great event throughout the British Dominions, but nowhere more portentous than here in America. It removes the greatest obstruction to a frank and friendly intercourse between this country and Great Britain..’
Diarmuid Lynch was more forthright in his condemnation of the Treaty, with his opinion that ‘with Irish coastal fortifications under British control...with an Ireland swearing allegiance to a foreign King, the use of the term ‘Irish Free State’ is an insult to the dead who died fighting for an independent Irish Republic’
Lynch Family Archives.
Judge Cohalan was equally caustic in his comments: ‘Lloyd George has won the greatest diplomatic triumph of his career. He has braced up the tottering British Empire for the moment by attaching it to an apparently satisfied Ireland. He hopes, largely as a consequence, as the London papers and their echoes here show, to proceed now to similarly attach America.’
The veteran Fenian, John Devoy seemed somewhat muted in his response: "The agreement will undoubtedly be altered to some extent; but whatever alterations are made in it, Ireland will remain under it an integral part of the British Empire. Parnell said that no man can set limits to the onward march of a nation; and this Agreement won't set limits to the onward march of the Irish nation to the only goal that is worth having - that is, to the Irish Republic."
Below: Press statement drafts by Diarmuid Lynch, Judge Cohalan and John Devoy issued December 7, 1921.
8
The Delegates returned from London and would have been arrested on arrival if some Commandants of the Republican Army had their way. There had been preparations to arrest them as they arrived for high treason against the Republic but Cathal Brugha refused to allow it.
On return, Collins called for a full Supreme Council meeting of the I.R.B to discuss the Treaty to be held on the 12th December.
Cabinet Treaty Discussion
The Dail Cabinet met for five hours to discuss the Treaty and to vote. Griffith defended the agreement stating there was no duress, Barton and Gavan Duffy admitting they signed solely to prevent war. Childers commenting later that ‘Collins argued ‘ that in a contest between a great Empire and a small nation, this was as far as the small nation could get. Until the British Empire was destroyed, Ireland could get no more’
Arthur Mitchell ‘Revoloutionary Government in Ireland – Dail Eireann 1919-22’ Gill & McMillan 1996. P326
Brugha warned that there would be Army opposition to the Treaty, but that he would abide by the Dail decision. De Valera stating that ‘The army as such was the instrument of the Civil Government and must obey the decision of the Dail’. On proposal of Treaty acceptance, De Valera, Brugha and Stack refused to recommend the document to the Dail but on the vote as expected, Collins, Griffith and Barton voted for the Treaty to be submitted along with Cosgrave whom had been counted on previously to vote against it. The Treaty would now be submitted to the Dail for approval.
De Valera issued a press statement, effectively outlining his bloc’s opposition to the Treaty, informing the people that he believed the Treaty was ‘in violent conflict with the wishes of the majority of the nation as expressed freely in the successive elections during the last three years’. Therefore he was unable to ‘recommend the acceptance of the Treaty either to Dail Eireann or to the country’.
Public opinion however was one of relief that a treaty had been concluded, meaning an end to the hostilities, the fighting, the Black and Tans, the Auxiliaries and the British Forces. An opportunity to look ahead, to self-Government and peace.
In London, Sir James Craig met with Lloyd George and discussed the Boundary Commission where a ‘slight re-adjustment’ would be made of the boundary to bring in Ulster Loyalists and to place those with Sinn Fein ‘sympathies to the area of the Irish Free State..’ This however, did not satisfy Craig and addressed the Northern Irish parliament said he still felt ‘grave disastisfaction and alarm’.
Sturgis wrote ‘We are living in a most exciting whirl…today the Sinn Fein cabinet is splitting. It is rumoured that de Valera is amongst the malcontents – may split off and lead a Republican party – that the Cabinet is over and de Valera is defeated and is down and out etc etc – we shall see..’
The Last Days of Dublin Castle – The Diaries of Mark Sturgis. Irish Academic Press Dublin & Oregon 1999. p 225
"With Irish coastal fortifications under British control, with an Ireland swearing allegiance to a foreign King, the use of the term "Irish Free State" is an insult to the dead who died fighting for an independent Irish Republic"
Diarmuid Lynch
9
Griffith issued a statement ot the press on the Treaty that ‘I believe that this treaty will lay the foundation of peace and friendship between the two nations. What I have signed I will stand by, in the belief that the end of the conflict of centuries is at hand’
Dail Eireann was summonsed to meet on December 14th with a statement by de Valera that the Treaty would not take effect unless ratified by the Dail and the British Parliament.
The Irish Independent published a letter of support by 15 members of the Hierarchy for the Treaty.
Lloyd George met with Sir James Craig to discuss the operation of the Boundary Commission, making a ‘Slight readjustment’ of the boundary line to bring in loyalists who were now outside that area and to exclude ‘an equivalent number of those having Sinn Fein sympathies to the area of the Irish Free State.’. This did not in any way satisfy Sir James as it meant the possible loss of Fermanagh and Tyrone to the Irish Free State under a plebiscite to determine the ‘wishes of the inhabitants’
Sturgis wrote of de Valera that ‘they expect him to have a very poor following. With him in the Cabinet are Burgess and Stack and outside it I suppose Mulcahy. I am told today that the IRA Commandants are practically unanimous behind Collins for peace. Andy [Cope] is not quite so happy as MacMahon as he regards it possible that de Valera may throw himself into the arms of Labour and thus form a Republican opposition. Personally I don’t care if he does – I think he is finished.’
The Last Days of Dublin Castle – The Diaries of Mark Sturgis. Irish Academic Press Dublin & Oregon 1999. p 225
IRA prisoners were released from internment camps beginning on this date.
Griffith issued a statement ot the press on the Treaty that ‘I believe that this treaty will lay the foundation of peace and friendship between the two nations. What I have signed I will stand by, in the belief that the end of the conflict of centuries is at hand’
Dail Eireann was summonsed to meet on December 14th with a statement by de Valera that the Treaty would not take effect unless ratified by the Dail and the British Parliament.
The Irish Independent published a letter of support by 15 members of the Hierarchy for the Treaty.
Lloyd George met with Sir James Craig to discuss the operation of the Boundary Commission, making a ‘Slight readjustment’ of the boundary line to bring in loyalists who were now outside that area and to exclude ‘an equivalent number of those having Sinn Fein sympathies to the area of the Irish Free State.’. This did not in any way satisfy Sir James as it meant the possible loss of Fermanagh and Tyrone to the Irish Free State under a plebiscite to determine the ‘wishes of the inhabitants’
Sturgis wrote of de Valera that ‘they expect him to have a very poor following. With him in the Cabinet are Burgess and Stack and outside it I suppose Mulcahy. I am told today that the IRA Commandants are practically unanimous behind Collins for peace. Andy [Cope] is not quite so happy as MacMahon as he regards it possible that de Valera may throw himself into the arms of Labour and thus form a Republican opposition. Personally I don’t care if he does – I think he is finished.’
The Last Days of Dublin Castle – The Diaries of Mark Sturgis. Irish Academic Press Dublin & Oregon 1999. p 225
IRA prisoners were released from internment camps beginning on this date.
10
The press carried the first rumblings of the split with a Times headline ‘De Valera Challenge…there is much speculation in ireland as to the outcome of the split in the Sinn Fein Cabinet. The statement made by Mr. De Valera came as a bombshell and everyone is wondering what is going to happen next. Is it peace or is it war?’
‘Ireland's sovereign independence is acknowledged by the British Cabinet and their action is approved by Britain’s King. This much is certain’.
Joe McGarrity in the Irish Press, Philadelphia.
‘I am delighted with the result of the Irish peace negotiations, De Valera, who led the Irish people in this grim and heroic fight for liberty, will now take his place in history alongside of Washington’.
James E Murray. Vice President on the American Association for the Recognition of the Irish Republic. The Butte Montana Independent.
De Valera began work on a re-draft of the Irish proposals. Macardle comments that he intended these to emphasise the safeguards offered to Britain and Ulster’s Unionists but in such a way as to leave Ireland free to maintain the Republic.
Lady Hazel Lavery maintained frequent contact through letters with Michael Collins. Commenting on the Churchill Treaty speech in the Commons, she wrote ‘ it was very long but excellent…and generally well received, excepting of course by the Tories who still rage, albeit more and more powerlessly..’
Sinead McCoole ‘Hazel – A Life of Lady Lavery 1880-1935’. Lilliput Press, Dublin 1996. P83
James Larkin; ‘We pledge ourselves now and in the future, to destroy this plan of a nation’s destruction. We propose carrying on the fight until we make the land of Erin a land fit for men and women – a Worker’s Republic of death’
Conor O’Clery ‘Ireland in Quotes’ The O’Brien Press Dublin 1999 p.56
At a meeting of the Supreme Council of the IRB, 11 supported the Treaty and 4 opposed it.
In Belfast, nationalist areas came under sustained attack from loyalist gunmen
11
Friends of Irish Freedom National Convention, New York.
By the time the Friends of Irish Freedom National Convention met at the Hotel Astor where it was founded 5 years before, the membership had grown to 26,350 regular members and 157 associate branches, but with two nation-wide organisations now claiming the allegiance of Irish American, the effectiveness of both was reduced. Diarmuid Lynch continued to be the National Secretary of the Friends and was re-elected along with Thomas F Cooney as National President and Michael McGreal as National Treasurer.
Without doubt, there was deep disappointment within the leadership of the Friends of Irish Freedom at the terms of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Each held some hopes that the Irish Free State would eventually either gain or fight for complete independence. The President of the Friends, Bishop Gallagher stated: ‘As American citizens, notwithstanding the compromise that has been reached, we cannot lower the flag of freedom’.
John Devoy, the oldest living Fenian was somewhat philosophical: ‘The agreement will undoubtedly be altered to some extent, but whatever alterations are made in it, Ireland will remain under it an integral part of the British Empire. Parnell said that no man can set limits to the onward march of a nation; and this agreement won't set limits on the onward march of the Irish nation to the only goal that is worth having - to the Irish Republic’.
The Treaty terms were rejected by the Friends and the organisations disappointment was expressed that far less had been achieved through the Treaty than the Republic which many had fought and died for since 1916.
A statement of principle from The Friends soon issued:
"We have given all the moral and material aid within our power, consistent with our duties and responsibilities as American citizens, in support of the Irish Republic. We will continue to give that support to those who carry forward the fight for complete national independence."
The Freemans Journal 29 December 1921 & quoted by Eileen McGough.'Diarmuid Lynch: A Forgotten Irish Patriot'. Mercier Press 2013. p154
Macus Garvey of the Universal Negro Improvement Association ‘ summoned a special mass meeting at Liberty Hall. He spoke on "Ireland and Africa," stating that "we have a cause similar to the cause of Ireland." Garvey made plain his support for the negotiated settlement with England: "I am glad that Ireland has won some modicum of self-government. I am not thoroughly pleased with the sort of freedom that is given to them, but nevertheless I believe that they have received enough upon which they can improve. . . ." Garvey then read a cable, to be sent to the leading Irish treaty negotiator Arthur Griffith, signed "Marcus Garvey, Provisional President of Africa." The cable informed Griffith: "Six thousand of us assembled in Liberty Hall, New York, representing the four hundred million Negroes of the world, send you congratulations on your masterly achievement of partial independence for Ireland. The stage is set for a greater day for Ireland. Long live the new Irish Free State."
Robert A Hill. “The Marcus Garvey and UNIA Papers Project “ UCLA ( Via Internet Site June 1997
Friends of Irish Freedom National Convention, New York.
By the time the Friends of Irish Freedom National Convention met at the Hotel Astor where it was founded 5 years before, the membership had grown to 26,350 regular members and 157 associate branches, but with two nation-wide organisations now claiming the allegiance of Irish American, the effectiveness of both was reduced. Diarmuid Lynch continued to be the National Secretary of the Friends and was re-elected along with Thomas F Cooney as National President and Michael McGreal as National Treasurer.
Without doubt, there was deep disappointment within the leadership of the Friends of Irish Freedom at the terms of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Each held some hopes that the Irish Free State would eventually either gain or fight for complete independence. The President of the Friends, Bishop Gallagher stated: ‘As American citizens, notwithstanding the compromise that has been reached, we cannot lower the flag of freedom’.
John Devoy, the oldest living Fenian was somewhat philosophical: ‘The agreement will undoubtedly be altered to some extent, but whatever alterations are made in it, Ireland will remain under it an integral part of the British Empire. Parnell said that no man can set limits to the onward march of a nation; and this agreement won't set limits on the onward march of the Irish nation to the only goal that is worth having - to the Irish Republic’.
The Treaty terms were rejected by the Friends and the organisations disappointment was expressed that far less had been achieved through the Treaty than the Republic which many had fought and died for since 1916.
A statement of principle from The Friends soon issued:
"We have given all the moral and material aid within our power, consistent with our duties and responsibilities as American citizens, in support of the Irish Republic. We will continue to give that support to those who carry forward the fight for complete national independence."
The Freemans Journal 29 December 1921 & quoted by Eileen McGough.'Diarmuid Lynch: A Forgotten Irish Patriot'. Mercier Press 2013. p154
Macus Garvey of the Universal Negro Improvement Association ‘ summoned a special mass meeting at Liberty Hall. He spoke on "Ireland and Africa," stating that "we have a cause similar to the cause of Ireland." Garvey made plain his support for the negotiated settlement with England: "I am glad that Ireland has won some modicum of self-government. I am not thoroughly pleased with the sort of freedom that is given to them, but nevertheless I believe that they have received enough upon which they can improve. . . ." Garvey then read a cable, to be sent to the leading Irish treaty negotiator Arthur Griffith, signed "Marcus Garvey, Provisional President of Africa." The cable informed Griffith: "Six thousand of us assembled in Liberty Hall, New York, representing the four hundred million Negroes of the world, send you congratulations on your masterly achievement of partial independence for Ireland. The stage is set for a greater day for Ireland. Long live the new Irish Free State."
Robert A Hill. “The Marcus Garvey and UNIA Papers Project “ UCLA ( Via Internet Site June 1997
12
Speaking before the Northern Ireland Parliament, Craig expressed ‘grave dissatisfaction and alarm’ at the proposed actions of the Boundary Commission.
A meeting of the Supreme Council of the I.R.B met to discuss the Treaty. There, the majority decided that the Treaty should be supported with those who were TD’s given the freedom to vote according to their choice. The statement went on to add that the IRB was ready ‘to make use of all instruments, political and otherwise, which were likely to aid in the attainment of its final end i.e. a free and independent Republican Government in Ireland. The IRB argument was essentially that the Treaty gave ‘freedom to achieve freedom’.
De Valera’s official biography stated however that ‘the influence of the organisation was powerfully used to secure an acceptance of the settlement’
Longford & O’Neill. “Eamon De Valera” Gill & McMillan. 1970. P174
McGarrity’s Irish Press in Philadelphia initially welcomed the agreement ‘Irelands sovereign independence is acknowledged by the British Cabinet and their action is approved by the Britain’s King. This much is certain.’
Its editorial stated: ‘The army of Ireland will take possession of the strongholds held by the British for centuries. The Irish flag will soon be seen on every sea, a menace to no nation or people, seeking only the right of fair trading with the world and bringing peace and goodwill wherever it appears. May its folds never be stained in the pursuit of Empire. Let every Irish heart be lifted up to his maker in gratitude for this approaching blessing which apparently h was willing to bestow. May no treachery of Ireland’s ancient enemy or lack of caution by Ireland’s friends longer prevent the realisation of Ireland’s absolute freedom.’
Sean Cronin. ‘The McGarrity Papers’ Anvil Press 1972. P122
Sergeant John Maher (24) from Carlow was killed in Ballybunion, Co. Kerry by four armed men. The Sergeant was understood to be ‘a marked man’ when it was alleged he had shot a man in Ballylongford.
Speaking before the Northern Ireland Parliament, Craig expressed ‘grave dissatisfaction and alarm’ at the proposed actions of the Boundary Commission.
A meeting of the Supreme Council of the I.R.B met to discuss the Treaty. There, the majority decided that the Treaty should be supported with those who were TD’s given the freedom to vote according to their choice. The statement went on to add that the IRB was ready ‘to make use of all instruments, political and otherwise, which were likely to aid in the attainment of its final end i.e. a free and independent Republican Government in Ireland. The IRB argument was essentially that the Treaty gave ‘freedom to achieve freedom’.
De Valera’s official biography stated however that ‘the influence of the organisation was powerfully used to secure an acceptance of the settlement’
Longford & O’Neill. “Eamon De Valera” Gill & McMillan. 1970. P174
McGarrity’s Irish Press in Philadelphia initially welcomed the agreement ‘Irelands sovereign independence is acknowledged by the British Cabinet and their action is approved by the Britain’s King. This much is certain.’
Its editorial stated: ‘The army of Ireland will take possession of the strongholds held by the British for centuries. The Irish flag will soon be seen on every sea, a menace to no nation or people, seeking only the right of fair trading with the world and bringing peace and goodwill wherever it appears. May its folds never be stained in the pursuit of Empire. Let every Irish heart be lifted up to his maker in gratitude for this approaching blessing which apparently h was willing to bestow. May no treachery of Ireland’s ancient enemy or lack of caution by Ireland’s friends longer prevent the realisation of Ireland’s absolute freedom.’
Sean Cronin. ‘The McGarrity Papers’ Anvil Press 1972. P122
Sergeant John Maher (24) from Carlow was killed in Ballybunion, Co. Kerry by four armed men. The Sergeant was understood to be ‘a marked man’ when it was alleged he had shot a man in Ballylongford.
13
Below: part of extensive cable from Lynch & the Friends of Irish Freedom to Kathleen Clarke advising of the Friends Declaration of Principles adopted at the National Convention, December 10 & 11, 1921. (further details and transcript to follow)
Below: part of extensive cable from Lynch & the Friends of Irish Freedom to Kathleen Clarke advising of the Friends Declaration of Principles adopted at the National Convention, December 10 & 11, 1921. (further details and transcript to follow)
Letter from Judge Jeremiah J Lynch of Butte, Montana to Judge Cohalan. Context and transcription to follow.
14
Parliamentary debates on the Treaty opened in both Dail Eireann and the House of Commons. While these debates were concluded within two days in London with large majorities, the initial meetings in Dublin were in private and resulting Treaty discussions lasted for 12 sessions in Dublin ending on January 10, 1922.
“Apart from a few speeches, the majority of the contributions to the debate were tedious, repetitious and irrelevant. Many of the Deputies who sat and listened were bogged down by the overpowering verbiage, and were ashamed at the personal abuse thrown at Collins and Griffith by some of the speakers.
Mark Tierney. Modern Ireland. Gill & MacMillan. Dublin 1972. p139.
Lloyd George recommended his Articles of Agreement in Parliament saying ‘They have been received in every quarter in this country with satisfaction and with relief. They have been received throughout the whole of His Majesty’s Dominions with acclaim.’
In Ireland, the situation was quite different. The Cabinet was divided with the President strongly against the Treaty and the debate opened with no argument either for or against the Treaty.
Dail Eireann – Treaty Debates. Session 1
The meeting of Dáil Eireann to deal with the Peace Treaty began in the Council Chamber, University College, Dublin, on Wednesday, December 14th, 1921. The Speaker (Dr. Eoin Mac Neill National University and Derry) took the Chair at 11.30 a.m., opened the proceedings calling on the Clerk to the Dail, Diarmuid O’hEigceartuigh to call the roll.
Parliamentary debates on the Treaty opened in both Dail Eireann and the House of Commons. While these debates were concluded within two days in London with large majorities, the initial meetings in Dublin were in private and resulting Treaty discussions lasted for 12 sessions in Dublin ending on January 10, 1922.
“Apart from a few speeches, the majority of the contributions to the debate were tedious, repetitious and irrelevant. Many of the Deputies who sat and listened were bogged down by the overpowering verbiage, and were ashamed at the personal abuse thrown at Collins and Griffith by some of the speakers.
Mark Tierney. Modern Ireland. Gill & MacMillan. Dublin 1972. p139.
Lloyd George recommended his Articles of Agreement in Parliament saying ‘They have been received in every quarter in this country with satisfaction and with relief. They have been received throughout the whole of His Majesty’s Dominions with acclaim.’
In Ireland, the situation was quite different. The Cabinet was divided with the President strongly against the Treaty and the debate opened with no argument either for or against the Treaty.
Dail Eireann – Treaty Debates. Session 1
The meeting of Dáil Eireann to deal with the Peace Treaty began in the Council Chamber, University College, Dublin, on Wednesday, December 14th, 1921. The Speaker (Dr. Eoin Mac Neill National University and Derry) took the Chair at 11.30 a.m., opened the proceedings calling on the Clerk to the Dail, Diarmuid O’hEigceartuigh to call the roll.
Debate summary:
Opening statements by President de Valera revolved around the apointment of the plenipotentiaries and their terms of reference, responsibility to report back to the Cabinet and ‘ If there was a definite difference of opinion, it was the plenipotentiaries had the responsibility of making up their own minds and deciding on it. We had ourselves the right of refusing to agree with them, if we thought that was right. It was also obvious that the Cabinet and the plenipotentiaries should keep in the closest possible touch. We did that. We were in agreement up to a certain point. A definite question had then to be decided and we did not agree.’ And stated that the negotiating team had not followed their instructions, a charge flatly denied by Arthur Griffith.
Michael Collins specified that the ‘final document which was agreed on by a united Cabinet, should be put side by side with the final document which the Delegation of Plenipotentiaries did not sign as a treaty, but did sign on the understanding that each signatory would recommend it to the Dáil for acceptance’
This was followed by Parliamentary argument as to should the Dail meet publicly or privately. D. Ceannt (Cork) commenting that all future sessions be held in public as ‘ I am thoroughly dissatisfied with the information we are getting here from time to time.’ De Valera stating ‘ This question of finding out how differences of opinion arose is the only question that cannot be probed except in private, whereas the big question is a matter for the whole nation obviously and it should be held in public.’
Sean McEntee (Monaghan) disagreed with de Valera: ‘ There are some of us to-day who may be called upon later to justify the positions they are taking before the country. Every factor that determines the position ought to be made plain to the public….we were not bound to ratify the treaty which the delegates proposed to us…. there ought to be no private session of the Dáil except upon one subject---that which relates to our military, financial or other resources. Remember the Treaty is not yet ratified. Anything like that which would give information to the enemy or would be helpful to them in the subversion of Irish liberties should be private’
Sean McGarry with a touch of humour agreed with McEntee ‘ I wish this session of the Dáil could be held on the Curragh, so that every man, woman and child in Ireland could hear us.’
Sean Etchingham (Wexford) agreed that the proceedings be held publicly and highlighted that ‘ The country has been kept in the dark and the people are saying so. The liberty and interests of Ireland are the concern of every man and woman and boy and girl, and they should be as conversant with it as any of us. Let us have all the public discussion we can….. I believe we are all here in the interests of Ireland.’
Michael Collins, while stating he was not in favour of a private session, pushed forward the debate protesting that the original credentials document should have been read first and requested permission to read it.
De Valera responded ‘ Was that ever presented? It was given in order to get the British Government to recognise the Irish Republic. Was that document giving the credentials of the accredited representatives from the Irish Government to the British Government presented to, or accepted by, the British delegates? Was that taken by the British delegates or accepted by them?’
Arthur Griffith ( Minister for Foreign Affairs ) stated they had no instructions to present it.
After some initial protests from de Valera, Michael Collins read the credientials document dated October 7th and with the Dail Eireann seal affixed:
"In virtue of the authority vested in me by Dáil Eireann, I hereby appoint Arthur Griffith, T.D., Minister for Foreign Affairs, Chairman; Michael Collins, T.D., Minister for Finance; Robert C. Barton, T.D., Minister for Economic Affairs; Edmund J. Duggan, T.D.; and George Gavan Duffy, T.D. as envoys plenipotentiaries from the elected Government of the Republic of Ireland to negotiate and conclude on behalf of Ireland, with the representatives of his Britannic Majesty George V. a treaty or treaties of settlement, association and accommodation between Ireland and the community of nations, known as the British Commonwealth. In witness hereof I hereunder subscribe my name as President.
Signed EAMON DE VALERA
‘ … I do not object to the second document being read, but the prior document should have been read first and we have agreed, those of us who differ---those of us who take one stand---to make no statement which would in any way prejudge the issue until this meeting of Dáil Eireann. Publicly and privately we did not prejudge the issue; we even refrained from speaking to members of the Dáil. I have not said a hard word about anybody. I know I have been called a traitor. [Cries of `no, no']. … If I am a traitor, let the Irish people decide it or not, and if there are men who act towards me as a traitor I am prepared to meet them anywhere, any time, now as in the past. For that reason I do not want the issue prejudged. I am in favour of a public session here now… <SMALL></SMALL>I agree with what the President said that the honour of Ireland was not involved in accepting this document. Ireland is fully free to accept or reject. Many a parliament of a country has refused to accept decisions of plenipotentiaries even if these decisions might be considered legally and morally more binding than the present decisions. I can only make plain again that the document is agreed to by the signatories and recommended to the Dáil for acceptance. If the Dáil does not accept it, I as one of the signatories will be relieved of all responsibility for myself, but I am bound to recommend it over my signature and of course we are bound to take action---whatever action was implied by our signing the document. The Dáil is perfectly free to accept or reject, we are only bound to recommend it to the Dáil for acceptance. The Articles of Agreement are put forward on our recommendation. That ought to be quite clear here, and ought to be equally clear to the public of this country, and the other country, the representatives of which have their signatures on the document also. ‘
De Valera replied: ‘…. Therefore it is agreed that this Treaty is simply an agreement and that it is not binding until the Dáil ratifies it. That is what we are concerned with. Now as to the differences that have arisen. I did not read out that first document because I was informed that it had not been accepted, in other words it had not been presented. It was given to safeguard the plenipotentiaries going over in case they should be asked by one Government from another:`Where is your authority to negotiate a Treaty with us?' I am very glad to know that the Prime Minister has accepted that document from the Irish Republic.
Now we all can go back to meetings of the Dáil. At these meetings I made our position perfectly clear, that the plenipotentiaries were to have the fullest freedom possible. It would be ridiculous to send them over if we were all the time to interfere with them from Dublin. There was an understanding that certain things would be done so that we in Dublin would be in a position to help in so far as we could help to come to an agreement or explain disagreements. The most important paragraph in these instructions, and its importance will at once appeal to every reasonable person, was paragraph 3, which laid down that a complete draft of the Treaty should be submitted to Dublin and a reply awaited.
That is a document every line of which was going to govern the relations of two countries for perhaps centuries, and it was important that that document should not be hurriedly signed and that there should be a certain delay. In fact one of the reasons I did not want to be a member of the delegation was that the delegation should be provided against hasty action. I do not mean to say that if we had signed finally the document it would have mattered. There would have probably been a division..… all sorts of misunderstandings have been created in the minds of the people about it. I want to get rid of that as a disturbing factor in your minds when making out the merits, or not, of the agreement; we hold one view, the delegates another.’
M.Hayes (National Univeristy) attempted to bring the debate back to the issue of whether it should be private or public with the debate on Treaty ratification discussed in public. Despite the Speakers suggestion that the Dail go into private session, a series of exchanges developed between de Valera, Collins and other TD’s on whether the plenipotentiaries credentials had been presented and/or accepted by the British and with it the aceptance of the delgation to negotiate a treaty or not.
Dr McCartan (Leix & Offaly ) attempted to sumarise the difficulty: ‘The delegates had full powers to conclude a Treaty, and that treaty has to be submitted to the Dáil as it has to be submitted to the British Legislature. The Delegates had power to conclude a Treaty. They had plenary powers and it is for us now to accept or reject what they have agreed to.
Arthur Griffith commented that ‘ these credentials were carried from President de Valera. We were instructed if the British Delegates asked for credentials to present them’ To which Austin Stack ( Home Affairs ) stated they had not been presented.
Arthur Griffith :’ I believe Mr. Lloyd George saw the document. They were not presented or accepted. The point President de Valera wants to know about is as to whether we considered that we had full power to make a treaty to bind the nation without the Dáil being consulted. Now the British Ministers did not sign the Treaty to bind their nation. They had to go to their Parliament and we to ours for ratification’
Finally the motion for debate on the Treaty to be held in private but with public introduction and discussion on the matter to be held was passed. Further debate followed on pedantic points of order and times for the Dail Eireann sessions, before closing.
Macardle summed up the future divisions that were forming:
‘Every circumstance that could cloud vision and distort judgement was present. Ancestral passions, reaction and exhaustion, hatred of England, dread of responsibility, respect for the patriot dead, loathing of war, fear of the taunt of ‘traitor’, fear of yielding to that fear, personal loyalties, all were at work and all were expressing themselves in the form of reasoned advocacy for this or that clause. Party spirit...split the Dail into two factions, violently antagonistic to each other..’
Macardle. ‘The Irish Republic’. Irish Press 1957. p617-618
The marquess Curzon of Kedleston, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in his speech to the House of Lords on the Anglo-Irish Treaty: ‘ There had not been a foreign minister in this country during the last 50 years who has not felt, and indeed often stated, that the strength of England was diminished, and her moral influence jeopardised, by the unsolved position of the Irish Question. This was felt…most of all in the United States…where the understanding which we so warmly desire has not only been rendered difficult, but almost impossible by the existence of the 'Irish Question'….Ireland remains within the circle of the British Empire …her people are our fellow subjects in the fullest sense of the term.’
Lady Hazel Lavery wrote to Collins, commenting on the shooting of six members of the Crown forces on December 11th:
‘[Winston] is much concerned over the two shootings…and he asked me if I would please write to you and say how difficult the incident has made matters here…..all our thoughts and prayers are with you Michael. I purchased a most expensive and gigantic candle on Sunday at early Mass and burnt it for your victory’
Sinead McCoole ‘Hazel – A Life of Lady Lavery 1880-1935’. Lilliput Press, Dublin 1996. P83
As for letters from Collins to Lady Lavery, most of the collection was either destroyed by Hazel herself before 1935 or by her daughter Alice after her mother’s death. Sinead McCoole discovered that a number of them passed into the possession of Kitty Kiernan and date from December 1921, although Leon O’Broin believed that these had been sent selectively to Kiernan to offset rumours of a liason between Hazel and Collins. Shane Leslie did see the entire collection some time before it was destroyed and recalled ‘Collins’s own letters to Hazel were of a type – full of half educated half romantic stuff but ending up with vital messages to the English Cabinet which were shown to Winston, Londonderry and others’.
Sinead McCoole ‘Hazel – A Life of Lady Lavery 1880-1935’. Lilliput Press, Dublin 1996. P84
Constable Thomas Enright (31) was killed while off duty near Kilmallock, Co. Limerick.
Opening statements by President de Valera revolved around the apointment of the plenipotentiaries and their terms of reference, responsibility to report back to the Cabinet and ‘ If there was a definite difference of opinion, it was the plenipotentiaries had the responsibility of making up their own minds and deciding on it. We had ourselves the right of refusing to agree with them, if we thought that was right. It was also obvious that the Cabinet and the plenipotentiaries should keep in the closest possible touch. We did that. We were in agreement up to a certain point. A definite question had then to be decided and we did not agree.’ And stated that the negotiating team had not followed their instructions, a charge flatly denied by Arthur Griffith.
Michael Collins specified that the ‘final document which was agreed on by a united Cabinet, should be put side by side with the final document which the Delegation of Plenipotentiaries did not sign as a treaty, but did sign on the understanding that each signatory would recommend it to the Dáil for acceptance’
This was followed by Parliamentary argument as to should the Dail meet publicly or privately. D. Ceannt (Cork) commenting that all future sessions be held in public as ‘ I am thoroughly dissatisfied with the information we are getting here from time to time.’ De Valera stating ‘ This question of finding out how differences of opinion arose is the only question that cannot be probed except in private, whereas the big question is a matter for the whole nation obviously and it should be held in public.’
Sean McEntee (Monaghan) disagreed with de Valera: ‘ There are some of us to-day who may be called upon later to justify the positions they are taking before the country. Every factor that determines the position ought to be made plain to the public….we were not bound to ratify the treaty which the delegates proposed to us…. there ought to be no private session of the Dáil except upon one subject---that which relates to our military, financial or other resources. Remember the Treaty is not yet ratified. Anything like that which would give information to the enemy or would be helpful to them in the subversion of Irish liberties should be private’
Sean McGarry with a touch of humour agreed with McEntee ‘ I wish this session of the Dáil could be held on the Curragh, so that every man, woman and child in Ireland could hear us.’
Sean Etchingham (Wexford) agreed that the proceedings be held publicly and highlighted that ‘ The country has been kept in the dark and the people are saying so. The liberty and interests of Ireland are the concern of every man and woman and boy and girl, and they should be as conversant with it as any of us. Let us have all the public discussion we can….. I believe we are all here in the interests of Ireland.’
Michael Collins, while stating he was not in favour of a private session, pushed forward the debate protesting that the original credentials document should have been read first and requested permission to read it.
De Valera responded ‘ Was that ever presented? It was given in order to get the British Government to recognise the Irish Republic. Was that document giving the credentials of the accredited representatives from the Irish Government to the British Government presented to, or accepted by, the British delegates? Was that taken by the British delegates or accepted by them?’
Arthur Griffith ( Minister for Foreign Affairs ) stated they had no instructions to present it.
After some initial protests from de Valera, Michael Collins read the credientials document dated October 7th and with the Dail Eireann seal affixed:
"In virtue of the authority vested in me by Dáil Eireann, I hereby appoint Arthur Griffith, T.D., Minister for Foreign Affairs, Chairman; Michael Collins, T.D., Minister for Finance; Robert C. Barton, T.D., Minister for Economic Affairs; Edmund J. Duggan, T.D.; and George Gavan Duffy, T.D. as envoys plenipotentiaries from the elected Government of the Republic of Ireland to negotiate and conclude on behalf of Ireland, with the representatives of his Britannic Majesty George V. a treaty or treaties of settlement, association and accommodation between Ireland and the community of nations, known as the British Commonwealth. In witness hereof I hereunder subscribe my name as President.
Signed EAMON DE VALERA
‘ … I do not object to the second document being read, but the prior document should have been read first and we have agreed, those of us who differ---those of us who take one stand---to make no statement which would in any way prejudge the issue until this meeting of Dáil Eireann. Publicly and privately we did not prejudge the issue; we even refrained from speaking to members of the Dáil. I have not said a hard word about anybody. I know I have been called a traitor. [Cries of `no, no']. … If I am a traitor, let the Irish people decide it or not, and if there are men who act towards me as a traitor I am prepared to meet them anywhere, any time, now as in the past. For that reason I do not want the issue prejudged. I am in favour of a public session here now… <SMALL></SMALL>I agree with what the President said that the honour of Ireland was not involved in accepting this document. Ireland is fully free to accept or reject. Many a parliament of a country has refused to accept decisions of plenipotentiaries even if these decisions might be considered legally and morally more binding than the present decisions. I can only make plain again that the document is agreed to by the signatories and recommended to the Dáil for acceptance. If the Dáil does not accept it, I as one of the signatories will be relieved of all responsibility for myself, but I am bound to recommend it over my signature and of course we are bound to take action---whatever action was implied by our signing the document. The Dáil is perfectly free to accept or reject, we are only bound to recommend it to the Dáil for acceptance. The Articles of Agreement are put forward on our recommendation. That ought to be quite clear here, and ought to be equally clear to the public of this country, and the other country, the representatives of which have their signatures on the document also. ‘
De Valera replied: ‘…. Therefore it is agreed that this Treaty is simply an agreement and that it is not binding until the Dáil ratifies it. That is what we are concerned with. Now as to the differences that have arisen. I did not read out that first document because I was informed that it had not been accepted, in other words it had not been presented. It was given to safeguard the plenipotentiaries going over in case they should be asked by one Government from another:`Where is your authority to negotiate a Treaty with us?' I am very glad to know that the Prime Minister has accepted that document from the Irish Republic.
Now we all can go back to meetings of the Dáil. At these meetings I made our position perfectly clear, that the plenipotentiaries were to have the fullest freedom possible. It would be ridiculous to send them over if we were all the time to interfere with them from Dublin. There was an understanding that certain things would be done so that we in Dublin would be in a position to help in so far as we could help to come to an agreement or explain disagreements. The most important paragraph in these instructions, and its importance will at once appeal to every reasonable person, was paragraph 3, which laid down that a complete draft of the Treaty should be submitted to Dublin and a reply awaited.
That is a document every line of which was going to govern the relations of two countries for perhaps centuries, and it was important that that document should not be hurriedly signed and that there should be a certain delay. In fact one of the reasons I did not want to be a member of the delegation was that the delegation should be provided against hasty action. I do not mean to say that if we had signed finally the document it would have mattered. There would have probably been a division..… all sorts of misunderstandings have been created in the minds of the people about it. I want to get rid of that as a disturbing factor in your minds when making out the merits, or not, of the agreement; we hold one view, the delegates another.’
M.Hayes (National Univeristy) attempted to bring the debate back to the issue of whether it should be private or public with the debate on Treaty ratification discussed in public. Despite the Speakers suggestion that the Dail go into private session, a series of exchanges developed between de Valera, Collins and other TD’s on whether the plenipotentiaries credentials had been presented and/or accepted by the British and with it the aceptance of the delgation to negotiate a treaty or not.
Dr McCartan (Leix & Offaly ) attempted to sumarise the difficulty: ‘The delegates had full powers to conclude a Treaty, and that treaty has to be submitted to the Dáil as it has to be submitted to the British Legislature. The Delegates had power to conclude a Treaty. They had plenary powers and it is for us now to accept or reject what they have agreed to.
Arthur Griffith commented that ‘ these credentials were carried from President de Valera. We were instructed if the British Delegates asked for credentials to present them’ To which Austin Stack ( Home Affairs ) stated they had not been presented.
Arthur Griffith :’ I believe Mr. Lloyd George saw the document. They were not presented or accepted. The point President de Valera wants to know about is as to whether we considered that we had full power to make a treaty to bind the nation without the Dáil being consulted. Now the British Ministers did not sign the Treaty to bind their nation. They had to go to their Parliament and we to ours for ratification’
Finally the motion for debate on the Treaty to be held in private but with public introduction and discussion on the matter to be held was passed. Further debate followed on pedantic points of order and times for the Dail Eireann sessions, before closing.
Macardle summed up the future divisions that were forming:
‘Every circumstance that could cloud vision and distort judgement was present. Ancestral passions, reaction and exhaustion, hatred of England, dread of responsibility, respect for the patriot dead, loathing of war, fear of the taunt of ‘traitor’, fear of yielding to that fear, personal loyalties, all were at work and all were expressing themselves in the form of reasoned advocacy for this or that clause. Party spirit...split the Dail into two factions, violently antagonistic to each other..’
Macardle. ‘The Irish Republic’. Irish Press 1957. p617-618
The marquess Curzon of Kedleston, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in his speech to the House of Lords on the Anglo-Irish Treaty: ‘ There had not been a foreign minister in this country during the last 50 years who has not felt, and indeed often stated, that the strength of England was diminished, and her moral influence jeopardised, by the unsolved position of the Irish Question. This was felt…most of all in the United States…where the understanding which we so warmly desire has not only been rendered difficult, but almost impossible by the existence of the 'Irish Question'….Ireland remains within the circle of the British Empire …her people are our fellow subjects in the fullest sense of the term.’
Lady Hazel Lavery wrote to Collins, commenting on the shooting of six members of the Crown forces on December 11th:
‘[Winston] is much concerned over the two shootings…and he asked me if I would please write to you and say how difficult the incident has made matters here…..all our thoughts and prayers are with you Michael. I purchased a most expensive and gigantic candle on Sunday at early Mass and burnt it for your victory’
Sinead McCoole ‘Hazel – A Life of Lady Lavery 1880-1935’. Lilliput Press, Dublin 1996. P83
As for letters from Collins to Lady Lavery, most of the collection was either destroyed by Hazel herself before 1935 or by her daughter Alice after her mother’s death. Sinead McCoole discovered that a number of them passed into the possession of Kitty Kiernan and date from December 1921, although Leon O’Broin believed that these had been sent selectively to Kiernan to offset rumours of a liason between Hazel and Collins. Shane Leslie did see the entire collection some time before it was destroyed and recalled ‘Collins’s own letters to Hazel were of a type – full of half educated half romantic stuff but ending up with vital messages to the English Cabinet which were shown to Winston, Londonderry and others’.
Sinead McCoole ‘Hazel – A Life of Lady Lavery 1880-1935’. Lilliput Press, Dublin 1996. P84
Constable Thomas Enright (31) was killed while off duty near Kilmallock, Co. Limerick.
15
Dail Eireann – Treaty Debates. Session 2
At a closed session of the Dail, De Valera produced an alternative wording to the Treaty proposals. Collins named them ‘Document No. 2’ as the Treaty was nominally ‘Document No.1’ though rarely reffered to as such. Document No 2 was very similar to the Treaty and while an obvious division was forming into those pro and anti Treaty, de Valera’s alternative forced a separate split within the anti-Treaty ranks, forcing those against compromise of any kind (Mellowes, Robinson & Etchingham) onto higher ground and which was firmly rejected by those who had signed the agreement in London. The proposal was withdrawn.
Dail Eireann – Treaty Debates. Session 2
At a closed session of the Dail, De Valera produced an alternative wording to the Treaty proposals. Collins named them ‘Document No. 2’ as the Treaty was nominally ‘Document No.1’ though rarely reffered to as such. Document No 2 was very similar to the Treaty and while an obvious division was forming into those pro and anti Treaty, de Valera’s alternative forced a separate split within the anti-Treaty ranks, forcing those against compromise of any kind (Mellowes, Robinson & Etchingham) onto higher ground and which was firmly rejected by those who had signed the agreement in London. The proposal was withdrawn.
In the House of Commons, Winston Churchill admitted that a military re-conquest of Ireland would have been a costly campaign. Northern Unionists felt they had been betrayed owing to the potential loss of Fermanagh and Tyrone to the Irish Free State under the terms of the Boundary Commission. Other more concerned that some British dominions would now follow suit and fight for independence.
Fermanagh County Council pledged allegiance to Dáil Éireann. After the meeting the RIC took over the council chamber
Meanwhile in the US, Mrs Muriel MacSwiney, widow of Terence MacSwiney was on a speaking tour with Diarmuid organising engagements such as in this letter:
Friends of Irish Freedom National Headquarters, 280 Broadway, New York City.
December 15, 1920
Mrs Muriel McSwiney
Hotel St Regis
New York City
A Chara
We have just received a telegram from Rev. F.X.McCabe, Kansas City, Mo., President of the Missouri State Council F.O.I.F. advising us that the State Convention held last Sunday extended an invitation to you to be their guest in Kansas City, Mo., at any time you could arrange to visit that city.
Trusting that your arrangements will permit acceptance of this invitation.
Is Mise le meas more,
Diarmuid Lynch
National Secretary
Lynch Family Archives.
16
The House of Commons ratified the Irish Treaty by 343, (401 supporting, 58 opposing) the House of Lords by 119 (166 supporting and 47 opposing)
Dail Eireann – Treaty Debates. Session 3
Meanwhile in Dublin, The Treaty debates in Dail Eireann continued.
The House of Commons ratified the Irish Treaty by 343, (401 supporting, 58 opposing) the House of Lords by 119 (166 supporting and 47 opposing)
Dail Eireann – Treaty Debates. Session 3
Meanwhile in Dublin, The Treaty debates in Dail Eireann continued.
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Sir Waren Fisher in a letter to Mark Sturgis, Dublin Castle on the Treaty:’better late than never, but I cant get out of mind the unnecessary number of graves’
Michael Hopkinson ’The Irish War of Independence’ Gill & MacMillan, Dublin 2002. p177
In Belfast, four people were shot dead. Meanwhile, six IRA volunteers were captured in an attempted raid at Balmoral military base, also in Belfast
Dail Eireann – Treaty Debates. Session 4
The Treaty debates continued in Dail Eireann.
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Public Session Dail Eireann – Treaty Debates. Session 5.
The public session of Dail Eireann opened with the Speaker, Dr. Eoin MacNeill taking the chair at 11.25am, followed by roll call. After some discussion on the alternative Treaty wording proposed by de Valera at the closed session of Dail Eireann, whether it would be made public or not, Arthur Griffith moved the debate forward....
In a letter to her sister, Kathleen Clarke commented on the events ‘ Great God, did I ever think I’d live to see it, to see men who were the bravest now fooled and blinded by a juggle of words into the belief that this treaty means a realisation of our highest ideals. If you heard the speeches in private, you'd be sick. Collins has mesmerised them all into thinking it’s the high road to everything we dreamed, and he had been fooled into believing it himself, and dev to a large extent is to blame, for one thing his lack of experience which I always feared, and another, his habit of trying to work things out alone in his own way taking no one entirely into his confience, and also trusting too much in the goodness of other people…I am to speak tomorrow, and my heart fails me at the thought. On Dev’s advice we are all restraining ourselves, but it is difficult. I’d just love to rip the duds off some of them…’
Kathleen Clarke ‘Revoloutionary Woman’ O’Brien Press 1991. P235.
Below: Friends of Irish Freedom National Executive meeting minutes, Monday 19 December, (context and transcription to follow)
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Dail Eireann – Treaty Debates. Session 6.
21
The two voices from The Irish Times 20 December 1921
Yesterday Mr Arthur Griffith and Mr Michael Collins invited Dáil ƒireann to ratify the Articles of Agreement between Great Britain and Ireland. Mr de Valera, Mr Austin Stack, and Mr Erskine Childers were the chief opponents of the Treaty; and we use the language of moderation when we say that the mass of the Irish people will read their speeches with mingled feelings of anger and despair. If they are to have their way, the hunt for the chimera of absolute independence is about to be renewed. It was always hopeless, but - if there are degrees of hopelessness - its renewal will be the most hopeless adventure for which a people ever sacrificed their peace and the blood of their young men.
Until Great Britain made her astonishingly generous offer to Ireland the Sinn Féin movement enjoyed a large measure of foreign sympathy - not as a Republican movement, but as a struggle for the just and reasonable rights of nationhood. All those rights are now Ireland's, to take or reject. None of the hostile arguments yesterday was able to discredit the Treaty as a real concession to this country of all, and more than all, for which her sons have striven through seven hundred years. Ireland is now a nation without any grievance that could induce any other nation to lift a finger or contribute a sixpence in her defence. The world applauds the British Empire's greatest act of Imperial magnanimity. It judges Britain to be wholly in the right, and will judge Ireland, if she rejects the Treaty, to be wholly in the wrong. Yet for the sake of an impossible idea - indeed, as it seems, for the sake of a mere quibble - Mr de Valera and his supporters are ready to drag Ireland down from the topmost pinnacle of hope fulfilled into the old slough of misery and despond ...
The goal of every member of Dáil Eireann is a united Ireland; but yesterday's discussions have not served the cause of a united Ireland. Some of the speeches will disappoint and alarm the loyalist minority in the South and West. They have accepted the Agreement as a final declaration of peace between Great Britain and Ireland. They were encouraged to put their fears and prejudices behind them by the hope that the Irish Free State would settle down to the task of making this country a peaceful and progressive partner in the community of the Empire. Are they to learn now that, even if the Agreement is ratified by a small majority, a section of Irishmen will refuse to be bound by it? They expect a constitutional Opposition in the Irish Free State, as in all free States; but are the first workings of our own infant State to be harried by the hostility of an unconstitutional Opposition? Is the dreary maxim, Plus a change, plus c'est la mme chose, to be true of the new Ireland with her Canadian status? Again, Ireland will not be Ireland without Ulster. Will Ulster's misgivings be abated by the menace of an un-appeased sentiment of hostility to the Imperial allegiance in an Ireland from which the last remnant of the Imperial forces will have been withdrawn? The Dáil must ratify the Agreement, but mere ratification will not suffice. The manner of its ratification must prove that Mr Griffith, not Mr de Valera, is the authentic spokesman of the Irish people.
A Churchill meorandum outlined the procedures which the British Government had in mind for the transfer of power:
‘Should the Dail ratify, the first step should be to get an Irish delegation, comprising of Mr. Griffith and Mr. Collins over here at the earliest moment. We should tlel them that we wish them tof orm a Provisional Government without delay. This government should be immediately responsible for the whole internal peace and order of Southern Ireland and would take executive control on the basis arranged. When the basis has been worked out, it will be for the Viceroy, after consultation with such leaders of parties and political personages as he thinks fit, to invite some gentlemen to form a Government…Griffith would then form his government, his ministers would sign the declaration prescribed in the Treaty, and take up their duties without delay’
Macardle. ‘The Irish Republic’. Irish Press 1957. P599
By the end of 1921, other British colonies, Egypt & India had studied the Irish situation in great detail.
Mark Sturgis commented on the Dail debates: ‘The debate in the Dail drags on. No personal prejudice can account for the view that the only speeches with anything in them are on the side of Ratification. Those against are purely ‘republican’ yet de Valera who leads that party has been shown over and over again to be ready to take less. ..I hear that the little knot of Commandants in uniform who sit together in the Dial on the side of Collins and Peace make a good show…Miss McSwiney wound up the days proceedings with a speech against ratification which lasted for two hours and forty minutes. It seems to have not only bore but really alarmed both sides at the prospect of such droning oratory carrying on far into the new year…’
The Last Days of Dublin Castle – The Diaries of Mark Sturgis. Irish Academic Press Dublin & Oregon 1999. p 226
Dail Eireann – Treaty Debates. Session 7.
22
Both Macardle and de Valera’s official biography make it clear that if a vote had been taken before the Christmas recess, the Treaty would have been defeated. But while popularly elected, the members of Dail Eireann were only able to gauge the mood of the public and constituents over the Christmas and New Year. The public were very much in favour of the Treaty, along with the Church, Press, Businness and as de Valera pointed out ‘the I.R.B was using its influence’. As for the I.R.B, it’s policy was one of ‘The stepping stone’ with the Treaty offering ‘freedom to achieve freedom’. One TD resigned his seat rather than obey his constituents and vote for the Treaty.
Griffith compounded difficulties by releasing both the draft and final version of the ‘Document No. 2’ to both the Irish Independent and Freeman’s Journal which were printed early in the New Year.
Macardle in an somewhat emotive and highly partisan comment on the Treaty helps highlight the depth of feeling amongst many of those against the Treaty when she wrote:
‘whose who strove to save the republic worked in diminishing hope’
‘the abandonment of the Republic and a false peace with England were equally intolerable – more unendurable than anything that the enemies of Ireland could inflict’
‘Upon all those who had shared one of the most intense loyalties, one of the most devoted and self-sacrificing efforts recorded in history, lay a weight of sorrow and desolation for the breaking of Sinn Fein’
Macardle. ‘The Irish Republic’ Irish Press. Dublin 1957. p.625-626.
In effect, the spirit of trust and confidence built up between Nationalists during the previous years was being whittled away with mututal distrust and suspicion on both sides.
Dail Eireann would reconvene on January 3, 1922 to continue to Treaty debates.
Dail Eireann – Treaty Debates. Session 8.
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24
Mahatma Gandhi granted full control of the Indian National Congress.
Mahatma Gandhi granted full control of the Indian National Congress.
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27
Constable Francis Hill (32) from Leitrim became the last RIC fatality in 1921. He was killed in a confrontation that killed another civilian and wounded another. The total number of police officers killed in 1921 was 241.
By the end of this year, RIC morale was extermely low with the continuining campaign of intimidation and boycotting. There was also increasing uncertainty as to the forces future within an emerging state.
Constable Francis Hill (32) from Leitrim became the last RIC fatality in 1921. He was killed in a confrontation that killed another civilian and wounded another. The total number of police officers killed in 1921 was 241.
By the end of this year, RIC morale was extermely low with the continuining campaign of intimidation and boycotting. There was also increasing uncertainty as to the forces future within an emerging state.
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29
30
31
The American Committee for Relief in Ireland funds distribution in Ireland continued to August 1922. Of this £804,000 went to personal relief, Belfast getting almost half of this amount ( and renaming a street ‘ACRI Street’ in honour of the organisation ), Cork received £170,000. The White Cross Reconstruction Commission provided 650 loans totalling £243,000, almost all of it for rebuilding houses.
Mitchell commenting on why symbolism was so important in the Treaty controversy explains ‘ because Sinn Fein, indeed Ireland, had been living in a world of political theatre. The whole trust of the political movement was based on activism, dramatic gestures, manifestos and posturing. All of this had been most effective. The British were being stripped of control of the country largely by these means. There had been a lot of concrete, practical administrative work done, but that was not nearly as exciting or popular. The glorification of the I.R.A, especially since the Truce reemphasised the attractions of gesture, drama and action…. Laim O’Briain described what they had lived through:
‘ A highly emotional experience, an escape from the hum-drum sordid existence, happy days in internment camps, exciting meetings , intimate committees, delightful Sunday evening causeries, writing articles and poetry, wonderful public funerals, praying outside prisons, patriotic concerts and the grand feeling of superiority, of being a hero’
Arthur Mitchell ‘Revoloutionary Government in Ireland – Dail Eireann 1919-22’ Gill & McMillan 1996. P328
"Don't let anybody fool you. We didn't shoot at women and children like the Tans but we were a bunch of killers. We got very good but there was hardly a week when some of us wasn't killed. Of the 22 men in the original column, only seven were alive at the Truce. We were never sure we'd be alive from one day to the next…. Don't let them pull the wool over your eyes. The war was the cold, the wet, standing to your neck in a drain or a whole night with bloodhounds on your trail, not knowing how you could manage the next step toward the end of a long march. That was the war: not when the band played and a bloody politician stepped forward to put flowers on the ground. "What did we get for it? A country, if you'd believe them. Some of our own johnnies in the top jobs instead of a few Englishmen. More than half of my own family work in England. What was it all for? The whole thing is a cod."
Moran in John McGahern ‘Amongst Women’ 1990 quoted in ‘1922 - The Birth of Irish Democracy ‘ by Professor Tom Garvin
George Bernard Shaw commenting on the Treaty ‘Any practical statesman will, under duress, swallow a dozen oaths to get his hand on the driving wheel.’
Conor O’Clery ‘Ireland in Quotes’ The O’Brien Press Dublin 1999 p.59
Mahatma Gandhi on the Treaty ’….it is the magnitude of the Irish sacrifice which has been the deciding factor’
Conor O’Clery ‘Ireland in Quotes’ The O’Brien Press Dublin 1999 p.60
Fr Patrick Gaynor, a Sinn Fein activist in Clare, commented years later on the war of independence and that passive resistance was not given an opportunity to work: ‘in truth, if a shot had never been fired we should have won the war to an equal extent. The progress might have been slow, but, on the other hand, if there were no fighting, there would have been no need for a Truce, no consequent lowering of morale, no need to enter negotiations with Britain on her terms, and – best of all – no Civil War’.
Michael Hopkinson ’The Irish War of Independence’ Gill & MacMillan, Dublin 2002. p42
Darrell Figgis argued that ‘the physical force side of the movement [ Sinn Fein ], led by the IRB, had hijacked the cause because moderates were in prison following the German Plot arrests at the time of the Dail’s formation’
Michael Hopkinson ’The Irish War of Independence’ Gill & MacMillan, Dublin 2002. p42
Hopkinson comments that prior to the Treaty ‘there had been more than twelve months of background machinations and that a wide range of opinion in Ireland and Britain had long seen the necessity for compromise. Nonetheless a failure of political will on the part of the British Government had prevented any realistic peace terms being offered openly. That period saw the most violent part of the war, which soured Anglo-Irish relations for many decades subsequently. Responsibility for this must be placed squarely on Lloyd George, who has not merited the favourable press he has generally received on the Irish Question…. Party political considerations must be taken into account when examining Lloyd George’s record on Ireland. Of the 484 MPs supporting the Coalition following the 1918 General Elections, 338 were Conservatives. Within the 22 strong Cabinet itself, seven were Liberals and all the rest were Tories…it is impossible to defend Lloyd George’s appointment of Lord French as Irish Supremo and his allowing Walter Long to dominate the Cabinet’s Irish policy for so long…the use of the Black and Tans was ultimately Lloyd George’s responsibility and ran counter to much of the advice he was receiving… a settlement was close in 1920 and Lloyd George was to blame for the collapse of the Clune initiative. Leading Tories were supportive of conciliation . notably Lord Curzon and Austen Chamberlain. Throughout the peace iniatives, the Prime Minister acted deviously and inconsistently. His failure to act on the advice offered by so many prolonged the war…Lloyd George had little sympathy for the Irish and, apart from considerations of his own political advantage, was chiefly motivated by the implications the question had for international and especially American relations…’
The total casualties in the War of Independence were around 1,400 of which 624 were members of the British security services and 752 were IRA and civilians. The official executions by the British were 14. The results of the war were a degree of independence and national freedom mixed with a bitter reality. Large elements of Irish society were excluded from politics, an internecine conflict was looming and Lloyd George’s short term fix of establishing partition before attempting settlement with the south was to have dire, long term consequences.
Hits of 1921: ‘The fishermen of England’, ‘Three o’clock in the morning’ and ‘Kitten on the keys’.
International Disarmament then as now, held hope for the future. Here's how Alfred Fruch in the New York World interpreted the future:
The American Committee for Relief in Ireland funds distribution in Ireland continued to August 1922. Of this £804,000 went to personal relief, Belfast getting almost half of this amount ( and renaming a street ‘ACRI Street’ in honour of the organisation ), Cork received £170,000. The White Cross Reconstruction Commission provided 650 loans totalling £243,000, almost all of it for rebuilding houses.
Mitchell commenting on why symbolism was so important in the Treaty controversy explains ‘ because Sinn Fein, indeed Ireland, had been living in a world of political theatre. The whole trust of the political movement was based on activism, dramatic gestures, manifestos and posturing. All of this had been most effective. The British were being stripped of control of the country largely by these means. There had been a lot of concrete, practical administrative work done, but that was not nearly as exciting or popular. The glorification of the I.R.A, especially since the Truce reemphasised the attractions of gesture, drama and action…. Laim O’Briain described what they had lived through:
‘ A highly emotional experience, an escape from the hum-drum sordid existence, happy days in internment camps, exciting meetings , intimate committees, delightful Sunday evening causeries, writing articles and poetry, wonderful public funerals, praying outside prisons, patriotic concerts and the grand feeling of superiority, of being a hero’
Arthur Mitchell ‘Revoloutionary Government in Ireland – Dail Eireann 1919-22’ Gill & McMillan 1996. P328
"Don't let anybody fool you. We didn't shoot at women and children like the Tans but we were a bunch of killers. We got very good but there was hardly a week when some of us wasn't killed. Of the 22 men in the original column, only seven were alive at the Truce. We were never sure we'd be alive from one day to the next…. Don't let them pull the wool over your eyes. The war was the cold, the wet, standing to your neck in a drain or a whole night with bloodhounds on your trail, not knowing how you could manage the next step toward the end of a long march. That was the war: not when the band played and a bloody politician stepped forward to put flowers on the ground. "What did we get for it? A country, if you'd believe them. Some of our own johnnies in the top jobs instead of a few Englishmen. More than half of my own family work in England. What was it all for? The whole thing is a cod."
Moran in John McGahern ‘Amongst Women’ 1990 quoted in ‘1922 - The Birth of Irish Democracy ‘ by Professor Tom Garvin
George Bernard Shaw commenting on the Treaty ‘Any practical statesman will, under duress, swallow a dozen oaths to get his hand on the driving wheel.’
Conor O’Clery ‘Ireland in Quotes’ The O’Brien Press Dublin 1999 p.59
Mahatma Gandhi on the Treaty ’….it is the magnitude of the Irish sacrifice which has been the deciding factor’
Conor O’Clery ‘Ireland in Quotes’ The O’Brien Press Dublin 1999 p.60
Fr Patrick Gaynor, a Sinn Fein activist in Clare, commented years later on the war of independence and that passive resistance was not given an opportunity to work: ‘in truth, if a shot had never been fired we should have won the war to an equal extent. The progress might have been slow, but, on the other hand, if there were no fighting, there would have been no need for a Truce, no consequent lowering of morale, no need to enter negotiations with Britain on her terms, and – best of all – no Civil War’.
Michael Hopkinson ’The Irish War of Independence’ Gill & MacMillan, Dublin 2002. p42
Darrell Figgis argued that ‘the physical force side of the movement [ Sinn Fein ], led by the IRB, had hijacked the cause because moderates were in prison following the German Plot arrests at the time of the Dail’s formation’
Michael Hopkinson ’The Irish War of Independence’ Gill & MacMillan, Dublin 2002. p42
Hopkinson comments that prior to the Treaty ‘there had been more than twelve months of background machinations and that a wide range of opinion in Ireland and Britain had long seen the necessity for compromise. Nonetheless a failure of political will on the part of the British Government had prevented any realistic peace terms being offered openly. That period saw the most violent part of the war, which soured Anglo-Irish relations for many decades subsequently. Responsibility for this must be placed squarely on Lloyd George, who has not merited the favourable press he has generally received on the Irish Question…. Party political considerations must be taken into account when examining Lloyd George’s record on Ireland. Of the 484 MPs supporting the Coalition following the 1918 General Elections, 338 were Conservatives. Within the 22 strong Cabinet itself, seven were Liberals and all the rest were Tories…it is impossible to defend Lloyd George’s appointment of Lord French as Irish Supremo and his allowing Walter Long to dominate the Cabinet’s Irish policy for so long…the use of the Black and Tans was ultimately Lloyd George’s responsibility and ran counter to much of the advice he was receiving… a settlement was close in 1920 and Lloyd George was to blame for the collapse of the Clune initiative. Leading Tories were supportive of conciliation . notably Lord Curzon and Austen Chamberlain. Throughout the peace iniatives, the Prime Minister acted deviously and inconsistently. His failure to act on the advice offered by so many prolonged the war…Lloyd George had little sympathy for the Irish and, apart from considerations of his own political advantage, was chiefly motivated by the implications the question had for international and especially American relations…’
The total casualties in the War of Independence were around 1,400 of which 624 were members of the British security services and 752 were IRA and civilians. The official executions by the British were 14. The results of the war were a degree of independence and national freedom mixed with a bitter reality. Large elements of Irish society were excluded from politics, an internecine conflict was looming and Lloyd George’s short term fix of establishing partition before attempting settlement with the south was to have dire, long term consequences.
Hits of 1921: ‘The fishermen of England’, ‘Three o’clock in the morning’ and ‘Kitten on the keys’.
International Disarmament then as now, held hope for the future. Here's how Alfred Fruch in the New York World interpreted the future:
Last word for 1921 needs to go to Mark Sturgis, who on December 31st wrote:
‘so ends 1921. The Dail will, I hear debate for three days and have the division on Thursday – we have helped in the tragedy; perhaps now we can soon sit and watch the farce.’
The Last Days of Dublin Castle – The Diaries of Mark Sturgis. Irish Academic Press Dublin & Oregon 1999. p 226